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Assutava Sutta 1

The Discourse on the Uninstructed 1 | S 12.61/2:94 f
Theme: Impermanence of the mind, dependent arising and nibbida
Translated & annotated by Piya Tan ©2006

1 Sutta structure

There are two Assutava Suttas¹ (S 12.61+62), and both deal with revulsion towards the body and dependent arising. The two Suttas are identical up to §7, that is, just before the similes of the monkey and of night and day. Then the two Suttas diverge: although both Suttas speak of dependent arising, the first Assutava Sutta treats it by way of the traditional formula, while the second Assutava Sutta more specifically presents the dependent arising and dependent ending of feelings.

The Commentary gives a helpful explanation of the sequence of the discourse. First, the monks are excessively obsessed with physical form; as such, the Buddha speaks as if it were improper to grasp form because its growth and decay are apparent, but not improper to take the body as self [§§2-5].

Then, in the passage beginning with “It would be better...to take this body as the self” [§6], the Buddha speaks as if it were proper to grasp the body but improper to grasp the mind because it is ever changing [§§7-8].

In the dependent arising passages [§§9-11], the Buddha speaks for the purpose of removing their obsession with both body and mind. (SA 2:98 f)

2 Citta, mano and viññāna

2.1 In the Assutava Sutta 1, the Buddha speaks of “‘mind’ or ‘thought [mentation],’ or ‘consciousness’” (cittam iti pi mano iti pi viññāṇām iti pi) [§4] as if they are synonyms.² The Sarnīutta Commentary, in fact, says that all these are here names for the mind-base (manāyatana) (SA 2:98). Where the general sense of “mind” is intended (as here in the Assutavā Sutta 1), we see that the three terms are used interchangeably in the Suttas.³ However, although these three terms have the same meaning, as noted by Bodhi,

in the Nikāyas they are generally used in distinct contexts. As a rough generalization, viññāṇa signifies the particularizing awareness through which a sense faculty (as in the standard sixfold division of viññāṇa into eye-consciousness, etc) as well as the underlying stream of consciousness, which sustains personal continuity through a single life and thread together successive lives (emphasized at S 12.38-40).⁴ Mano serves as the third door of action (along with body and speech) and as the sixth internal sense base (along with the five physical sense bases); as the mind base it coordinates the data of the other five senses and also cognizes mental phenomena (dharmamā), its own special class of objects. Citta signifies mind as the centre of personal experience, as the subject of thought, volition and emotion. It is the citta that needs to be understood, trained, and liberated. (S:B 769 n154)⁵

2.2 Bodhi uses “mentality” for mano.⁶ However, here I am influenced by the Buddhist Dictionary definition of citta, where adhicitta = “higher mentality.” Moreover, as Bodhi himself has noted: “Mano serves as the third door of action (along with body and speech)⁷ and as the sixth internal sense base (along

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² Cf Brahma,jāla S (D 1): Yaṁ...idam vuccati cittan ti vā mano ti vā viññāṇan ti vā (D 1.49/1:21,21).
³ Eg D 1:21; S 2:94 f
⁴ On the 2 kinds of consciousnesses, see Cetanā S 1-3 (S 12.38-40/2:65-67) = SD 7.6a+b+6c.
⁵ For a detailed discussion, see Hamilton 1996a: ch 5 & also Viññāṇa = SD 17.8a(12).
⁶ S:B 595 & 769 n154.
⁷ Hence, we could speak of the karmic triad of “body, speech and mind,” where “mind” is mano.

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with the five physical sense bases); as the mind-base it coordinates the data of the other five senses and also cognizes mental phenomena (dhammā), its own special class of objects.”

2.3 As such, “mind” or “mentation” (a function) are clearly better translations of mano than “mentality” (more of a state). This is just a bit of pedantry probably limited to this passage. Furthermore, the well known word “thought” translates citta here. Elsewhere, it is best (as Bodhi himself admits) to translate both citta and mano as “mind,” as most translators now do, too. The point is to be aware of the proper context; and in many cases these terms overlap.

