17

Mahā,nidāna Sutta
The Discourse on the Great Connections | D 15
Theme: Dependent arising, language and non-self
Translated by Piya Tan ©2003

1 Background

1.1 The theme of the Mahā,nidāna Sutta is paṭicca,samuppāda, which has been simply rendered as dependent arising. The reasons for this have been discussed elsewhere.¹ There are many versions of the dependent arising (paṭicca,samuppāda) model given in the Canon. Hence, it is useful for us to know their various applications.² The Mahā Nidāna Sutta’s presentation of the dependent arising is mainly concerned with the relationship between consciousness (viññāna) and name-and-form (nāma-rūpa). This relationship is, indeed, the heart of dependent arising.

1.2 The Mahā Nidāna Sutta³ is the longest and most detailed discourse of the Buddha. It is also the most important sutta dealing with dependent arising, a central teaching in Buddhism. Despite its length, however, the Mahānidāna Sutta does not give the most complete formal exposition of dependent arising. It lacks the abstract formula and a statement of the sequence of cessation. Moreover, its series of conditions omits three factors of the standard version: ignorance, volitional activities [saṅkhāra], and the 6 sense-bases. These omissions have led some scholars to suggest that the twelvefold formulation may be later augmentation of a shorter original; but such suggestions remain purely conjectural, misleading, and objectionable on doctrinal and textual grounds. All in all, omissions of the Mahānidāna Sutta are more than compensated for by its detailed explanations, interesting digressions, and supplementary sections. Indeed, it might well be suspected, contrary to the thesis of historical development, that in the present sutta the Buddha has varied the usual exposition expressly to create an opportunity for such a special treatment.⁴ (Bodhi, The Great Discourse on Causation, 1984:6)

1.3 Bodhi has done a very learned and insightful translation of the Mahā Nidāna Sutta⁵ together with all the doctrinally important passages from its Commentary and Subcommentary. His long and important introductory essay discusses the Sutta’s rich doctrinal and philosophical implications, and an appendix explains the treatment of dependent arising according to the Abhidhamma system of conditional relations (paṭṭhāna). Bodhi’s .

2 Terminology

2.1 The Sutta Title

2.1.1 Nidāna

2.1.1.1 Although nidāna in the title seems to sound better in English as “causation” or “causality” (Bodhi translates the title as “The Great Discourse on Causation”), I have rendered the title here to reflect the more likely historical reality, that is, the Buddha’s deliberately turning the Vedic term nidāna on its head to expound what is perhaps the leading discourse on dependent arising.⁶ Vedic scholar, Joanna

---

¹ See Dependent arising, SD 5.16 (1).
² For a more detailed study, see Dependent arising, SD 5.16. On the Buddha’s usage of the 12-link paṭicca,samuppāda as a polemic against the Vedic cosmogony, see Jurewicz 2000 & Myth in Buddhism, SD 36.1(5.4).
³ The Sānyutta has its own Nidāna S (S 12.60/2:93 f), but while the opening sections [1-4] of the Sānyutta version is identical to the Majjhima version [1], the rest of it forms a separate sutta of its own, Mahā Rukkha S (S 12.- 55/2:87 f). The identical passages share the same long commentary. See S:B 768 m152 & Bodhi (tr) 1984:58-73.
⁴ See Table 1 for a tabular comparison of the two versions.
⁵ See biblio.
⁶ For an important study on this connection, see Joanna Jurewicz 2000.
Jurewicz, in her paper, “Playing with fire: The praṇītyasamutpāda from the perspective of Vedic thought” (2000), explains that the word nidāna appears in the cosmogonic context in the Rgveda:

“What was the prototype, what was the counterpart and what was the connection between them?” (kṣuṭī pramā kīṁ nidānāmi) [Rv 10.130.3]. In ŚB [Śata,patha Brahmaṇa] 11.1.63 pratimā is the cosmos identified with the fire altar, in ŚB 11.1.83 pratimā is sacrifice.7 The pramā is Prajāpati, the Creator, the nidāna, the link between the Creator and the creation: their identity. Thus pramā and pratimā resolve themselves into nidāna which guarantees and expresses their identity.

Nidāna, denoting the ontological connection between different levels and forms of beings, also refers to the epistemology: [sic] it gives the explanation of this connection.8 I presume that this is the first meaning of nidāna in the title of the Buddha’s sermon. It is really “a great explanation”: there is no ātman, the nidāna of the cosmogony. The negation of the ontological nidāna constitutes the Buddha’s mahānidāna. (Jurewicz 2000:100)

2.1.1.2 Jurewicz goes on to explain what other Indologists and Buddhologists would fully agree on, that is, that the Buddha teaches at least some of his discourses to educated people, well versed in brahmānic thought, who are familiar with the concepts and the general idea of Vedic cosmogony. Jurewicz explains in detail how the terms of dependent arising have a definite meaning, evoking definite associations. Having explained dependent arising in this manner, the Buddha then brilliantly turns the table against the brahmans!

The act of cutting off the ātman—or rather given his fiery nature, the act of blowing him out—deprives all the hitherto well-defined concepts of their meaning and challenges the infallibility of all their associations, exposing the meaninglessness, absurdity even, of all the cosmogonic development they express ....

And since fire is the intrinsic character of the ātman, nīrvaṇa can mean not only the liberating recognition of the ātman’s absence, but also the refutation of the whole of the Vedic metaphysics, which postulates that fire underlies, conditions, and manifests itself in the cosmogony.

(Jurewicz 2000:100)

2.1.1.3 The word nidāna comes from the prefix ni- (“down”) + dāna (from dā or dl meaning “to bind”): hence, “to tie down,” meaning “(figuratively & literally) ground, foundation, occasion; source, origin, cause; reason, reference, subject” (PED). In early Buddhist usage, nidāna (as used in the Sutta title) is often found in a string of synonyms related to the idea of “cause,” such as those occurring 17 times here in the Mahānidāna Sutta itself:

“Therefore, Ānanda, this itself is the reason, this is the connection [link], this is the arising, this is the condition for decay and death, that is to say, birth”

Tasmā ti-h’ānanda es’eva hetu etaiṁ nidānāṁ esa samudayo esa paccayo jārā, maranassa, yad idam jāti. (§§4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22)

2.1.2 Mahā. Clearly, based on such information, Bodhi has rendered nidāna as “source,” reserving “cause” for hetu.9 Bodhi also thinks that the prefix mahā was used by the Sutta compilers “far more probably ... to emphasize the sutta’s own intrinsic greatness” rather than that it is a “great discourse” (cf Jurewicz’s “great explanation” above) in contrast to a short one (of which there is none) (1984:v).

However, Bodhi titles it as “The Great Discourse on Causation.” If the greatness is placed upon its topic, then, surely it would be more appropriate to title it as “The Discourse on the Great Connections.” I have translated nidāna as “connections,” reflecting the Buddha’s awareness of its Vedic usage, and this same familiarity of his intended audience, as discussed by Jurewicz above.10

---

7 Smith 1989:73-75 [Jurewicz’s n].
8 Smith 1989:79 [Jurewicz’s n].
9 Bodhi 1984:v.
10 On the prefixes mahā and cūla (or culla) in sutta names, see Satipaṭṭhāna S (D 22, M 10) @ SD 13.1 (2).
2.2 Sāṅkhārā. Another important and difficult term connected with dependent arising is sāṅkhārā (plural), often translated as “formations.” This term is derived from as saṁ (¼ com- or con-, “together”) + karoti, “he does, he makes.” The noun has both the active and passive senses: as such, sāṅkhārā refers both to the things that we deliberately put together, construct and compound other things (especially our ideas and views), and also to the things that are on themselves put together, constructed and compounded (such as our body). In the Nikāyas, sāṅkhārā occurs in a number of major doctrinal contexts.11

As the 2nd link of dependent arising, sāṅkhārā are the karmically active volitions responsible, in conjunction with ignorance and craving, for producing rebirth and clinging on to the wheel of existence; rendered here as “volitional formations” to distinguish it from the passive “formation” discussed in the Kāma,bhū Sutta 2 (S 41.6).12

3 Variations in the dependent arising formula

3.1 Consciousness and name-and-form

3.1.1 In the dependent arising formula, it is important to note the relationship between consciousness (viññāṇa) and name-and-form (nāma,rūpa): with consciousness as condition, there arises name-and-form, which in turn is the condition for the 6 sense-bases (saḷ’āyatana). Peter Harvey present this fascinating notion:

As I have argued elsewhere,…the Pali Suttas (though not later Pali) includes [sic] indications that the early Buddhists regarded consciousness (viññāṇa) as able to “break free” of the network of interactions (Harvey 1989:61-68, 58). Indeed, the Suttas often see personality as a vortex of interaction not between nāma (including consciousness) and rūpa, but between consciousness and nāma,rūpa (D 2:32, 63 f; S 3:9-10) [4]. By turning away from all objects, seen as ephemeral and worthless, consciousness could become objectless. “It” would then not be a limited, conditioned process, but the unconditioned: Nibbāna. Unlike the situation of cessation,13 this would not be the complete absence of consciousness, but the timeless experience of a “consciousness,” which had transcended itself by dropping all objects. (Harvey 1993:12 digital ed)

3.1.2 Elsewhere, we find variations in the relationship between consciousness and name-and-form. In the Dīgha Nikāya, for example, we find consciousness and name-and-form mutually conditioning one another [§§21-22] and also in the Mahā'padāna Sutta (D 14.2.18-19/2:32),14 the Nagara Sutta (S 12.65-2:104)15 and the Nala.kalapiya Sutta (S 12.67/2:112-115). Name-and-form are the condition for contact (phassa).

When name-and-form is correlated with the 5 aggregates (pañca-k,khandha),16 form is identified with the aggregates of physical form (rūpa), and name with the three aggregates of feeling (vedanā), perception (saññā) and mental formations (sāṅkhāra) (Vism 17.187/644 f).17 Consciousness (viññāṇa), although inseparably linked with the three mental aggregates, is not included here as it is the condition for name-and-form. As such, the Vibhaṅga Sutta (S 12.2) gives this definition of name-and-form:

Further see Sāṅkhāra, SD 17.6 (5).

S 41.6/4:293 (SD 48.7). On volitional formations, see Sāṅkhāra, SD 17.6.

“Cessation,” ie, cessation of perception and feeling (saññā,vedayita,nirodha), see Mahā Vedalla S (M 43.25/-1:296) & SD 30.2 (4); Cūḷa Vedalla S (M 44.16-21/1:301 f) & SD 40a.9 (2.5); also SD: saññā,vedayita,nirodha.

This sutta and the next—Mahā'padāna S (SD 49.8) & Nagara S (SD 14.2)—contains the passage “This consciousness turns back (paccudāvattati) at nāma,rūpa [name-and-form or mind-and-body]; it goes no further” (D 14,2:19/2:32 = S 12.65,9/2:104). See Bucknell 1999:317 & S:B 777 n177.

See Bodhi’s useful notes: S:B 776 n176 & 777 n177.

The 5 aggregates: for a general survey, see (Upādāna) Parivatīta S (S 22.56), SD 3.7; for study of the individual aggregates, see SD 17. On the difference btw dependent-arising and the 5-aggregate models, see Sāṅkhāra, SD 17.6 esp (5.3).

On some technical difficulties regarding this term, see Bodhi 1984:18 n1, Harvey 1993:3-5 (digital ed) & Hamilton 1996a ch VI, esp 124-127.

http://dharmafarer.org 147
And what, bhikshus, is name-and-form? Feeling, perception, volition, contact, attention. This is called name. And the 4 great elements and the material form derived from the 4 great elements. This is called form. Thus, this is name and this is form—this is called name-and-form. (S 12.2, 12/2:3), SD 5.15

3.2 Origins of Social Problems. The Mahā nipāṇa Sutta gives an important variant sequence of dependent arising. In the usual sequence, after giving contact as the condition for feeling, feeling as the condition for craving would follow. Here, however, the Buddha introduces a variation [§§9-18]. From feeling as conditioning craving, he elaborates on the effects of craving, that is, giving a new series—a secondary sequence—of nine factors, each of which arises in dependence on its predecessor [Table 3].

Table 3

Concordance of the standard and the Mahā nipāṇa versions of dependent arising

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standard version</th>
<th>Mahā nipāṇa version</th>
<th>Secondary sequence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ignorance</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Secondary sequence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volitional</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>formations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consciousness</td>
<td>Consciousness</td>
<td>Seeking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name-and-form</td>
<td>Name-and-form</td>
<td>Gain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 sense-bases</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Decision-making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact</td>
<td>Contact</td>
<td>Desire and lust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling</td>
<td>Feeling</td>
<td>Attachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craving</td>
<td>Craving</td>
<td>Possessiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinging</td>
<td>Clinging</td>
<td>Avarice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existence</td>
<td>Existence</td>
<td>Safe-guarding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth</td>
<td>Birth</td>
<td>Various bad, unwholesome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decay and death</td>
<td>Decay and death</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: An arrow represents a relationship of conditionality from the condition to the dependently arisen phenomenon. [Source: Bodhi, The Great Discourse on Causation, 1984:143]

18 See Dependent arising, SD 5.16 (4).
This more down-to-earth sequence shows, as a result, how “there are born various bad unwholesome states” [§9]. The purpose of this sequence is clear: it shows that dependent arising can be used to explain the origins of social problems just as effectively as it can be used to understand the origins of individual suffering. Thus, craving not only brings further rebirth with personal pains, but also causes various unwholesome conditions leading to social disorder.19

4 Summary of dependent arising

4.1 The Sutta’s instruction proper begins with a short catechism on dependent arising pointing out the condition for each dependent factor in the series [§2]. The catechism follows the series in reverse order from decay and death being dependent on birth back to consciousness being dependent on name-and-form. The Buddha then presents the entire sequence again in forward order, without the catechism, adding the regular refrain identifying the series as the arising of suffering [§3].