2.4 Here are the rules of thumb for the translations of citta, mano, and viññāṇa, by using their verbs as mnemonics. The verb for citta is cinteti or, less commonly, ceteti, “he thinks or intends”;9 hence, citta is best translated as “thought.” Mano, perhaps due to its being natural or abstract mental process seems to have no verb. There are two close verbs—maneti and manteti—which are not directly related to mano but function as derived forms. Māneti, a causative of vāman, “to think,” means “to honour, revere, think highly (of).”10 Manteti, amongst others, means “to consider, think over.”11 As such, we are left, as it were, with “mind” as the most suitable translation here. Viññāṇa is clearly a psychological term, as indicated by its verb, vijānati, “to cognize, have discriminative knowledge, be aware of, ascertain,” and technically describes the working of consciousness. However, in the early suttas, it often simply means “to know.”12

3 The mind always wants an object

The Assutava Sutta 1 contains two simple but important similes: that of the monkey in the forest and of night and day:

Just as a monkey, bhikshus, roaming through the forest and mountain-side, takes hold of one branch, letting that go, then grabs another,13 even so, bhikshus, that which is called ‘mind,’ or ‘thought,’ or ‘consciousness,’ arises as one and ceases as another, like night and day. [§8]

The monkey here represents the mind, the branches mind-objects, and the grasping attention.

This monkey simile is probably one of the sources for the popular saying that the mind is often “as restless as a monkey,” which may well be true. However, as Bodhi reminds us, “It should be noted that neither the sutta nor the commentary interprets the monkey simile here as saying that the untrained mind is as restless as a monkey; the point, rather, is that the mind is always dependent on an object.” (S:B 771 n157).14

The figurative expression, “like night and day,”15 points to the fact that the untrained mind tends to grasp at thought after d5.3 different another, and so mentally proliferates with countless thoughts.16 As the

8 S:B 769 n154.
9 Sn 834; Pv 2.9.7; S 12.38/2:65.15 as ceteti pakappeti anuseti, “he intends, plans, tends to.” It has many forms and derivations; see PED: cinteti; DP: ceteti.
10 D 16.5.3.b/2:138,20 māneti, “he honours” in māneti pūjeti apacayati paramāya pūjāya, “he honours (the Tathagata), respects him, reveres him, worships him with the supreme worship”; PVa 54,29 aor mānesuṁ, “he held in high esteem,” in sakkarīṇsu garu,kariṇsu ~ pūjesuṁ, “honoured, show respect, held in high esteem, venerated.
11 A 3.67/1:199,15 as pot mantaye “should discuss, seek counsel”; Miln 91,24 ind manteti, “he consults, deliberates”; Miln 91,12 as grd mantayītiba, “to be discussed (with)”; Miln 91,22 inf mantayītu, kāma, “desirous to consult.”
12 Sn 93 f, 763; Dh 64, 65; Nm 442. Further see SID: citta mano viññāṇa.
13 Comy (SA 2:100) explains the monkey simile in detail by way of presenting the post-Buddha theory of moments, which explains the nature of mind and matter as time-bound, ie as momentary events. On the momentariness of the mind, see “The conscious process” = SD 17.8b(5) & Nimitta & anuvyañjana = SD 19.14. On the momentariness of matter, see Matter and moments = SD 17.2b.
14 However, cf Tha 1111c—“the trembling mind is like a monkey”—where the simile clearly applies to a distracted mind: see Tāla,puṭa Tha (Tha 1111c) = SD 20.9.
15 Rattiyā ca divasassa ca, lit “in the night and in the day,” a genitive in the locative sense, ie, “during the night and during the day.”
Sutta puts it, the mind “arises as one and ceases as another.” The Commentary interprets this almost literally, saying that the meaning here is that the mind that arises and ceases during the day is other than the mind that arises and ceases during the night. Be that as it may, the statement, however, should not be taken to mean that one thing arises and something different ceases. As the Commentary further notes: “Night and day” alludes to continuity, which is a continuity of lesser duration than that of the body (SA 2:99). Here the imagery should not be overstretched, for the meaning here is simply that the thought-moments are discrete.

4 The three graspings

The Assutavā Sutta I says that the uninstructed worldling may be able to regard the body with disgust as its change and decay are clearly apparent, but not so in the case of the mind [§5]. He clings to the mind, thinking, “This is mine (etam mama); this I am (eso’ham asmi); this is my self (eso me attā).” [§5] The Saṁyutta Commentary calls them the three graspings (gāha) and explains them in terms of craving, conceit and views.

The self is held to (ajjhositā) by being swallowed up by craving; it is owned (mamāyita) by being owned by craving; and it is grasped (parāmaṭṭha) by being grasped through views.

“This is mine” (etam mama) is the grasp of craving (taṇhā,gāha);
“This I am” (eso’ham asmi) is the grasp of conceit (māna,gāha); and
“This is my self” (eso me attā) is the grasp of views (diṭṭhi,gāha).

“The grasp of craving” here includes the 108 thoughts of craving, as stated in the (Vicarita) Taṇhā Sutta (A 4.199), thus:

Thus are the eighteen thought-courses rooted in craving, dependent on what is internal, and the eighteen thought-courses rooted in craving, dependent on what is external.

These are called the thirty-six thought-courses rooted in craving.