4.2 A longer exposition follows with the Buddha returning to each proposition of the original sequence and elaborating on its meaning. His explanations serve 3 purposes:
(1) to explain the meaning of specific conditionality (idap, paccatā);
(2) to give a precise understanding of dependent arising by analyzing the conditioning factors into their constituents; and
(3) to show how each condition supports the arising of state dependent on it.

Although no formal definition of specific conditionality is given,

the explanation of the connection between each pair of factors suffices to make the underlying principle clear. Specific conditionality is a relationship of indispensability and dependency: the indispensability of the condition (eg, birth) to the arisen state (eg, ageing and death), the dependency of the arisen state upon its condition.

(Bodhi, The Great Discourse on Causation, 1984:10 f; see Vism 17.68/612)

4.3 The Buddha’s commentary begins with the statement that decay and death (jarā, maraṇa) occur with birth as condition [§4], affirming the fact that suffering cannot be avoided. By merely being born, one is subject to decay and death. But there is a solution to this, since suffering like everything else in the world is conditioned. Conception does not occur through biological causes alone, but involves a dynamic stream of consciousness21 flowing over from a previous life.

4.4 The condition for birth, in other words, is existence (bhava) [§5], of which there are three: the sense existence (kāma, bhava), form existence (rūpa, bhava) and formless existence (arūpa, bhava). Because rebirth into each realm occurs through a particular kind of karma, the word “existence” also refers to the Karma conducive to rebirth in that realm. The two applications of “existence” are distinguished as karma-existence (kamma, bhava) and rebirth-existence (upātti, bhava).22

19 Well known examples of the causal origins of social problems are found in Aggaṇīṇa S (D 27/3:80-98), Cakkavattī Sīhanāda S (D 26/3:57-79, esp 26.14-22/3:67-75) and Vāseṭṭha S (Sn 594-656): see discussion in Payutto 1994:73-75. Other suttas that investigate the causal conditions behind social disorder are Sakka-pañha S (D 21), Mahā Dukkha-k, khandha S (M 13) and Kalaha, vivāda S (Sn 4.11). Despite their differences in formulation, they all come to the same conclusion.

20 Comy labels the two sides of craving, viz, “craving which is the root of the rounds” (vaṭṭa, mūła, tanhā) and “obsessional craving” (samudācāra, tanhā) (DA 2:500).

21 It should be noted here that “stream” is only an imagery. The consciousness “flows on” like electrical impulses, without any permanent form or abiding entity.

22 Bodhi: “The distinction is explicitly drawn, with full definitions, in Vibhaṅga [Vbh 137]. It does not seem to be stated as such in the suttas, but may have been based on such passages as the following: “If, Ānanda, there were no kamma ripening in the sense-sphere, would sense-sphere existence be discerned?”—“Certainly not, bhante.” [A 3.76/-1:223]. Patīsamabhidā, magga too treats existence, in the context of dependent arising, as identifiable with volition, thus as kamma [Pm 1:52].” (1984:14 n2, slightly edited)
The specific condition for existence in both aspects (karma-existence and rebirth-existence) is clinging (upādāna): clinging to sense-pleasures (kām’ upādāna), to views (diṭṭ’ upādāna), to vows and rituals (sīla-bhart upādāna) and to a doctrine of the self (atta-vād’ upādāna) [§6]. The specific condition for clinging is craving (tanḥā), which, in this Sutta, is subdivided in two ways: first, by way of its immediate object, it is divided into craving for each of the sense-objects [§7]; second, by way of its projected aim, it is divided into craving for sense-pleasures (kāma,tanḥā), craving for existence (bhava,tanḥā) and craving for non-existence (vibhava,tanḥā) [§18].

5 Conceptual impression and sense-impression

5.1 Bhikkhu Bodhi’s Views

5.1.1 Conditions for experience

5.1.1.1 Whether one is enjoying a present object (mostly physical experience) or planning to do so (a mental experience), craving has feeling (vedanā) as its condition [§19]. Feeling, in turn, has contact (phassa) as condition [§20]. Contact is the coming together of sense-organ, sense-object and sense-consciousness.

5.1.1.2 This section contains two terms—“labelling contact” or conceptual impression (adhivacana,-samphassa) and “impact contact” or sense-impression (paṭigha,samphassa)—that are peculiar to the Mahā Nidāna Sutta. The Commentary glosses “conceptual impression” with mind-contact, and “sense-impression” with the 5 kinds of sense-contact, without discussing their special meanings here. The Buddha states that conceptual impression is impossible in the physical body (rūpa,kāya) when the special qualities of the mental body (nāma,kāya) are absent [§20]. As such, contact here depends both on the mental body and the physical body. It is then obvious that these two bodies “are intended in a narrower sense, as two sides of the sentient organism, rather than in the broader sense as including the objective spheres.” (Bodhi 1984:19-22)

5.1.1.3 Experience works both ways: from our mind outwards into the world, or from the world inwards into our mind. Outward experience occurs with mind-consciousness, resulting in conceptual and volitional activity. Inward experience occurs with the respective sense-consciousnesses (the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and the mind itself) when the mind passively receives the respective sense-objects. Outward experience begins with designation (adhivacana) or naming, that organizes the raw data of experience into a coherent construct or picture of the world.

5.1.2 How we create our own experiences

5.1.2.1 However, this is really an internal picture, comprising our mind’s own conceptual schemes, whereby it evaluates and subjects these data to fit its own understanding, biases and purposes. Thus, a difference in feeling may make a person appear to be “friend” or “foe”; with a slight shift in perception, we consider a fruit as “ripe” or “unripe”; a shift in volition leads us to designate a piece of plank as “future door” or “future table-top”; a shift in attention decides whether a distant object is “moving,” “stationary,” or “illusory.”

5.1.2.2 When an object is designated thus, a union occurs between the designating consciousness and the designated object through the designation process—this union is called conceptual impression. This

23 Craving for existence leads to a belief in the immortality of the soul (the eternalist doctrine); craving for existence to a theory of personal annihilation at death (the materialist doctrine); craving for sense-pleasures can give rise to either an annihilationist view justifying indulgence here and now, or to an eternalist view promising a heaven of delight to those obedient to the religious injunctions. See Bodhi, 1984:15 f.

24 See eg, Madhupiṇḍika S (M 18.16/1:111) & SD 6.14 (4).

25 Also rendered as “resistance contact” or “resistance impression.”

26 For a fuller discussion, see Saṁññā, SD 17.4(2.2).

http://dharmafarer.org
act can only occur with a mental body, with or without an “external” physical body (that is, with only the respective physical sense-objects alone). Here, “external” refers to the object that is acted upon.

5.1.3 Acting and reacting

5.1.3.1 Sense-perception begins with impingement (patīgha), here used as a technical term referring to the “impact” or stimulus of an object on a sense-faculty. The union of the consciousness with the impinging object is called sense-impingement. Technically, it belongs to the mental body, but it cannot occur in the mental body alone. We need the physical body to provide the internal bases for its arising or experience.

The two terms, impingement and designation, have a fundamental importance which ties them to dependent arising as a whole. They again indicate the basic oscillatory pattern of experience referred to earlier, its movement back and forth between the phases of reception and response. The receptive phase sees the maturation of the kammic inflow from the past; it is represented here by impingement issuing in sense consciousness. The responsive phase involves the formation of new kamma; it is represented by designation issuing in action. Each impinging object elicits from the mind an appropriate designation, and this sparks off an action considered the fitting response. Thus the relationship between impingement and designation depicts in cognitive terms the same situation depicted in conative terms by feeling and craving: the regeneration of the round of existence through present activity building upon the kammic inheritance from the past. (Bodhi, The Great Discourse on Causation, 1984:21; emphases added)

5.1.3.2 In simple terms, how we deliberately act or experience an event results from our past karma. However, karma also works with the present conditions, too. For example, we are able to see clearly, or read without glasses, is the result of both past karma and present conditions. How we react to what we read (or what we are reading), creates or further our karma, good or bad, depending on our mental state.

When we understand what we read, for example, we feel joyful (good karma), and we continue to read. However, when we find a sutta passage difficult, we are not upset (or we let a negative feeling pass), but make a mental note o find out more about it (a wholesome act of determination). This wholesome process also applies to our hearing, experiencing or thinking.

5.2 N Ross Reat’s Views

5.2.1 Reat, in his insightful study, “Some fundamental concepts of Buddhist psychology” (1987:15-28), comments on this passage [§20], saying that it identifies nāma and rūpa as two classes of objects of consciousness, nāma is conceptual (adhivacana); rūpa is sensory (patīgha, “impact”). Reat observes that the nāma,rūpa of early Buddhism was a near-synonym to its counterpart in the pre-Buddhist Upanishads (Bṛhad Āraṇyaka Upaniṣad 1.4.7; cf Reat 1987:18), where it figures in an account of the manifestation of the universe. He concludes that

adhivacana (verbal) and patīgha (sensual), as categories of phassa, are an alternative to the more commonly enumerated six kinds of phassa, and thus that nāma-rūpa is a dual categorization of the six types of objects of consciousness.

(1987:18, 22)

In short, Reat is saying that nāma,rūpa refers to the two sense-categories: the rūpa category comprising physical sense-objects (form, sound, smell, taste, touch), and the nāma category, comprising non-physical sense-objects (dhammas, mind-objects).

---

27 A dream occurs without the direct involvement of the physical body, but with purely mental experiences, or memories of bodily experiences. We may dream that we are seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, or touching someone or something.

28 See also Bucknell 1999:323 ff.

29 Like Reat, Tetsurō Watsuji (1971:228-231) & Shi Yinshun (1981:16 f, 20-22) too do not support the rendition of nāma,rūpa as “mind-and-body” or the like, but regard it as a collective term for the 6 types of sense-objects. Kögen Mizuno (1969:142-144) & Ishii Yamada (1980:272) take the same understanding of nāma,rūpa. Reat’s reason-
5.2.2 “The textual basis for his [Reat’s] argument,” notes Bucknell, “is strengthened by the fact that the same account of the causal connection between nāma-rūpa and phassa appears in three of the four extant Chinese counterparts of the Pali Mahānidāna-sutta.” (1999:323 f).30 Perhaps, concludes Bucknell, “the Buddha appropriated and adapted this important term precisely so that his teaching of Conditioned Arising would be recognized as a response to the doctrines of his opponents.” (1999:340).

5.3 SUJATO BHikkhu’s essay

5.3.1 Name-and-form. This whole section, very insightful and instructive in itself—with an element of characteristic Buddhist humour—has been extracted from Sujato’s thought-provoking essay, “The mystique of the Abhidhamma” (nd),31 and included here without comment:

Name-and-form. Let us continue the story of name-and-form in the specifically Buddhist context of dependent origination. There, name-and-form is shown to be dependent on cognition. This suggests that “name” is a term for certain mental functions exclusive of cognition, while “form” designates physical phenomena. There is a very interesting passage in the Mahā Nidāna Sutta which highlights the root meaning of “name.” I would therefore consider this to be an early conception of “name.” The passage is obscure even in Pali and nearly incomprehensible in a literal English translation, so I paraphrase.

“Name” and “form” are each shown to correlate with a particular kind of “contact.” Name correlates to “labeling contact,” while form correlates to “impact contact.” So let us have a look at this “contact.” In the normal analysis of contact, it is said to be the cooperation of three factors: the external sense object (eg, “image”), the internal sense organ (eg, “eye”), and the corresponding class of cognition (eg, “visual cognition”). In the case of the 5 physical senses, then, the “impact contact” would be the “impact” of the external sense object on the internal sense organ—light “hitting” the eye, or sound “hitting” the ear. In the case of mental cognition, we have the mental objects (dhāmas), mano (usually rendered “mind”), and mano-cognition.

5.3.2 Mano. What then is mano? It is not defined in this context in the suttas, so any explanation remains speculative. In simpler, non-specialized contexts, such as the three doors of action (body, speech, and mind), mano is more or less a synonym for “mind” (citta) or “cognition” (viññāṇa). But here, since mano is clearly distinguished from mano-cognition, it seems to carry a more specialized nuance.

The Abhidhammikas invoke their beloved “mind-moment” here, opining that mano refers to certain kinds of mind-moments in the process of cognition, while mano-cognition refers to certain others. Specifically, the mano, dhatu is defined as the “5-door adverting consciousness” and the “receiving consciousness” that accepts the 5-sense impingement; which is rather odd since the mano, dhatu is the support for mano-cognition, not 5-sense cognition.

Elsewhere mano is inconsistently identified with bhavaṅga, the subliminal “life continuum consciousness,” which is interrupted by “adverting consciousness” to give rise to a process of active cognition; this despite the fact that the suttas clearly state that the mind (mano) must be intact, not cut off, in order for mind-cognition to occur.32

5.3.3 Tinnaṃ saṅgati phasso

5.3.3.1 Furthermore, the suttas make it plain that the “co-operation” (sangati, “coming together”) of mano, mental objects, and mano-cognition constitutes contact. How can separate mind-moments occur simultaneously? Since in the Abhidhamma, the simultaneous occurrence of the 3 factors becomes stretched out into successive occurrences, it may seem only natural to further separate out contact, dignifying it with a real existence of its own, rather than it being a mere function.

---

30 See also Bucknell 1999:323 n 31.
32 See eg, §20. On citta, mano and viññāṇa, see SD 20.2 (2).
5.3.3.2 So, the Abhidhammikas alter the Sutta statement that the three are contact (tinnaṁ sangati phasso) to say that the three give rise to contact (tinnaṁ sangatiya phasso). To sum up, then: the suttas say, “Dependent on mano and mental objects, mano-cognition arises. The co-operation of the three is contact.” The Abhidhamma explains: “Dependent on certain kinds of cognition and mental objects there arises sense-cognition or other kinds of mental cognition. Due to the co-operation of the three there is contact.” Surely, we can do a little better than this, thinks Sujato.

The Abhidhammika, in other words, is wrong is attributing causality to the 3 factors of experience, when they are merely conditions for an experience to arise. If we speak of any “cause,” it would be ignorance or craving underlying the whole process, and not the experience itself. In simple terms, then, all the links work co-ordinately together, one link working with previous and the next links, bringing about experience. The Abhidhammikas are saying that these factors cause an experience. The suttas simple say these factor, when present, bring about experience, how we sense the world. There is a subtle working of “non-self” here that we need to take some time to figure out for ourself.