Thus, monks, with the thirty-six thought-courses regarding the past, thirty-six thought-courses rooted in craving regarding the future, and thirty-six thought-courses rooted in craving regarding the present, there are the one hundred and eight thought-courses rooted in craving.

This, monks, is the sticky net that traps, cast wide into the river; by which this world is overspread and covered up like touseld thread of muñja [tall reed] and balbaja [coarse grass], tangled into knots; that does not go beyond the evil destination, the lower realm, the place of misery, or samsara. (A 4.199.4-6/2:212,31-213,2) = S 16.2

Further, the Suttas often mention how an uninstructed ordinary person tends to regard the five aggregates (form, feeling, perception, mental formations, consciousness) in terms of the four kinds of self-identity view (sakkāya,diṭṭhi), thus:

(1) the aggregate as the self, or
(2) the self as possessing (the aggregate), or
(3) the aggregate as in the self, or
(4) the self as in (the aggregate).

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16 See Nimitta & anuvyañjana = SD 19.14.
17 Aññadeva uppajjati, aññaṁ nirujjhati.
19 These 18 thoughts comprise all the 1st person grammatical moods possible over the three periods of time in a reflexive way.
20 These 18 thoughts similarly comprise all the 1st person grammatical moods possible over the three periods of time in reference to another (ie an external state).
21 See Bhaddeka,ratta S (M 131) = SD 8.9 (4).
When this is applied to the five aggregates in turn, we have the **20 wrong views** of the uninstructed worldling. Both the Suttas and the Abhidhamma define self-identity view as comprising these 20 wrong views.

The noble disciple, on the other hand, simply reflects on the aggregates, thus: “This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self” (S 3:18 f; cf 3:16).

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The Discourse on the Uninstructed

S 12.61/2:94 f

Thus have I heard.

We tend to “own” our minds

At one time the Blessed One was staying in Anātha,piṇḍika’s Park in Jeta’s Grove near Sāvatthī.

“Bhikshus, the uninstructed worldling might be revulsed towards this body made of the four great elements, or he might be dispassionate towards it, or he might be freed from it.

Therefore, the uninstructed worldling might be revulsed towards this body made of the four great elements, or he might be dispassionate towards it, or he might be freed from it.

But, bhikshus, as regards to what is called ‘mind’ or ‘thought [mentation],’ or ‘consciousness,’—the uninstructed worldling is unable to be revulsed towards it, unable to be dispassionate towards it, unable to be freed from it.

What is the reason for this?

Because, bhikshus, for a long time, it has been held, cherished, and grasped by him, thus:

“This is mine; this I am; this is my self.”

Therefore, the uninstructed worldling is unable to be revulsed towards it, unable to be dispassionate towards it, unable to be freed from it.

The nature of the mind

It would be better, bhikshus, for the uninstructed worldling to take this body, made of the four great elements—rather than the mind—as the self.

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22 M 131.4/3:188, M 138.20/3:227 f; S 22.1/3:3, S 22.7/16, S 22.81/96.
23 M 44.7-8/1:300, M 109.10/3:17 f; S 22.82/3:102; Dhs 182. See Gethin 1985:44 f. On views, conceit and craving, see foll essays: “I”: the nature of identity = SD 19.1, “Me”: the nature of conceit = SD 19.2a, & “Mine”: the nature of craving = SD 19.3.
24 Assutava puthujjana. The uninstructed worldling is one who lacks learning, questioning and discerning of the aggregates of existence. He may either be a crowd-follower or a highly opinionated individual guided by self-identity. One who is willing and able to seek and understanding Dharma is called “instructed worldling” (sutava puthujjana) [§9]. the On puthujjana, etc, see “I”: The Nature of Identity = SD 19.1(7.1).
25 Ācayo pi apacayo pi, lit “building up [accumulating] and lessening.”
26 The four great elements (mahā,bhūta): see Rūpa = SD 17.2a.
27 Citta, and the foll 2, mano and viññāna are all synonyms here. See Intro (2).
28 Mano, see prec n.
29 On these 3 terms, see Viññāna = SD 17.8(12).
30 These are the 3 grasping (gāha): see Intro (4).
7a What is the reason for this?
Because this body, made of the four great elements, is seen standing for one year, two years, three years, for four, five, or ten years, for twenty, thirty, forty or fifty years, for a hundred years, [95] or is seen standing for even longer.31

7b SIMILES. But that which is called ‘mind,’ or ‘thought,’ or ‘consciousness,’ arises as one thing and ceases as another, like night and day.32

8 Just as a monkey, bhikshus, roaming through the forest and mountain-side, takes hold of one branch,33 letting that go, then grabs another, even so, bhikshus, that which is called ‘mind,’ or ‘thought,’ or ‘consciousness,’ arises as one and ceases as another, like night and day.34