5.3.3.3 Mano and mental objects here give rise to cognition, in the same way that name-and-form gives rise to cognition. And just as the physical sense organs are physical constructs that enable or facilitate the act of physical cognition, so too mano would seem to be a mental “construct” that enables or facilitates the act of mental cognition. I would therefore suggest that it seems to be similar if not identical with “name” itself. We might therefore render it in this context as “mentality.” The “mental objects” would most commonly consist of “thoughts,” etc, which are related to “name,” and also “mental images,” which are part of “form.”

5.3.4 Impact contact & labeling contact

5.3.4.1 But we digress. To return to the Sutta: we now have form giving rise to sense-impression or “impact contact,” consisting in the impact of external sense-objects on the sense-organs [§20(1)]. Then, name, appropriately enough, gives rise to conceptual impression or “labeling contact” consisting in conceptual processing of sense data [§20(2)]. I am desperately flailing here in an almost doomed attempt to avoid making this discussion too technical. There are important qualifications to be made to my discussion both above and below, but I hope that by simplifying things somewhat, I can clarify the outlines without any distortion of the process.

5.3.4.2 We can see that “impact contact” deals primarily with receiving data from “outside” (that is, from sense-objects), while “labeling contact” deals primarily with processing inner, conceptual information. Thus, the earlier, mystical understanding of name-and-form receives a strictly rational, psychological treatment.

Name-and-form are shown to be interdependent. If there were no name, there could be no labeling, that is, no conceptual processing of sensory experience. If there were no form, there would be no awareness of the world outside. Finally, in its closing half, the Mahānidāna Sutta passage proceeds by way of synthesis to show that both of these processes are essential aspects of “contact.”

5.3.4.3 So far I have treated this analysis as general psychological (mind-centred) manner. But the context, and elsewhere, too, suggest that it may be applied albeit, in a special way to the stages of infant development. Thus, we can see that without sensory stimulus the infant’s mind would not develop past an undifferentiated, “oceanic” subconscious, like a foetus in the womb. And without developing conceptual abilities, we will not be able learn to assimilate and process sensory input in a meaningful and useful way.

5.3.5 Buddhist ontology

5.3.5.1 I have, however, omitted a very important aspect of this passage for understanding early Buddhist ontology. Normally, in dependent origination, existence is simply described in terms of the existence or being of the factor itself, as in the famous formula: “This being, that is … this not being, that is not.” But our present passage speaks, not of the existence of, say, “name,” but of the existence of “qualities, traits, signs and indicators” by which there is a concept of name [§20].

33 This is from the specific dependent arising (idap.paccayatā) formula: see Ariya Pariyesanā S (M 26,19/1:167), SD 1.11); Dependent arising, SD 5.16 (6).

http://dharmafarer.org
If these “qualities” or “properties” are absent, no “labeling contact” regarding “form” can be “found.” Conversely, if the “qualities” by which there is a “concept” of “form” are absent, no “impact contact” regarding “name” can be “found.”

5.3.5.2 This demonstrates in a most emphatic and explicit way that the “qualities” by which phenomena are known are, for all Dhamma purposes, equivalent to the phenomena themselves, since they perform the identical function in dependent origination. We cannot distinguish between a thing’s properties and the thing itself, since the label we give a “thing” is just a concept denoting the exercise of certain functions. To say a thing “exists” is to say it is “found.” And the very workings of experience, the fundamental structure of information processing, is necessarily dependent on this conceptual apparatus.

5.3.5.3 Without “labeling,” without the qualities or properties by which a thing is “conceptualized,” stimulus, and hence the entire perceptual process cannot work. Thus this passage thoroughly demolishes any attempt to wedge a division between “ultimate reality” and “conventional reality.” Wisdom does not consist in going past convention to the ultimate substratum, but in understanding how conceptualizing is inherent in the cognitive process itself. Hence the Buddha said that the extent of concepts, language, and labeling is precisely the domain of wisdom; that is, birth, ageing, and death, cognition together with name-and-form.

5.3.6 The 3 ways of speech. Bodhi, however, reads this passage in just the opposite way. For him, the mention of the “properties” implies that they are conceptually distinct from the thing in and of itself. But he is surely just reading a later agenda into an earlier teaching. He buttresses his position with reference to the three “ways” of speech, designation, and language, mentioned a little below in our sutta. Claiming support from the Commentaries (although they are not consistent here, always a suspicious sign), he says that “speech” refers to conceptual description, while the “way” of speech refers to the objective referent of speech, tha is, the 5 aggregates.

Unfortunately, when the identical phrase occurs in the Khandha Saniyuttta, it refers to, not five, but three “ways” of speech—that is, past tense, future tense, and present tense (remembering that in Pali these tenses often mean past lives, future lives, and the present life). Any statement must be phrased in terms of these modes, and must therefore buy into time, into the course of rebirths. This is especially so in a heavily inflected language like Pali, where the tenses are built into the verb forms; the statement would perhaps lose some of its punch when applied to, say, Chinese or other uninflected languages where tenses may be omitted.

5.3.7 Theory of the 2 truths

5.3.7.1 Understanding the difference between “ultimate” and “conventional” truth was upheld by later Buddhists as a sign of profound wisdom, a key to penetrating the inner mysteries of the Dhamma. But any specialized field of endeavor—from mechanics to mathematics, from fishing to physics—will develop a technical vocabulary of terms used in narrowly defined and sometimes eccentric ways—a jargon. Dhamma is no different. We just take our jargon a tad too seriously.

Tracing the arbitrary and inconsistent usage of this ontological apartheid in its checkered career through Buddhist history, we can discern only one constant factor—to exalt our own teachings as “ultimate” and denigrate that of others’ as “conventional.”

Thus, the Abhidhamma is “ultimate” while the suttas are “conventional”; or the Mahāyāna suttas are “ultimate” while the Abhidhamma is “conventional,” and so on. It is a standard Abhidhamma rhetoric to claim that the entire Abhidhamma is phrased in terms of “ultimate truth.” But this is a transparent bluster. There are two whole books, and much material elsewhere in the Abhidhamma Pitaka, that straightforwardly talk of what even the Abhidhammnikas would consider to be “conventional” truth.34

5.3.7.2 Thus, the Kathāvatthu enlightens us with learned discussions on such crucial issues as, say, the smell of the Buddha’s excrement. However, we can see that every word in the Abhidhamma Pitaka, from “kusala” to “paccayo,” is nothing but convention. Probably, the composers of the Abhidhamma Pitaka would agree with us.

34 See SD 7.14 (4) & SD 10.6 (3.3).
5.3.7.3 **The Puggala Pannatti** (“The Concept of the Person”) lists 6 concepts—the concepts of aggregates, sense media, elements, truths, faculties and persons. The Puggala Pannatti itself obviously deals with the sixth kind of concept, and the rest of the Abhidhamma Pitaka deals with the remaining concepts.

5.3.7.4 Thus, in harmony with the suttas and the rest of the Abhidhamma Pitaka, there is no attempt to sanctify the aggregates, etc., with a privileged ontological status above the “person.” The later Abhidhammikas, drawing on the subtle epistemology of the Sautrantikas, proposed that conventional truth is known through inference (anvaya, anumana), while ultimate truth is known through direct perception (paccajātikha). Ultimate truth is then said to constitute the objects of vipassanā, while the objects of samatha are mere conventional truth.

5.3.7.5 **Samatha & vipassanā.** We have discussed elsewhere at length that samatha and vipassanā are not distinguished in the suttas by their objects, but by their characteristic emphasis on either peace or understanding. But I do not need to resort to the subtleties of dialectic to refute this theory. We need only glance at the way “direct knowledge” (dhamme ṇānā) and “inferential knowledge” (anvaye ṇānā) are treated in the Nidāna Sāriyuttas to see that they are both aspects of vipassanā. Direct knowledge understands the present; inferential knowledge understands the past and future.

5.3.8 **Name group & form group**

5.3.8.1 In the Mahā Nidāna Sutta passage, name and form are also called the “name group” (nāmakaṅha) and the “form group” (rūpakaṅha), implying that each consists of a number of factors. Elsewhere in the suttas, they are indeed defined, not synthetically as above, but analytically. “Name” is feeling, perception, attention, contact and volition. “Form” is the four great material properties and their “derived form.”

5.3.8.2 One factor which is, however, associated with conceptualisation is “perception.” This is the associative aspect of consciousness. “Perception” (saññā) relates to “cognition” (viññāna) just as “connotation” relates to “denotation.” The suttas treat perception as a key aspect of concept formation. In everyday usage it can mean “contract” or “agreement.” In this sense, perception approaches the meaning of convention (sammuti). The two are etymologically parallel. Noteworthy by its absence from name is “thought” (vitakka), which is not an essential factor for consciousness. Elsewhere, the factors constituting “name” are said to precede thought. So, it seems that despite the terms “name” and “labeling,” name deals with very fundamental, pre-linguistic proto-conceptual processes.

5.3.9 **Abhidhamma conception of “name.”** By the time of the Abhidhamma (beginning around 300 BCE), “name” (nāma) has drifted even further from its basic meaning [5.3.8.1]. Now, name becomes an umbrella term for all mental phenomena, including cognition, which, as we saw above, was specifically excluded in the suttas. This is justified by relying on a spurious connection with the verb “to bend” (namati), and asserting that cognition “bends” towards its objects—a highly athletic accomplishment for our agile mind-moment!

Thus “name-and-form” becomes translated as “mind and body,” the “ultimate reality,” and wisdom is the ability to mince these into very small bits. Which rather misses the point. A skilled surgeon is not one who can hack their patient into shreds, but one who can delicately remove just the diseased tissue. (Sujato, “The mystique of the Abhidharma,” 12-15, digital ed)

---

35 On the nature of name-and-form (nāma,rūpa), see SD 17.2a (12).
36 On “derived form” (upādāya,rūpa), see SD 17.2a (10).
37 On how name-and-form works with consciousness, see the parable of the sheaves of reeds in Naḷa,kalāpī S (S 12.67/2:114), SD 83.11.
6 The hidden vortex

6.1 NAME-AND-FORM AND CONSCIOUSNESS

6.1.1 The next two sections [§§21-22] are intimately interconnected, dealing the interaction between name-and-form and consciousness. In his *The Magic of the Mind*, Nānananda calls this activity “the hidden vortex” (1971:25) and claims that this discovery of the Buddha is “[t]he most outstanding contribution made by the Law of Dependent Arising to the ethical, psychological and philosophical enquiries of all times” (id).

6.1.2 The Buddha first shows how consciousness (viñṇāna), as the specific condition for name-and-form (nāma,rūpa), is necessary to the latter in four ways: at conception, during gestation, when emerging from the womb and in the course of life [§21]. That consciousness is a condition for conception is also mentioned in the Mahā Taṇhā,saṅkhaya Sutta (M 38), that is, conception can only successfully occur when consciousness “has descended into the womb” (M 38.26/1:265 f). Bodhi, however, cautions us:

The description of consciousness as descending is metaphorical; it should not be taken literally as implying that consciousness is a self-identical entity which transmigrates from one life to another. The Buddha expressly repudiates the view that “it is the same consciousness that travels and traverses (the rounds of rebirths)” [M 38.5/1:258]. Consciousness occurs by way of process. It is not an ongoing subject but a series of transitory acts of cognition arising and passing away through conditions. Each act is particular and discrete—an occasion of eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness, or mind-consciousness. Based on its sense faculty it performs its function of cognizing the object, then, gives way to the next act of consciousness, which arises in immediate succession.

(1984:22)

6.2 THE 6 SENSES AND CONTACTS. In the next section of the sutta, instead of going on to the 6 senses and their respective contacts, as in the standard formula, the Buddha reverses his last statement and says: “With name-and-form, there is consciousness” [§22.1]. To prevent any misunderstanding, the Buddha then, introduces a remarkable passage unique to this Sutta [§22.2]:

It is thus far, Ānanda, that one can be born, and decay and die, pass away and re-arise; thus far that there is a pathway for designation; thus far there is a pathway for language; thus far there is a pathway for description; thus far there is a sphere for wisdom; thus far that the samsaric round (of lives) turns for describing this (state of being), that is, when there exist name-and-form together with consciousness. [§22.2]

In other words, just as conception cannot occur without “the descent of consciousness” (for biological conception), so, too, consciousness cannot arise unless it “finds a footing” in name-and-form. In fact, consciousness requires name-and-form throughout life.39

7 The problem of language

7.1 CONCEPT, LANGUAGE AND REALITY. According to the Dīgha Subcommentary (tiṅka), the terms “designation” (adhivacana) [§20], “language” (niruttī) and “description” (paññatti) are near-synonyms generally referring to verbal statements expressing meaning. The “pathway” (pathā) for designation, language and description, that is, the world of reference or the connecting of words and things,40 is the same

---

38 Naḷa,kalapiya S (S 12.67) compares this intimate interconnection between nāma,rūpa and viñṇāna to “two bundles of reeds that are standing and supporting each other…if one of the two were to fall, the other would fall, too.” (S 12.67/2:114).

39 On this important topic, see Bodhi 1984:22-25.

40 An example in English is the relationship between the word *tree* and the object “tree” (referent) in the real world.
for all three, namely, the 5 aggregates,\textsuperscript{41} referred to here as “name-and-form together with consciousness.”\textsuperscript{42} (DA 2:504).

There is, as such, an interesting relationship between concepts, language and reality. In showing how this is relevant to our understanding of existence, Bodhi adds an instructive note:

To bring that relevance to light it is necessary to investigate briefly the nature of reference, the act which establishes connections between words and things. Designation, language and description are the tools of reference, enabling us to interpret and evaluate our experience privately to ourselves and to communicate our thoughts to others... But reference involves more than simply the indicating of a referent. It is also signification, the ascribing of meaning to the referent. While the referent provides the locus for meaning, the meaning itself is contributed by the mind\textsuperscript{43} making the reference. (1984:28; emphases added)

7.2 LANGUAGE AND THE UNWHOLESALE ROOTS. This process of language and cognition is further complicated by the infiltration of greed, hate and delusion, causing one’s attention to waver and veer about unsteadily. In such a case, the mental body can hardly be expected to mirror the world according to reality through precise ideas and words. Even when the meanings given to words conform to the popular conventions governing their use, this is no guarantee against aberrant references; “for often these conventions stem from and reinforce unrecognized common error, the ‘collective hallucinations’ of the world” (Bodhi, 1984:29).

Of all the tools of reference a person may use, those of greatest importance to himself are the ones that enable him to establish and confirm his sense of his own identity. These are the designations “mine,” “I am,” and “myself.” In the Buddha’s teaching such ideas and all related notions, in the way they are ordinarily entertained, are regarded as conceptual outcroppings of the ego-consciousness. They are fabrications of the mind (mathita), subjective conceivings (maññita), conceptual proliferations (papañca),\textsuperscript{44} grounded in ignorance, craving, and clinging ...

Through the designation “mine” he establishes a territory over which he claims control, through the designation “I am” and “myself”\textsuperscript{45} he establishes an identity upon which he builds his concepts and views. (Bodhi, 1984:29)

7.3 WORDS AND THE SELF

7.3.1 W S Waldron makes a similar insightful remark:

And what is our most important source of human categorization and classification, whose distinctions have no spatial location either inside or outside of our brains, and is, furthermore, one of the most salient features of our physical and mental structures? Language. It appears that we embody not only the results of what we have thought, felt and done, but, in addition, of what we have heard and said. We are, in short, the word become flesh. (Waldron 2002:147; fn omitted)

\textsuperscript{41} The 5 aggregates (pañca-khandha): form (rūpa), feeling (vedanā), perception (saññā), mental formations (sankhāra) and consciousness (vīthāna).
\textsuperscript{42} This identification is confirmed by Niruttī,Patha S (S 22.62) which speaks of three “pathways for language, designation and description”: the 5 aggregates which have ceased are the pathway for the designation “was” (ahosi), those aggregates which have not yet arisen are the pathway for the designation “will be” (bhavissati), and those that have presently arisen are the pathway for the designation “is” (atthi) (S 22.62/3:71-73),SD 68.1. As the 5 aggregates encompass all that we are, they include both internal and external sense-bases.
\textsuperscript{43} See Cūla Veddalla S (M 44): “Having first thought and pondered, one then breaks out into speech.” (M 44,15/-1:301), SD 40a.9.
\textsuperscript{44} W S Waldron speaks of papañca as “language’s endless recursivity” (2002:152).
\textsuperscript{45} See SD 19.1-3.
7.3.2 In the ultimate analysis, the referents are simply the 5 aggregates themselves, which when carefully examined will reveal nothing of an abiding self. However, even though there is no abiding “self,” words like “I,” “me” and “mine” are useful as tools of communication. The Buddha and his saints use ideas and words freely like everyone else, but when used by the Buddha and the saints those ideas and words do not betray latent tendencies of craving, conceit and wrong views, but simply a recognition of their referential function:

These, Citta, are merely names, expressions, turns of speech, designations in common use in the world. And a tathāgata [thus come] uses them, but indeed, he does not misapprehend them.  
(D 9,53/1:202)\textsuperscript{46}

8 Direct experience

8.1 Construction and reality. An important purpose of the Mahā Nidāna Sutta is to enable us to discriminate between two kinds of phenomena: the actual phenomena pertaining to the “pathways for designation, language and description” and the mental constructs derivative upon them.\textsuperscript{47} Reality is signified by those “qualities, traits, signs and indicators through which there is a description of the mental body” [§20], which are experienced immediately as objects of direct cognition. This cognition validates their reality as things existing independently of conceptualization.

The mental constructs, on the other hand, do not reveal their own distinctive “qualities, traits, signs and indicators.” Our mental process, in short, comprises two streams: one responsible for the mental constructions and the other the “pathways” providing the raw materials and the objective basis to which the completed constructs are ascribed.

8.2 Two levels of talk

8.2.1 In the long insightful introduction to his Mahā Nidāna Sutta translation, Bodhi goes on to discuss the significance of these sutta passages [§§21-22] regarding description, especially in terms of religious philosophy and language. He speaks of two levels of religious talk: veridical description and deviant description (that is, truthful discourse and false discourse). Veridical description or truthful discourse is

description [that is] true from the special standpoint of insight-contemplation, [that] not only represents actuality correctly, but represents it solely in terms of what is discovered in contemplation—its constituent phenomena, their qualities, and their relations. Examples would be such statements as: “The earth element has the characteristic of hardness, consciousness that of cognizing an object,” etc; “All material form is impermanent,” etc…  
(Bodhi 1984:33)

8.2.2 Deviant description or false discourse either posits mental constructs as actual existents (e.g., a Creator God, the universal soul, the personal soul, etc) or else ascribes to the actual phenomena attributes they only appear to possess due to cognitive distortion. From the Dharma level, the most important of these are the appearance of beauty (subha), permanence (nicca), pleasure (sukha) and self (attā). The relevance of this distinction becomes clear when we come to the section of description of the self [§23].

8.2.3 The “pathways” (patha) for designation, language and description not only makes possible the vortical interaction between consciousness and name-and-form, but also makes possible “a sphere for wisdom” (paññāvacara) [§22.2]. The sphere for wisdom is the pathways themselves: the 5 aggregates in process of dependent arising. When the aggregates are examined with mindfulness and clear comprehension—thus, “This is not mine; this I am not; this is not my self”—they are transformed into the basis for the growth of wisdom, as stated in the Rāhula Sutta 1 (§ 22.91):

\textsuperscript{46} Further see Language and discourse, SD 26.11.

\textsuperscript{47} In later scholastic terminology, as in Yogācāra philosophy, a contrast is made between parispanna, dharmā (P parinipphannā dhammā), ie, ultimate truth, and parikalpita, dharmā (P parikappitā dhammā), the “imagined” reality.
9 Seeking the self
9.1 DESCRIPTIONS OF THE SELF
9.1.1 In the next section [§23] of the Sutta, the Buddha appears to digress to a new and unrelated topic—that of the different descriptions of the self (atta, paññatti) proposed by speculative thinkers—but the Dīgha Commentary explains that this new section connects to the Buddha’s original statement that “this generation has become like a tangled skein” (DA 2:504). The purpose of the ensuing passages is to clarify this statement by identifying the tangles and showing how they have occurred. In other words, the Buddha takes a new angle of approach in discussing the causal process of existence.

9.1.2 The Dīgha Commentary explains that these self-views can arise either from meditative experiences or from mere reasoning. In terms of meditation, says the Commentary, these wrong views arise from the misinterpretation of the kasiṇa sign (the inwardly visualized image of the external meditation object). If the sign itself is apprehended as the self, it is conceived as material; if the area covered by the sign or the mental factors covering it is apprehended, then, the self will be conceived as immaterial; if the sign is unextended (that is, confined to a small area), the self is conceived as limited; if the sign is extended as far as visualization will allow, the self will be conceived as infinite. (DA 2:504). These are the four basic views of the self arising from meditation.

9.2 IGNORANCE AND VIEWS
9.2.1 “This generation has become like a tangled skein” because it fails to understand and realize dependent arising. That is to say, they are kept bound to the rounds of existence due to their own lack of insight into the conditions that keep them bound. The root of these conditions is ignorance, the absence of true knowledge, the knowledge of the 4 noble truths. Since nature abhors a vacuum, when this true knowledge is absent, its place is filled with false knowledge or views (dīthi). These views are the mental tangles, knots and matting that prevent one from going beyond the cycle of existence.

9.2.2 According to Bodhi, “Of all the tools of reference a person may use, those of greatest importance to himself are the ones that enable him to establish and confirm his sense of his own identity” (1984: 29) [§7]. Similarly, of all the views one may hold, the ones clung to with the greatest tenacity are one’s views of the self, which define for one that identity. One’s intellect (or lack of it) then creates for oneself a conceptualized view of the self. “Therefore, in order to dislodge ignorance and craving, a preliminary step often becomes necessary: to take away their protective shield of views.” (Bodhi 1984: 36).

9.3 DESTINIES OF THE SELF
9.3.1 The next section [§24] talks about the present and future destinies of the self. Temporal speculations, however, admit three possibilities (in terms of the past, the present and the future), which in principle can be combined with any of the four basic views [9.1.1]. However, in actuality, notes Bodhi, there is a tendency for certain of the basic views to combine with one of the temporal views more readily that the other. Thus a description of the self as limited and material will tend to the annihilationist mode, a description of the self as infinite and immaterial will tend to the eternalist mode.

9.3.2 A short passage on the “non-description of the self” [§§25-26] states that, unlike the speculative theorists, the Buddha’s disciples, on the basis of their spiritual attainments or practice, refrain from describing the self. The Commentary notes: “They know that the counterpart-sign 48 of the kasiṇa is only a counterpart sign and that the formless aggregates 49 are only formless aggregates.” (DA 2:505). That is to

---

48 The “counterpart-sign” (paṭibhāga, nimitta) is a clear, stable and effortless mental image of the meditation object that is attended by a profound bliss or powerful rapture.

49 That is, feeling, perceptions, formations, and consciousness.
say, they only describe the describable, namely, as dependently arisen phenomena that are all impermanent, suffering and non-self.

9.4 SELF-CONSIDERATIONS

9.4.1 Next [§27] the Buddha explains how a consideration of the self (atta, samanupassanā) can lead to twenty forms of the self-identity view (sakkāya diṭṭhi). He selects one aggregate, that of feeling, and shows how in four alternative ways it can become a basis for conceiving self: one who recognizes a self either considers feeling as self, or the self as altogether without feeling, or the self as being distinct from feeling but is of the nature to feel (or, subject to feeling).

9.4.2 The view that feeling is self is then examined [§§28-29]. The 3 kinds of feeling—pleasant, painful and neutral—are found to be distinct and mutually exclusive, experienced only one at a time. Feeling, in other words (like any of the other aggregates) is a succession of distinct states lacking an enduring entity essential to selfhood.

9.4.3 The Buddha then rejects the view of a completely insentient self on the ground that such a self could not even conceive the idea “I am” [§30]. In the third view, the Buddha shows how an attempt is made by theoretical thinkers to avoid the faults of the first two position by making the self as having the nature to to feel [§31]. Perhaps the closest historical parallel to this view is the Sāṃkhya philosophy with its dualism of puruṣa, the self as the changeless witness of nature, and prakṛti, nature itself, the ever-changing psychophysical field.

10 The 8 liberations

10.1 The 2 Kinds of Arhats

10.1.1 Having abandoned all these speculative views, one becomes an arhat, and the saint is described in a general way [§§32-36]. Then, the Buddha introduces a division of the spiritually freed into two kinds: “the one freed by wisdom” (paññā, vimutta) and “the one freed both ways” (ubhato, bhāga, vimutta). Both win arhathood through wisdom, and their wisdom is the same, as stated in the Sambuddha Sutta (S 22.58).\(^{51}\)

The distinguishing mark between them, then, is the “bodily suffusion” of the immaterial liberations—the four immaterial [formless] attainments and the cessation of perception and feeling. The ubhato bhāga vimutta arhat has this experience, the paññāvimutta lacks it.

(Bodhi 1984:47 f; see 48 n1)

10.1.2 The wisdom-freed arhat is described in terms of his understanding of the different realms of existence. This allusion to the realms gives the Buddha the occasion to present a psychocosmic map.\(^{52}\) Having explained the conditions for rebirth, the Buddha goes on to show how the realms are divided into the 7 stations for consciousness (viññāna-tī, thitiyā) and the 2 bases (āyatana).\(^{53}\) [Table 10]

10.1.3 The arhat freed both ways or “dual-freed” arhat, on the other hand, is described by way of his mastery over the 8 liberations (vimokkha) [§35]. These liberations include the 9 successive attainments

---

\(^{50}\) On the 4 types of arhats, see Te, vījja S (D 13), SD 1.8(2.1). Richard Gombrich, in ch 4 of his book How Buddhism Began (1996:96-134), discusses how he thinks ceto, vimutti and paññā, vimutti came to mean different things in the early development of Buddhist doctrine. This development was closely connected with the later scholastic view that one could gain awakening without meditation, which some scholars like Gombrich think the Buddha did not envisage (1996:96). See also Brekke 2002:67.

\(^{51}\) S 22.58.3:65 f (SD 49.10).

\(^{52}\) “Psychocosmic” means “mental universe,” esp in ref to the early Buddhist idea of the higher existent realms being attainable through meditation even while we live.

\(^{53}\) Elsewhere these are called “the 9 abodes of beings” (nava, sattī āvāsa) (D 33.3.2(3)/3:263 + 2.2(3)/3:288; A 9.24(4)/401). Here āyatana is rendered as “sphere,” referring to a realm or level of meditation; where it refers to the senses, it is tr as “base.” Avacara (avā, “down, out” + cara, “wandering”) is tr as “realm,” but “sphere” is often used here, too. See SD 17.8a (5.2) & (11.2).