Revulsion through dependent arising

9 As such, bhikshus, the instructed noble disciple, closely and wisely attends to dependent arising itself, thus:

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\begin{align*}
\text{Imasmiṁ sati, idaṁ hoti;} & \quad \text{with ignorance as condition, there are volitional activities;} \\
imass'uppādā, idam uppaジャisti. & \quad \text{with volitional activities as condition, there is consciousness;} \\
imasmiṁ asati idam na hoti; & \quad \text{with consciousness as condition, there is name-and-form;} \\
imassā nirodā�� idaṁ nirujjhati. & \quad \text{with name-and-form as condition, there is the sixfold sense-base;} \\
\end{align*}
\]

That is, with ignorance as condition, there are volitional activities;36 with volitional activities as condition, there is consciousness; with consciousness as condition, there is name-and-form; with name-and-form as condition, there is the sixfold sense-base; with the sixfold sense-base as condition, there is contact; with contact as condition, there is feeling; with feeling as condition, there is craving;37 with craving as condition, there is clinging;37 with clinging as condition, there is existence; with existence as condition, there is birth; with birth as condition there arise decay and death.

31 Dissatāyain bhikkhave cātummahā,bhūtiko kāyaṁ ekam pi vassain tiṭṭhamāno, dve pi vassani tiṭṭhamāno, tīni pi vassāni tiṭṭhamāno... (the text repeats a full sentence for each number, but is here abridged in the scribal tradition). Comy here introduces the post-Buddha theory of moments (khanika,vāda)—that formations right there even as they arise—and so asks why the Buddha says that the body “stands [endures].” In autoanswer, it says that the body endures just like the light of a lamp burns through the night “by way of a connected continuity” (pavēni,sambhanda,vasena), even though the flame ceases right where it burns without crossing over to the next part of the wick. (SA 2:99)

32 Ratiyā ca divasassa ca. See Intro (3).

33 The monkey simile. See Intro (3).

34 “Like night and day,” ratiyā ca divasassa ca, lit “in the night and in the day,” a genitive in the locative sense, ie, during the night and during the day. See Intro (3).

35 This is the well known “specific conditionality” (idap.paccayatā) formula, ie, the dependent arising formula in brief. The full formula follows. See Dependent arising = SD 5.16(2).

36 Comy: When it is said, “With ignorance as condition, there are volitional formation,” the meaning should be understood thus: “It is ignorance and it is a condition; hence ‘ignorance-as-condition’ (avijjā ca sā paccayā cā tī avijjā,paccayā). Through that ignorance-as-condition, volitional formation come to be (tasmiṇā avijjā,paccayā sanbhārā sambhavanti)” (SA 2:9 f). Bodhi: “This explanation suggests that the verb sambhavanti, which in the text occurs only at the end of the whole formula, should be connected to each proposition, thus establishing that each conditioned state arises through its condition. The twelve terms of the formula are treated analytically in [Vibhaṅga S].” (S:B 725 n1)

37 In (Samudayatṭhaṅgamagama) Loka S (S 12.44), the dependent arising is shown to be broken here when “with the remainderless fading away and ending of that same craving comes cessation of clinging...” the rest of the chain breaks accordingly leading to the ending of “this whole mass of suffering.” (S 12.44/2:71-73)
soka, parideva, dukkha, -
  domanass' upāyasā sambhavanti
  evam-etassa kevalassa dukkha-k, -
  khandhassa samudayo hoti

10

But with the utter fading away and ending of ignorance,
volitional activities end;
with the ending of volitional activities, consciousness ends;
with the ending of consciousness, name-and-form ends;
with the ending of name-and-form, the six sense-bases end;
with the ending of the six sense-bases, contact ends;
with the ending of contact, feeling ends;
with the ending of feeling, craving ends;
with the ending of craving, clinging ends;
with the ending of clinging, existence ends;
with the ending of existence, birth ends;
with the ending of birth, there end decay-and-death;
  sorrow, lamentation, physical pain,
  mental pain and despair.

—Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.

11

Seeing thus, bhikshus, the instructed noble disciple
is revulsed towards form;
he is revulsed towards feeling, too;
he is revulsed towards perception, too;
he is revulsed towards formations, too;
he is revulsed towards consciousness, too.

Feeling revulsed, he becomes dispassionate.
Through dispassion, (his mind) is liberated.
When it is liberated, there arises the knowledge: ‘Liberated’
He understands: ‘Destroyed is birth. The holy life has been lived. What needs to be done has been done. There is no more of this state of being.’”

— evam —

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