160  http://dharmafarer.org
### Table 10

**The 7 stations for consciousness and the 2 bases**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formless realm (arūpāvacara)</th>
<th>Base only</th>
<th>Base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7th station for consciousness</td>
<td>Base of nothingness</td>
<td>ākāśāṇaṭhāyatanā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th station for consciousness</td>
<td>Base of infinite consciousness</td>
<td>viññāṇaṭc 'āyatana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th station for consciousness</td>
<td>Base of infinite space</td>
<td>ākāśāṇaṭc 'āyatana</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form realm (rūpāvacara)</th>
<th>Not stations: The pure abodes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Base only</td>
<td>Base of non-peripient beings asaṅña,sattā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th station for consciousness:</td>
<td>Gods who delight in creating:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beings same in body,</td>
<td>The contented gods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>same in perception</td>
<td>The Yāma gods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd station for consciousness:</td>
<td>The gods of the Thirty-three</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beings same in body,</td>
<td>nimmāṇa,raṭī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>different in perception</td>
<td>yāma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd station for consciousness:</td>
<td>The gods of the Four Great Kings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beings different in body,</td>
<td>cātum,mahārājika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>same in perception</td>
<td>manussa,loka</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sense realm (kāmāvacara)</th>
<th>Gods who lord over others’ creations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st station for consciousness:</td>
<td>para,nimmita,vasavatī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beings different in body,</td>
<td>Gods who delight in creating:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>different in perception</td>
<td>The contented gods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd station for consciousness:</td>
<td>The Yāma gods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beings different in body,</td>
<td>The gods of the Thirty-three</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>same in perception (lower realms)</td>
<td>nimmāṇa,raṭī</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

54 See *Viññāṇa-ṭhīti*, SD 23.14, & *Group karma?* SD 39.1 (1.4).

55 This is called a “sphere” (avacara), not a “station” (ṭhīti), because the consciousness is extremely subtle here so that it cannot be said to exist or not exist.

56 The pure abodes (suddh ’āvāsa), the 5 highest of the form worlds (rūpa,loka), are not listed as “stations for consciousness.” They are inhabited only by non-returners who will reach their last birth to become arhats and attain nirvana. Hence, it is not a rebirth-sphere, but a “resting place” for non-returners living their last life. These abodes are Aviha (“non-declining”), Atappa (“unworried”), Sudassā (“clearly beautiful”), Sudassī (“clear-visualized”) and Akanīṭhā (“peerless”) (D 3:237, M 3:103, Vbh 425, Pug 42-46; cf D 3:253; A 4:39). See *Viññāṇa-ṭhīti*, SD 23.14.

57 According to Brahma,jāla S (D 1) and Pāṭika S (D 24), this is not a “station for consciousness” because no consciousness is found in the beings there. All cognitive activities are suspended here. As soon consciousness arises in a being there, he vanishes from that world. (D 1.2.31/1.28, 24.2.20/3.33), SD 63.3.

58 The first 6 are the sense-sphere deva-realms, the lowest of the celestial realms.
reached by the power of concentration: the 4 dhyanas (jhāna), the 4 formless attainments (ārūppa samāpatti), and the cessation of perception and feeling (saññā, vedayita, nirodha = nirodha, samāpatti).60

10.2 The 8 Liberations Defined. The 8 liberations (attha vimokkha) are eight grades or levels of mental liberation based on mental cultivation of profound states, that is the form dhyanas and formless attainments. They are described in such discourses as the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta (D 16).61

The first three of the 8 liberations are kasiṇa meditations,62 which are explained in some detail in the Mahā Sakuludāyi Sutta (M 77,23), but a more detail exposition is found in the Paṭisambhidāmagga (Pm 2:38-40). The 8 liberations are shown in Table 10.

1. The 1st liberation is that of one with physical form who sees physical forms (rūpī rūpāni passati). The Majjhima Comentary explains that the meditator does the preliminary exercise (parikamma) on an internal form (in our own body), for example, the dark (nīla) of the eyes for a blue kasiṇa, the skin for a yellow kasiṇa, the blood for a red kasiṇa, the teeth for a white kasiṇa, but the concentration sign (nimita) arises externally (MA 3:258 f.). The “transcending” (abhibhāyataana) of the forms is the attainment of dhyana together with the arising of the sign. On emerging from the dhyana, he considers, “I know, I see.”

2. The 2nd liberation is that of one who does not see physical forms internally, but sees physical forms externally (ajjhattam arūpā-saññī bahiddhā rūpāni passati). Here, the kasiṇa preliminary exercise is done on an external form (a kasiṇa object) and the arising of the concentration-sign externally. The formulation of the second vimokkha “suggests that it is a shorthand for all the eight abhibhāyatanas which consist of variations on the theme ajjhattam arūpā-saññī eko bahiddhā rūpāni passati” (Gethin 2002:267 n7).

3. The 3rd liberation is that of one freed after contemplating the idea of the beautiful (subhan’t eva adhimutto hoti). This is said in reference to the attainment of form dhyana (rūpā jhāna) by means of concentrating the mind on perfectly pure and bright colours as the kasiṇa-object. The Paṭisambhidāmagga says that this mental state is also produced through the cultivation of the divine abodes (brahma, vihāra), as a result of which all beings appear perfectly pure and glorious, and thus the mind turns to the beautiful (Pm 5.20/2:39).

These first three are said in connection with kasiṇa meditation by way of the “bases of mastery” or “bases for transcendence” (abhibhāyatanas), that is, one of the 8 stages of mastery over the senses through dhyana (jhāna).63 The following four (4-7) are the formless attainments (arūpā samāpatti):

4. The 4th liberation. Through the utter transcending of the perception of physical form, the passing away of the perception of impenetrable [patiṭha, sense-contact], and non-attention to the perception of diversity, contemplating, “Space is infinite,” one enters and dwells in the base of infinite space. This is the fourth liberation.

5. The 5th liberation. Through the utter transcending of infinite space, contemplating, “Consciousness is infinite,” one enters and dwells in the base of infinite consciousness. This is the fifth liberation.

60 Or, arūpa, samāpatti. These terms are commentarial.
61 D 16,3.33 (SD 9).
62 The kasiṇa is a meditation device (a colour, a primary element or light) that provides support for visualization exercise until one acquires the mental image (nimitta). For example, a disc made of clay is used in earth kasiṇa meditation, a bowl of water in water kasiṇa meditation. On the 10 kasiṇas, see Mahā Sakuludāyi Sutta (M 77, 24/2:14 f); SD 49.5b (1). For details, see Vism chs 4-5 (where, however, the space kasiṇa is restricted to limited space, and the consciousness kasiṇa is replaced by the light kasiṇa).
63 Mahā Parinibbāna Sutta (D 16,3.24/2:110); Mahā Sakuludāyi Sutta (M 77,22/13); Abhibhāyatanas (A 8.65/4:305), Kosala Sutta (A 10.29/5.61). The Dhamma, saṅgāṇi apparently regard the abhibhāyatanas as being “concerned with the mastery and facility in certain aspects of jhāna practice” (Gethin, 2001:267). See Dhs 45-52 where the 8 abhibhāyatanas (with slight variations from the Nikāya formulation) are treated as an aspect of jhāna that is of the form realm (rūpāvacara); cf DhsA 187-190. See BDic: abhibhāyatanas.
(6) **The 6th liberation.** Through the utter transcending of the base of infinite consciousness, contemplating, “There is nothing,” one enters and dwells in the base of nothingness. This is the sixth liberation.

(7) **The 7th liberation.** Through the utter transcending of the base of nothingness, one enters and dwells in the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception. This is the seventh liberation.

(8) **The 8th liberation.** Through the utter transcending of the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, one enters and dwells in the cessation of perception and feeling. This last stage requires both concentration and insight, and can be attained only by non-returners and arhats who have mastered the formless attainments.

The Commentary on the Mahā Sakuludāyi Sutta (M 77.22/2:13) says that these liberations (vimokkhā) are the mind’s full (but temporary) release from the opposing states and its full (but temporary) release by delighting in the object (ārammaṇa) (MA 3:255, cf 255-259).  

11 “Positive” dependent arising

In the Mahā Nidāna Sutta, conditionality is depicted in negative mode, that is, showing the impossibility of a dependent state from arising without its condition. On the other hand, conditionality is presented positively—showing how a condition flows into the dependent state—in suttas such as:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sutta</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Āhāra Sutta</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>The 4 kinds of food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upanisā Sutta</td>
<td>6.12</td>
<td>Mundane and supramundane dependent arising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paccaya Sutta</td>
<td>39.12</td>
<td>Specific conditionality and ignorance as root</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sammasa Sutta</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>How the Buddha awakened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upayanti Sutta</td>
<td>83.17</td>
<td>How suffering is conditioned</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is said that the nun Khemā had listened to the Mahā Nidāna Sutta in the time of Kassapa Buddha (Ap 34/2:546), and on hearing it again, expounded by our Buddha, she recalled the event and became an arhat (Ap 72/2:549).

— — —

**The Discourse on the Great Connections**

D 15

[55]  
1 Thus have I heard.  
At one time, the Blessed One was staying among the Kurus. 65 There was a market-town of the Kurus called Kammāsa,damma. 66

---

64 For further details, see SD 49.5b (3).

65 Comy to Mahā Nidāna S (D 15) says: “It is said that the Blessed One was unable to find any dwelling-place at (ie, near) the market-town. So leaving the market-town, the Blessed One went into the great forest, where he found a certain suitable and pleasant spot with water, and there he dwelt, making the market-town his alms-resort” (Bhagavato kira tasmiṁ nigame vasan’okāso koci vihāro nāma nāhosī. Nigamato pana apakkamma aññatarasmiṁ udakaka,sampanne ramaniye bhūmi,bhāge mahā,vana,soṇḍo ahosi tattha bhagavā vihāsi, tam nigamaṁ gocara,gāmaṁ katvā) (DA 2:483). See Intro (1.2) & (12).

66 This opening is identical to Mahā Satipaṭṭhāna S (D 22) and Satipaṭṭhāna S (M 10). As such, it is very likely that this sutta was taught at the same venue around the same time. DA explains that there was no place in town for the Buddha to stay, so he stayed outside, in the jungle. The same setting opens Mahā Nidāna S (D 15.1/2:55). Kammāsa,damma, Kammāsa,dhamma, or Kammasa-: Comy here says: “It is said that the Blessed One was unable to find any dwelling-place at (ie, near) the market-town. So leaving the market-town, the Blessed One went into the
Ānanda’s declaration

1.2 Then, the venerable Ānanda approached the Blessed One, saluted him and sat down at one side. Seated thus at one side, he said this to the Blessed One:

“It is wonderful, bhante; it is marvellous, bhante, how deep this dependent arising is, how deep it appears to be.67 Yet it is as clear as can be to me!”

“For example, Ānanda! Do not say so, Ānanda! The dependent arising is deep, it appears deep. Ānanda, because of not understanding, because of not penetrating this truth, this generation has become like a tangled skein, like a knotted ball of thread, like matted muñja-grass68 and reeds—it does not cross beyond the cyclic life69 with its plane of misery, its bad destination, its lower realms.

I. Description of dependent arising

Reverse cycle

2 Ānanda, if one were asked, ‘Are decay and death due to a specific condition?’70 One should say, ‘They are.’

If one were asked, ‘With what as condition, is there decay and death?’ one should say, ‘With birth as condition, there is decay and death.’

Ānanda, if one were asked, ‘Is birth due to a specific condition?’ [56] one should say, ‘It is.’

If one were asked, ‘With what as condition, is there birth?’ one should say, ‘With existence as condition, there is birth.’

Ānanda, if one were asked, ‘Is existence due to a specific condition?’ one should say, ‘It is.’

If one were asked, ‘With what as condition, is there existence?’ one should say, ‘With clinging as condition, there is existence.’

Ānanda, if one were asked, ‘Is clinging due to a specific condition?’ one should say, ‘It is.’

---

The Kurukṣetra

The Kurukṣetra was located in the plain of Kurukṣetra between the Yamunā and the Ganges, where its capitals of Hastinapura (Pali Hatthihina, pura) (NE of Meerut) and Indraprastha (Pali Indapatta) (near Delhi) played important roles during the Epic period. According to Buddhaghosa the people of Kammāsadalama had a good diet and great wisdom; hence, out of compliment, the Buddha taught them profound suttas: (Mahā) Satipatthāna Sutta (D 22; M 10), Mahā Nidāna Sutta (D 15) and Āneñja, sappāya Sutta (M 106/2:261 ff) (SA 2:87). The (Cūja) Nidāna Sutta (S 12.60/-2:92), Sammāsa Sutta (S 12.66/2:107 f) and Ariyasa, vasā Sutta (A 18.20/5:29 f) were also delivered at Kammāsadalama.

Bodhi: “We might perhaps understand the first phrase [“The dependent arising is deep’] to refer to dependent arising as an objective principle, the second [“appears deep’] to the verbal exposition of that principle. Together they indicate that dependent origination is deep both in essence and in manifestation.” (1984:7). Comy explains that dependent arising is “deep” in 4 respects: (1) depth of meaning (ie, from the effect looking back to its condition); (2) depth of phenomena (ie, from the condition looking to its effect); (3) depth of teaching (diversity of methods use by the Buddha to teach it); (4) depth of penetration (it makes one realize the true nature of existence). (DA 2:485 f; see also 1984:7-9).

Muñja, a kind of grass reed, Saccharum graveolens Rottler (Sn 440). Cf muñja, kesa, “having dark flowing mane (like muñja grass),” (D 2:174). It is sometimes made into slippers (muñja, pādukā) (DhA 3:451). The muñja reed itself (as opposed to the sheath) is called istikā, but this is found only in similes (D 1:77 = M 2:17; cf J 6:67; DA 1:222). SED (Monier Williams), under iksukānda, says that muñja is a kind of sugar cane. According to the University of Melbourne (Australia)’s “Multilingual Multiscript Plant Name Database,” muñja is the Bengal cane, see http://rimmo.mur.csu.edu.au/Plantnames/Sorting/Saccharum.html.

Cyclic life,” saṃsāra, lit “perpetual wandering,” ie, round/s of rebirth. This is the unbroken chain of the aggregates (khandha) that are inherently painful due to their impermanence.

“Specific condition,” idap, paccaya jāra maraṇaṁ ti, lit “Is there specific condition in decay and death?” “Specific condition,” (idap, paccayā), that is, the proximate cause and effect. See Bodhi 1984:10-13.
If one were asked, ‘With what as condition, is there clinging?’ one should say, ‘With craving as condition, there is clinging.’

Ānanda, if one were asked, ‘Is craving due to a specific condition?’ one should say, ‘It is.’

If one were asked, ‘With what as condition, is there craving?’ one should say, ‘With feeling as condition, there is craving.’

Ānanda, if one were asked, ‘Is feeling due to a specific condition?’ one should say, ‘It is.’

If one were asked, ‘With what as condition, is there feeling?’ one should say, ‘With contact as condition, there is feeling.’

Ānanda, if one were asked, ‘Is contact due to a specific condition?’ one should say, ‘It is.’

If one were asked, ‘With what as condition, is there contact?’ one should say, ‘With name-and-form as condition, there is contact.’

If one were asked, ‘With what as condition, is there name-and-form?’ one should say, ‘With consciousness as condition, there is name-and-form.’

Ānanda, if one were asked, ‘Is consciousness due to a specific condition?’ one should say, ‘It is.’

If one were asked, ‘With what as condition, is there consciousness?’ one should say, ‘With name-and-form as condition, there is consciousness.’

Such is the arising of this whole mass of suffering.

Birth conditioning decay-and-death

4 It is said thus: ‘With birth as condition, there is decay and death.’

4.2 Ānanda, how birth conditions decay and death should be known in this manner:

If there were no birth of any kind whatsoever in anyone anywhere—

that is to say, of devas into the deva state, of gandharvas into the gandharva state, of yakshas into the yaksha state, of non-humans into the non-human state, of humans into the human state, of quadrupeds

71 While this sutta defines the terms for the other links, it does not define nāma,rūpa, but goes on to discuss the causal connection between nāma,rūpa and phassa (omitting saññā aññata) [19-22]. Reat (1987) gives an insightful study of nāma,rūpa. See also Bucknell 1999:322 ff.

72 This link and the next form a loop. They are both defined at §§21+22a.

73 On the relationship of this condition and the preceding, see Intro (3).

74 Nābhavissa sabbaṇa sabbaṇa sabbathā sabbaṇa kassaci kimhi, alt tr, “If all ... of all kinds whatsoever everywhere were not to be.” Sabbaṇa sabbaṇa sabbathā sabbaṇa, lit “the all with all, the all every way,” which occurs 15 times altogether in this Sutta: §§4-19 (D 15/2:57,6+21+31, 58,11+22, 59,11+25, 60,1+12+22+33, 61,8+17+26, 62,4). On the significance of sabbaṇa sabbaṇa sabbathā sabbaṇa, see Potaliya S (M 54,14+25) + SD 43.8 (2.2).

75 “Gandharvas,” gandhabba, in Mahā Taṇha,saññkhaya S (M 38,26). SD 7.10, refers to the “being-to-be-born” or rebirth-consciousness (patissandhi, cittā). Although here, gandhabba can refer to class of divine beings, it is more likely that is the intermediate state (antarābhava). This is a state between rebirths when the being is none of the 5

http://dharmafarer.org
into the quadruped state, or the winged into the winged state, or reptiles into the reptile state, each into their own state—

if there were no birth whatsoever—
then, in the complete absence of birth, with the cessation of birth, would decay and death occur?"  
“Certainly not, bhante.”

“Therefore, Ānanda, this itself is the reason, this is the connection [link], this is the arising, this is the condition for decay and death, that is to say, birth.”

Existence conditioning birth

5 “It is said thus: ‘With existence as condition, there is birth.’
Ānanda, how existence conditions birth should be known in this manner:

5.2 If there were no existence of any kind whatsoever—that is to say, the sense existence, the form existence, or the formless existence—
if there were no existence whatsoever—
then, in the complete absence of existence, with the cessation of existence, would birth occur?”
“Certainly not, bhante.”

5.3 “Therefore, Ānanda, this itself is the reason, this is the connection [link], this is the arising, this is the condition for existence, that is to say, existence.”

Clinging conditioning existence

6 “It is said thus: ‘With clinging as condition, there is existence.’
Ānanda, how clinging conditions existence should be known in this manner:

If there were no clinging of any kind whatsoever in anyone—that is to say, no clinging to sense-pleasure, clinging to views, clinging to vows and rituals, or clinging to the self-doctrine—if there were no clinging whatsoever—
then, in the complete absence of clinging, with the cessation of clinging, would there be existence?”
“Certainly not, bhante.”

“Therefore, Ānanda, this itself is the reason, this is the connection [link], this is the arising, this is the condition for existence, that is to say, clinging.”

(deva, human, animal, preta, or hell-being) or 6 (the 5 classes + asura) classes of beings. For discussion, see Harvey 1995:105-108. See “Is rebirth immediate?” in SD 2003:2.16.

77 “Non-humans,” bhūtā, usu tr as “spirits, demons,” but here I follow Comy and give a broader sense of the term.
77 “The winged,” pakkhiṇa, here encompasses not only birds, but any animals with wings, such as bats.
78 “Reptiles,” sirīṇasapa (Skt sarīrśpa), lit “crawling, creeping,” ie, snake, reptile (V 1:3, 2:110; D 2:57; M 1:19; S 1:154; A 2:73, 117, 143, 5:15; Sn 52, 964; J 1:93; Pv 3.5, 2; Nm 484; VbhA 6).*
79 “Would there by decay and death?” jārā, maraṇaṁ padaññayethā, lit “would decay and death be manifested?”

80 Tasmā ‘ti-h ānanda es’eva hetu etañi nidānaṁ esa samudayo esa paccayo jārā, maraṇaṁ, yad idaṁ jāti. The phrase “this itself is the reason, this is the connection [link], this is the arising, this is the condition” (es’eva hetu etañi nidānaṁ esa samudayo esa paccayo) occurs 17 times (§§4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22); see Intro (2.1).

81 Sābbha sabbhā sabbhā sabbhaṁ: see §4 n.
82 Sābbha sabbhā sabbhā sabbhaṁ: see §4 n.
83 The 4 clippings (upādāna): to sense-pleasure (kāmāpādāna), to views (dīṭṭhāpādāna), to vows and rituals (sīla-b, batupādāna), and to the self-doctrine (atta, vādāpādāna): see Sāmā Diṭṭhi S (M 9,34/1:50 f), SD 11.14. On clippings to sense-pleasures, see Anusaya, SD 31.3 (2). On clippings to views, see Anusaya, SD 31.3 (5). On clippings to vows and rituals, see Entering the stream, SD 3.3 (5.3). On clippings to self-doctrine, see Anusaya, SD 31.3 (5.2): self-view. Atṭānāvāda. Cf D 2:58, 3:230; M 1:66; S 2:3; Dhs 212. Regarding atta, vādāpādāna (clipping to a self-view), Comy says that those who hold such a view, talk about or cling to the “self” (MA 1:219). On atta,āda, see Sallekha S (M 8/1:40).
Craving conditioning clinging

7 “It is said thus: ‘With craving as condition, there is clinging.’

Ānanda, how craving conditions clinging should be known in this manner:

If there were no craving of any kind whatsoever in anyone anywhere—that is to say, no craving for visible forms, no craving for sounds, no craving for smells, no craving for tastes, no craving for touches, no craving for for mind-objects—

if there were no craving whatsoever—

then, in the complete absence of craving, with the cessation of craving, would there be clinging?”

“Certainly not, bhante.”

“Therefore, Ānanda, this itself is the reason, this is the connection [link], this is the arising, this is the condition for clinging, that is to say, craving.”

Feeling conditioning craving

8 “It is said thus: ‘With feeling as condition, there is craving.’

Ānanda, how feeling conditions craving should be known in this manner:

If there were no feeling of any kind whatsoever in anyone anywhere, that is to say, no feeling born of eye-contact, no feeling born of ear-contact, no feeling born of nose-contact, no feeling born of tongue-contact, no feeling born of body-contact, no feeling born of mind-contact—

if there were no feeling whatsoever—

then, in the complete absence of feeling, with the cessation of feeling, would there be craving?”

“Certainly not, bhante.”

“Therefore, Ānanda, this itself is the reason, this is the connection [link], this is the arising, this is the condition for craving, that is to say, feeling.

Dependent arising of social problems

9 Thus, Ānanda,

dependent upon feeling (vedanā), there is craving;
dependent upon craving (tānha), there is seeking;
dependent upon seeking (parīyesanā), there is gain;
dependent upon gain (lābha), there is decision-making;
dependent upon decision-making (vinicchaya), there is desire and lust;
dependent upon desire and lust (chanda, rāga), there is attachment;
dependent upon attachment (ajjhosāna), there is possessiveness;
dependent upon possessiveness (pariggaha), there is avarice; [59]
dependent upon avarice (macchariya), there is safe-guarding;
dependent upon safe-guarding (ārakkha), there arise various bad unwholesome states—taking up of the rod, taking up of

---

84 Sabbena sabbaṁ sabbathā sabbaṁ: see §4.2 n.
85 Sabbena sabbaṁ sabbathā sabbaṁ: see §4.2 n.
86 This section—listing the 9 states rooted in craving, omitting the first link, feeling—forms a short sutta of its own called Taḥha, mūla S (A 9.23/4:400 f), and which recurs at D 34.2.2(4)/3:289 (“the 9 things to be abandoned”) & Vbh 390. In the well known dependent arising formula, we have “contact→feeling→craving.” Here, however, the formula starts with feeling as the condition for craving, successively followed by 9 other factors, the last being a list of social problems. Comy labels the 2 sides of craving as “craving which is the root of the rounds” (vaṭṭa, mūla, taṇha) and “obsessional craving” (samudācāra, taṇha) (DA 2:500). See Intro (3.2). On dependent arising being applied to the rise of social disorders, see Dependent arising, SD 5.16 (19.5).
87 “Decision-making,” vinicchaya, lit “decision, deliberation, examination, investigation.”
88 “Desire and lust,” chanda, rāga, here treated as dvandva (so Nāṇamoli/Bodhi), “desire and passion” (Rhys Davids); sometimes treated as karmadharaya: “lustful desire” (Walshe).
the sword, conflicts, quarrels, disputes [strife], back-biting, harsh speech, false speech.\textsuperscript{89}

10 It is said: ‘\textbf{Dependent upon safe-guarding, there are born various bad unwholesome states—}\nthe taking up of the rod, the taking up of the sword, conflicts, quarrels, disputes, harsh speech, and false speech.’

Ānanda, how safe-guarding conditions the taking up of the sword, conflicts, quarrels, disputes, harsh speech and false speech should be known in this manner:

If there were no safe-guarding of any kind whatsoever in anyone anywhere,\textsuperscript{90} then, in the complete absence of safe-guarding, with the cessation of safe-guarding, would there be the taking up of the sword, conflicts, quarrels, disputes, harsh speech and false speech?’

“Certainly not, bhante.”

“Therefore, Ānanda, this itself is the reason, this is the connection [link], this is the arising, this is the condition for the taking up of the sword, conflicts, quarrels, disputes, harsh speech and false speech, that is to say, safe-guarding.

11 It is said: ‘\textbf{Dependent upon avarice, there is safe-guarding.}’

Ānanda, how avarice conditions safe-guarding should be known in this manner:

If there were no avarice of any kind whatsoever in anyone anywhere,\textsuperscript{91} then, in the complete absence of avarice, with the cessation of avarice, would there be safe-guarding?’

“Certainly not, bhante.”

“Therefore, Ānanda, this itself is the reason, this is the connection [link], this is the arising, this is the condition for safe-guarding, that is to say, avarice.

12 It is said: ‘\textbf{Dependent upon possessiveness, there is avarice.}’

Ānanda, how possessiveness conditions avarice should be known in this manner: [60]

If there were no possessiveness of any kind whatsoever in anyone anywhere,\textsuperscript{92} then, in the complete absence of possessiveness, with the cessation of possessiveness, would there be avarice?’

“Certainly not, bhante.”

“Therefore, Ānanda, this itself is the reason, this is the connection [link], this is the arising, this is the condition for avarice, that is to say, possessiveness.

13 It is said: ‘\textbf{Dependent upon attachment, there is possessiveness.}’

Ānanda, how attachment conditions possessiveness should be known in this manner:

If there were no attachment of any kind whatsoever in anyone anywhere, then, in the complete absence of attachment, with the cessation of attachment, would there be possessiveness?’

“Certainly not, bhante.”

“Therefore, Ānanda, this itself is the reason, this is the connection [link], this is the arising, this is the condition for possessiveness, that is to say, attachment.

14 It is said: ‘\textbf{Dependent upon desire and lust, there is attachment.}’

Ānanda, how desire and lust condition attachment should be known in this manner:

If there were neither desire nor lust of any kind whatsoever in anyone anywhere, then, in the complete absence of desire and lust, with the cessation of desire and lust, would there be attachment?’

“Certainly not, bhante.”

“Therefore, Ānanda, this itself is the reason, this is the connection [link], this is the arising, this is the condition for attachment, that is to say, desire and lust.

15 It is said: ‘\textbf{Dependent upon decision-making, there is desire and lust.}’

\textsuperscript{89} Ārakkhā` dhikaraṇāṁ daṇḍa`dānā, saṭṭh`adānā, kalaha, viggaha, vivāda, tuvan`tuva, pesu`na, musavādā aneke pāpakā akusalā dhammā sambhavanti.

\textsuperscript{90} Sabbena sabbaṁ sabbathā sabbaṁ: see §4.2 n.

\textsuperscript{91} Sabbena sabbaṁ sabbathā sabbaṁ: see §4.2 n.

\textsuperscript{92} Sabbena sabbaṁ sabbathā sabbaṁ: see §4.2 n.
Ānanda, how decision-making conditions desire and lust should be known in this manner:
If there were no decision-making of any kind whatsoever in anyone anywhere, then, in the complete absence of decision-making, with the cessation of decision-making, would there be desire and lust?” [61]
“Certainly not, bhante.”
“Therefore, Ānanda, this itself is the reason, this is the connection [link], this is the arising, this is the condition for desire and lust, that is to say, decision-making.
16 It is said: ‘Dependent upon gain, there is decision-making.’
Ānanda, how gain conditions decision-making should be known in this manner:
If there were no gain of any kind whatsoever in anyone anywhere, then, in the complete absence of gain, with the cessation of gain, would there be decision-making?”
“Certainly not, bhante.”
“Therefore, Ānanda, this itself is the reason, this is the connection [link], this is the arising, this is the condition for decision-making, that is to say, gain.

17 It is said: ‘Dependent upon seeking, there is gain.’
Ānanda, how seeking conditions gain should be known in this manner:
If there were no seeking of any kind whatsoever in anyone anywhere, then, in the complete absence of seeking, with the cessation of seeking, would there be gain?”
“Certainly not, bhante.”
“Therefore, Ānanda, this itself is the reason, this is the connection [link], this is the arising, this is the condition for gain, that is to say, seeking.

18 It is said: ‘Dependent upon craving, there is seeking.’
Ānanda, how craving conditions seeking should be known in this manner:
If there were no craving of any kind whatsoever in anyone anywhere—that is, no craving for sense-pleasure, craving for existence or craving for non-existence—then, in the complete absence of craving, with the cessation of craving, would there be seeking?”
“Certainly not, bhante.”
“Therefore, Ānanda, this itself is the reason, this is the connection [link], this is the arising, this is the condition for seeking, that is to say, craving.

Thus, Ānanda, these two dharmas, being a duality, converge into a unity in feeling. [62]

Feeling

19 It is said: ‘With contact as condition, there is feeling.’
Ānanda, how contact conditions feeling should be known in this manner:
If there were no contact of any kind whatsoever in anyone anywhere—that is to say, there were no eye-contact, ear-contact, nose-contact, tongue-contact, body-contact or mind-contact—then, in the complete absence of contact, with the cessation of contact, would there be feeling?”
“Certainly not, bhante.”
“Therefore, Ānanda, this itself is the reason, this is the connection [link], this is the arising, this is the condition for feeling, that is to say, contact.

---

93 Comy: These two dharmas (or phenomena) (ime dve dhammā) are the two aspects of craving, that is, craving as the root of the rounds of rebirths (vaṭṭa, miḷa, tanhā) and craving as obsession (samudācāra, tanhā), ie, obsessive craving (DA 2:500). In the Chinese texts, only one Dirghāgama reading (T60c.13) mentions the three forms of tanhā, but both Dirghāgama and Madhyamāgama list “these two dharmas” as kāma, tanhā and bhava, tanhā (T243a19-20 = T579b22 = T845a8-9). Bucknell concludes, “It is likely, therefore, that [the Dīgha version] formerly listed just the two kinds, despite Buddhaghosa’s suggestion that the phrase refers to a different two kinds of tanhā [DA 500].” (1999:317 n21).

94 Sabbena sabbathā sabbaṁ: see §4.2 n.
Contact

20 It is said: ‘With name-and-form as condition, there is contact.’

Ānanda, how name-and-form conditions contact should be known in this manner:

(1) If, Ānanda, there were no qualities, traits, signs and indicators through which there is a description [definition] (paññatti) of the mental body [mind-group]—then, would conceptual impression manifest in the physical body?

“Certainly not, bhante.”

(2) If, Ānanda, there were no qualities, traits, signs and indicators through which there is a description of the mental body [mind-group]—then, would sense-impression manifest in the mental body?

“Certainly not, bhante.”

(3) If, Ānanda, there were no qualities, traits, signs and indicators through which there is a description of the mental body and the physical body [the mind-group and the body-group]—then, would conceptual impression or sense-impression manifest itself?

“Certainly not, bhante.”

(4) If, Ānanda, there were no qualities, traits, signs and indicators through which there is a description of the name-and-form—then, would there be contact?

“Certainly not, bhante.”

“Therefore, Ānanda, this itself is the reason, this is the connection [link], this is the arising, this is the condition for contact, that is to say, name-and-form.

---

95 Yehi ākārehi yehi lingehi yehi nimittehi yehi uddesehi. Comy: The mutually dissimilar nature of feeling, perception, mental formations and consciousness, are called “qualities” (ākāra). They are also called “traits” (linga) because, when carefully examined, they betray the hidden meanings (of their base) (līnam-atha). They are also called “signs” (nimitta) because they are the causes of perceiving (sañjāna,hettu); and they are also called “indicators” (uddesa) because they are to be indicated (“pointed out”) (uddisitabbo) [through these, the meaning is signalled or inferred]. (DA 2:500 f; DAṬ within square brackets). For further explanation, see SD 18.3(1.1).

96 Nāma,kāya, the “mind-group” comprises the 4 formless groups of existence (arūpino khandhā): feeling (vedanā), perception (saññā), formations (saṅkhāra) and consciousness (viññāna). It is distinguished from rūpa,kāya, the body-group, comprising form (rupa), ie, the 4 elements (dhātu, mahā,bhūta) [see SD 17.1 & 2]. We have here the first canonical occurrence of this term and also at Pmn 1:183 (where it is def as “feeling, perception, intention, contact, attention and naming are the mental body, and also what are called mind-formations, vedanā saññā cetanā phasso manasīkārā nāma ca, nāma,kāya ca, ye ca vuccanti citta,saṅkhārā) but nāma,kāya is mentioned by itself at Sn 1074. The twofold grouping (nāma,kāya and rūpa,kāya) is common in Comys. In Dhamma,saṅgāṇī, all phenomena are classified as 3 groups: consciousness (citta) (khandha 5), mental factors (cetasika) (khandha 2-4) and form (rupā = khandha 1).

97 “Conceptual impression,” adhivacana,samphassa, lit “designation-contact” or “labelling-contacts” [5.3] referring to verbal (ie, mental or conceptual) impression. Comy: “Conceptual impression is synonymous with mind-contact, which arises in the mind-door taking the four (mental) aggregates as its basis [because it is apprehended by means of designation and description]” (DA 2:501 with Subcomy). U Thittila, in his Vbh 6 tr, renders it as “analogical contact” (Vbh: T §17/7) with the n, “Mind and mental objects do not impinge but are explained by the analogy (adhivacana) of physical states.” On adhivacana and patīgha, see Intro (5.2) above.

98 Yehi Ānanda ākārehi yehi lingehi yehi nimittehi yehi uddesehi nāma,kāvassa paññatti hoti, tesu ākāresu tesu līgessu tesu nimittesu tesu uddesesu asati, api nu kho rūpa,kāve adhivacana, samphasso vā patīgha,samphasso vā paññāyethā ti. On rūpa,kāya, see §20(1) n here.

99 “Sense-impression,” paṭīgha,samphassa, lit “impingement-contact” or “impact-contact” [5.3], referring to impression through sensory stimulus. Comy: Sense-impression is the contact that arises taking the contact-aggregate of form as basis (sappatīgham rūpa,khandhān vattaṭhān) (DA 2:501), that is, contact arising through eye-contact, ear-contact, nose-contact, tongue-contact and body-contact (ie, the 5 physical sense-experiences). On adhivacana and patīgha, see (5.2) above.

100 Yehi Ānanda ākārehi yehi lingehi yehi nimittehi yehi uddesehi rūpa,kāvassa paññatti hoti, tesu ākāresu tesu līgessu tesu nimittesu tesu uddesesu asati, api nu kho patīgha,samphasso vā paṭīgha,samphasso vā paññāyethā ti.
The looped dependent arising\textsuperscript{101}

**Existential consciousness**\textsuperscript{102}

21 It is said: ‘With consciousness as condition, there is name-and-form.’ [63]

Ānanda, how consciousness conditions name-and-form should be known in this manner:

If there were no consciousness to descend into a mother’s womb, would name-and-form take shape in the womb?\textsuperscript{103}

“Certainly not, bhante.”

If, after descending into the mother’s womb, the consciousness were to depart, would name-and-form be generated in this state of being here?”

“Certainly not, bhante.”

“If the consciousness of a young boy or a young girl were to be cut off, would name-and-form grow, develop and mature?”

“Certainly not, bhante.”

“Therefore, Ānanda, this itself is the reason, this is the connection [link], this is the arising, this is the condition for name-and-form, that is to say, consciousness.

**Cognitive consciousness**\textsuperscript{104}

22 It is said: ‘With name-and-form as condition, there is consciousness.’

Ānanda, how name-and-form conditions consciousness should be known in this manner:

If there were no name-and-form to find a footing in consciousness, would there be further arising of birth, decay, death and suffering?

“Certainly not, bhante.”

“Therefore, Ānanda, this itself is the reason, this is the connection [link], this is the arising, this is the condition for consciousness, that is to say, name-and-form.

**Name-and-form and consciousness**

22.2 It is thus far, Ānanda, that one can be born or decay or die or fall away or re-arise;\textsuperscript{105}

thus far there is a pathway for designation; \textit{adhivacana, patha}

thus far there is a pathway for language; \textit{niruttapi, patha}

thus far there is a pathway for description; \textit{paññatti, patha}

thus far there is a sphere for wisdom [knowing]— \textit{paññā ´vacara}

it is thus far that the samsaric round (of lives) turns [64]

\textsuperscript{101}On the looped dependent cycles, see SD 14.7 (3).

\textsuperscript{102}This term (“existential consciousness”) and the next subheading (“cognitive consciousness”) are neologisms.

See Viññāṇa, SD 17.8a (6) & The unconscious, SD 17.8b (3) & (5.1).

\textsuperscript{103}Cf Titth’āyatana S (A 3.61) where the Buddha declares: “Based on the 6 elements, there is descent into the womb; | (On account of) such a descent, there is name-and-form; | With name-and-form as condition, there is contact; | With contact as condition, there is feeling. | Now, it is for one who feels that I make known [the 4 noble truths]” (A 3.61.9/1:176). This clearly shows that feeling arises with the descent of the gandharva (rebirth consciousness) into the womb. However, this is not a common interpretation of viññāṇa-nāma,rūpa dyad, where “viññāṇa in this context became the consciousness that descends into the mother’s womb at conception, while nāma-rūpa became the body complex that takes shape and, after developing sense-organs (saḷāyatana), experiences contact (phasa) and so on.” (Bucknell 1999:339). More commonly, viññāṇa is “the consummation of the 6 types of consciousness associated with the sense organs, which makes the version read like an account of the psychological process of sensory perception.” (Bucknell 1999: 327): see Madhu,piṇḍika S (M 18.16-18/1:111-113). See discussion on nāma,rūpa in the essay Dependent arising, SD 5.11 Intro.

\textsuperscript{104}On the 2 forms of consciousnesses, see §21 subheader n.

\textsuperscript{105}On this section, see (8.2.3).
II. Talk on the rounds (vaṭṭa,kathā): self-views

Descriptions of the self

23 To what extent, Ānanda, does one, when describing the self, describe it?107 Ānanda, one describing the self as having form and being limited, describes it thus, ‘My self has form and is limited.’ Or, Ānanda, one describing the self as having form and being unlimited, describes it thus, ‘My self has form and is unlimited.’ Or, Ānanda, one describing the self as being formless and limited, describes it thus, ‘My self is formless and limited.’ Or, Ānanda, one describing the self as being formless and unlimited, describes it thus, ‘My self is formless and unlimited.’

24 Here, Ānanda, the one who describes the self as having form and being limited either describes such a self (as existing only) now,108 or one describes such a self as one that will be [will arise in the future],109 or one thinks: ‘What is not so, I will fashion it so that it is so’.110 This being the case, it is right to say that the notion (of a self) as having form and being limited lies latent in one.

24.2 Here, Ānanda, the one who describes the self as having form and being unlimited either describes such a self (as existing only) now, or one describes such a self as one that will be [will arise in the future], or one thinks: ‘What is not so, I will fashion it so that it is so.’ This being the case, it is right to say that the notion (of a self) as having form and being unlimited lies latent in one.

24.3 Here, Ānanda, the one who describes the self as being formless and limited either describes such a self (as existing only) now, or one describes such a self as one that will be [will arise in the future], or one thinks: ‘What is not so, I will fashion it so that it is so.’ This being the case, it is right to say that the notion (of a self) as being formless and limited lies latent in one.

106 The PTS ed is followed here. Be adds añña-m-añña,paccayatā pavattati, “(which) occur as conditions for one another.” “But this phrase seems to have been mistakenly read from the commentarial gloss into the text itself.” (Bodhi 1984:60 n1). On the interrelationship between name-and-form and consciousness [21, 22], see Naḷa,kaḷapi-ya S (S 12.67) which compares this intimate interconnection (nāma,rūpa and viññāṇa) to “two bundles of reeds that are standing and supporting each other...if one of the two were to fall, the other would fall, too.” (S 12.67/ 2:114).

107 Kittavatā ca ānanda attānaṁ paññāpento paññāpeti, lit, “And in what ways, Ānanda, does one describing the self, describe (it)?” The syntax is significantly purposeful, as the question means: How do we see the self without falling into the false notion that it is something eternal or abiding—and without identifying with it in any way? In other words, how do we actually not conceptualize the self, but see it merely as its really is: impermanent, changing and becoming other. [§25 n]

108 As in the case of a materialist holding an annihilationist view.

109 Tattha bhāvini vā so rūpiṁ anantaṁ attānaṁ paññāpento paññāpeti. For example, in the case of an eternalist or a Creator-God believer.

110 Atthaṁ vā pana santāṁ tathättāya upakappessāmi. Walshe: “Though it is not so now, I shall acquire it there.” Nānamoli/Bodhi: “That which is not thus, I will convert towards the state of being thus.” One possible interpretation is that, for example, an eternalist thinking that his “soul” is not permanent, hopes for “eternal life” by subscribing to some eternalist belief. For the interpretations of this enigmatic sentence, see Bodhi 1984:38 (Intro).
24.4 Here, Ānanda, the one who describes the self as being formless and unlimited 
either describes such a self (as existing only) now, 
or one describes such a self as one that will be [will arise in the future], 
or one thinks: ‘What is not so, I will fashion it [65] so that it is so.’

This being the case, it is right to say that the notion (of a self) as formless and unlimited lies latent in one.

—Ānanda, it is in these ways that one describing the self describes it.

Non-description of the self

25 To what extent, Ānanda, does one, when not describing the self, not describe it?\(^{111}\)
Here, Ānanda, one not describing the self as having material form and being limited, does not describe it thus, ‘My self has form and is limited.’
Or, Ānanda, one not describing the self as having form and being unlimited, does not describe it thus, ‘My self has form and is unlimited.’
Or, Ānanda, one not describing the self as being formless and limited, does not describe it thus, ‘My self is formless and limited.’
Or, Ānanda, one not describing the self as being formless and unlimited, does not describe it thus, ‘My self is formless and unlimited.’

26 Here, Ānanda, one who does not describe the self as being formless and limited neither describes such a self (as existing only) now, nor does one describe such a self as one that will be [will arise in the future], nor does one think: ‘What is not so, I will fashion it so that it is so.’

This being the case, it is right to say that the notion (of a self) as having material form and being unlimited does not lie latent in one.

26.2 Here, Ānanda, one who does not describe the self as having form and being unlimited neither describes such a self (as existing only) now, nor does one describe such a self as one that will be [will arise in the future], nor does one think: ‘What is not so, I will fashion it so that it is so.’

This being the case, it is right to say that the notion (of a self) as having form and being unlimited does not lie latent in one.

26.3 Here, Ānanda, one who does not describe the self as being formless and limited neither describes such a self (as existing only) now, nor does one describe such a self as one that will be [will arise in the future], nor does one think: ‘What is not so, I will fashion it so that it is so.’

This being the case, it is right to say that the notion (of a self) as being formless and limited does not lie latent in one.

26.4 Here, Ānanda, one who does not describe the self as being formless and unlimited neither describes such a self (as existing only) now, nor does one describe such a self as one that will be [will arise in the future], nor does one think: ‘What is not so, I will fashion it so that it is so.’ [66]

This being the case, it is right to say that the notion (of a self) as being formless and unlimited does not lie latent within one.

—Ānanda, it is in these ways that one not describing the self does not describe it.

\(^{111}\) Kittavatā ca ānanda attānaṁ na paññāpento na paññāpeti (note the double neg), lit, “How far, Ānanda, does one when not describing the self, does not describe (it)?” Here, we see the self simply as a conventional and convenient construct (as in referring to something and in human communication). Hence, the “self” is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise, and should not be identified in any way. In this way, we do not feed the latent tendencies of lust, ill will and ignorance. \(\S 23\). See Bodhi 1984:34-47.
The self is meaningless apart from experiences

27 In what ways, Ānanda, does one, contemplating the self, contemplate it?

(1) Here, Ānanda, one contemplating the (notion of) the self, contemplates it thus, ‘Feeling is my self.’

(2) Or, Ānanda, one contemplating the (notion of) the self, contemplates it thus, ‘Feeling is not my self; my self is without the experience of feeling.’

(3) Or, Ānanda, one contemplating the (notion of) the self, contemplates it thus, ‘Feeling is not my self, but my self is not without feeling. My self feels; for my self is of the nature to feel.’

One feeling at a time

28 (1) In the case, Ānanda, of the one who says, ‘Feeling is my self,’ he should be asked: ‘Friend, there are these 3 kinds of feeling: pleasant feeling, painful feeling, neutral feeling. Of these three kinds of feeling, which do you consider as the self?’

Ānanda, when one experiences a pleasant feeling, one does not, at the same moment, experience a painful feeling or a neutral feeling. At that moment, one experiences only a pleasant feeling.

Ānanda, when one experiences a painful feeling, one does not, at the same moment, experience a pleasant feeling or a neutral feeling. At that moment, one experiences only a painful feeling.

Ānanda, when one experiences a neutral feeling, one does not, at the same moment, experience a pleasant feeling or a painful feeling. At that moment, one experiences only a neutral feeling.

Feelings are impermanent, non-self

29 Ānanda, a pleasant feeling is impermanent, conditioned, dependently arisen, subject to destruction, subject to passing away, subject to fading away, subject to ending.

Ānanda, a painful feeling, too, is impermanent, conditioned, dependently arisen, subject to destruction, subject to passing away, subject to fading away, subject to ending.

Ānanda, a neutral feeling, too, is impermanent, conditioned, dependently arisen, subject to destruction, subject to passing away, subject to fading away, subject to ending.

29.2 If, when one experiences a pleasant feeling, one thinks, ‘This is my self,’ then, with the ending of that pleasant feeling, one thinks, ‘My self is gone!’

If, when one experiences a painful feeling, one thinks, ‘This is my self,’ then, with the ending of that painful feeling, one thinks, ‘My self is gone!’

If, when one experiences a neutral feeling, one thinks, ‘This is my self,’ then, with the ending of that neutral feeling, one thinks, ‘My self is gone!’

29.3 Thus one who thinks, ‘Feeling is my self’ regards the self as something that, even here and now, is impermanent, a mixture of pleasure and pain, subject to arising and passing away.

Therefore, Ānanda, it is unacceptable to contemplate thus, ‘Feeling is my self.’

---

112 For a discussion on this section see, Steven Collins, Selfless Persons, 1982:98-103; also Self & selves, SD 26.9 (2.4(3)).

113 Vedanā me attā ti. That is, identifying the “self” with the feeling aggregate (vedanā-k,khandha) (DA 2:507 f).

114 Na h’eva kho me vedanā attā, appaṭṭasamvedano me attā ti. That is, identifying the “self” with the body aggregate (rūpa-k,khandha). (DA 2:507 f).

115 “My self...is of the nature to feel,” Na h’eva kho me vedanā attā, no pi appaṭṭasamvedano me attā, attha me vediyati, vedanā, dhammo hi me attā. That is, identifying the self with the aggregates of perception (sañña-k,khandha), formations (sankhāra-k,khandha) and consciousness (viññāna-k,khandha) (DA 2:507 f).

The sentence, vedanā,dhammo hi me attā, lit “feeling-nature indeed is my self,” alt tr “my self is subject to feeling.”
We are what we feel

30 Here, Ānanda, of the one who says, ‘Feeling is not my self; my self is without the experience of feeling,’ he should be asked: ‘Friend, where there is nothing at all that is felt, could the idea “I am” occur here?”

“Certainly not, bhante.”

“Therefore, Ānanda, it is unacceptable to contemplate thus, ‘Feeling is not my self; my self is without the experience of feeling.’

Feelings change

31 Here, Ānanda, of the one who says, ‘Feeling is not my self, but my self is not without feeling,’ he should be asked: ‘Friend, if feeling were to utterly end without remainder, then, when feeling does not exist at all, with the ending of feeling, could (the idea), “I am this,” occur there?”

“Certainly not, bhante.”

“Therefore, Ānanda, it is unacceptable to contemplate thus, [68] ‘Feeling is not my self, but my self is not without the experience of feeling.’

One who clings not to the world

32 Ānanda, when a monk

(1) does not regard feeling as the self, and

(2) does not regard the self as without experience of feeling, and

(3) does not contemplate thus, ‘My self feels; for my self is of the nature to feel’—then, being without such considerations, he does not cling to anything in the world.

Not clinging, he is not agitated. Unagitated, he attains nirvana for himself. He understands, ‘Destroyed is birth. The holy life has been lived. What needs to be done has been done. There is (for me) no more of arising in any state of being.’

32.2 Ānanda, if anyone should say of a monk whose mind has been thus freed that he holds the view, ‘A tathāgata exists after death’—that would not be proper.

Or that he holds the view, ‘A tathāgata does not exist after death’—that would not be proper.

Or that he holds the view, ‘A tathāgata both exists and does not exist after death’—that would not be proper.

Or that he holds the view, ‘A tathāgata neither exists nor not exist after death’—that would not be proper.

32.3 What is the reason for this? Because that monk is freed by directly knowing that thus far there is a way for designation;

thus far there is a way for language;

thus far there is a way for defining;

thus far there is a sphere for knowing [wisdom];

thus far that the samsaric round (of lives) turn for defining this (state of being).

116 On refutations (2) and (3), Harvey says: “These two refutations show that, for the authors of the early Suttas, a real Self must have self-awareness, having a sense of ‘I am’ or ‘this I am.’ The argument is, though, that the sense of ‘I am’ or ‘this I am’ only arises when feeling exists. As they thus depend on feeling, which is itself not-Self (refutation i), they are themselves not-self [1995: §1.9/p20 f]. The ‘I’ that is Self would thus turn out to be not-Self, which is a contradictory situation. That is, if there can only be a Self under conditions which would make it not-Self, then, it is clearly impossible for there to be such a thing as s Self. While the above passage may not be intended to ‘refute’ Self, but only deny certain views on Self, it clearly has the effect of showing that the concept itself is self-contradictory.” (1995:31 f). In 2012, Harvey uses “non-self” instead of “not-self”: see Is there a soul, SD 2.16 (1.2).

117 Be ayam aham asmi, “I am this.” The PTS ed asmi, “I am,” which is confirmed by Comy. Both eds have ayam aham asmi as the reading for the following section.

118 Attā me vediyati, vedanā, dhammo hi me attā ‘ti.
32.4 To say of a monk who is freed by directly knowing this that he holds the view, ‘One does not know, one does not see’—that would not be proper.

III. Talk on the ending of the rounds (vivatta,kathā)

The 7 stations for consciousness

33 Ananda, there are these 7 stations for the consciousness, and there are the 2 bases.

What are the seven?
(1) There are, Ananda, beings who are different in body and different in perception, that is to say, human beings, some devas and some beings in the lower realms.
This is the first station for the consciousness.
(2) There are, Ananda, beings who are different in body but same in perception, that is to say, the beings of the Brahma world who have arisen through the first dhyana.
This is the second station for the consciousness.
(3) There are, Ananda, beings who are the same in body but different in perception, that is to say, the devas of streaming radiance (abhā-s, sara).
This is the third station for the consciousness.
(4) There are, Ananda, beings who are the same in body and same in perception, that is to say, the devas of radiant glory (subha,kinna).
This is the fourth station for the consciousness.
(5) There are, Ananda, beings who, through having utterly transcended the perception of physical form, the passing away of perceptions of impingement, and non-attention to the perception of diversity, (contemplating,) ‘Space is infinite,’ arrive at the base of infinite space.
This is the fifth station for the consciousness.
(6) There are, Ananda, beings who, through having utterly transcended the base of infinite space, (contemplating,) ‘Consciousness is infinite,’ arrive at the base of infinite consciousness.
This is the sixth station for the consciousness.
(7) There are, Ananda, beings who, through having utterly transcended the base of infinite consciousness, (contemplating,) ‘There is nothing,’ arrive at the base of nothingness.
This is the seventh station for the consciousness.

33.2 And there is the base of non-percipient beings with the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception as the second.

The true nature of the 7 stations for consciousness

34 (1) Ananda, regarding the 1st station for consciousness, whose beings are different in body and different in perception, that is to say, human beings, some devas and some beings in the lower realms—whoever understands it, and its arising, its passing away, its satisfaction, its dangers, and the escape from it—is it proper for him to delight in it?” [70]
“Certainly not, bhante.”
(2) “Ananda, regarding the 2nd station for consciousness,

---

119 “The 7 stations for the consciousness,” satta viññāṇa-t.thitiyo. For diag, see Table 10. It is interesting to note that the Pure Abodes (suddhāvāsa), the five highest heavens of the form world (rūpa,loka), are not listed as “stations for consciousness” (viññāṇa-t.thiti) [Table 10 n ad loc].
120 Elsewhere these are called “the nine abodes of beings” (nava,sattāvāsa) (D 33.3.2(3)/3:263, 33.2.2(3)/3:288; A 9.24/4:401). Here āyatana is rendered as “sphere,” referring to a realm or level of meditation; where it refers to the senses, it is tr as “base.” Avacara (lit “down-wandering”) is tr as “realm,” but “sphere” is often used here, too. See Table 10 for a full list of the various stations and spheres.
121 ***
whose beings are different in body but same in perception, that is to say, human beings, some devas and some beings in the lower realms—

whoevers he understands it, and its arising, its passing away, its satisfaction, its dangers and the escape from it—is it proper for him to delight in it?”

“Certainly not, bhante.”

(3) “Ānanda, regarding the 3rd station for consciousness, whose beings are same in body but different in perception, that is to say, the devas of streaming radiance (abha-s,sara)—

whoevers he understands it, and its arising, its passing away, its satisfaction, its dangers and the escape from it—is it proper for him to delight in it?”

“Certainly not, bhante.”

(4) “Ānanda, regarding the 4th station for consciousness, whose beings are same in body and same in perception, that is to say, the devas of radiant glory (Subha,kinna)—

whoevers he understands it, its arising, its passing away, its satisfaction, its dangers and the escape from it—is it proper for him to delight in it?”

“Certainly not, bhante.”

(5) “Ānanda, regarding the 5th station for consciousness, through having utterly transcended the perception of physical form, the passing away of perceptions of impingement, and non-attention to the perception of diversity, (contemplating,) ‘Space is infinite,’ arrive at the base of infinite space—

whoevers he understands it, its arising, its passing away, its satisfaction, its dangers and the escape from it—is it proper for him to delight in it?”

“Certainly not, bhante.”

(6) “Ānanda, regarding the 6th station for consciousness, through having utterly transcended the base of infinite form, (contemplating,) ‘Consciousness is infinite,’ arrive at the base of infinite consciousness—

whoevers he understands it, its arising, its passing away, its satisfaction, its dangers, and the escape from it—is it proper for him to delight in it?”

“Certainly not, bhante.”

(7) “Ānanda, regarding the 7th station for consciousness, whose beings, through having utterly transcended the base of infinite consciousness, (contemplating,) ‘There is nothing,’ arrive at the base of nothingness—

whoevers he understands it, its arising, its passing away, its satisfaction, its dangers and the escape from it—is it proper for him to delight in it?”

“Certainly not, bhante.”

“Ānanda, when a monk—having understood as they really are, their arising, their passing away, their satisfaction, their dangers, and the escape concerning these 7 stations for the consciousness and concerning the two bases—is freed through non-clinging, then, he is called a monk freed by wisdom.

The 8 liberations

Ānanda, there are these 8 liberations.122 What are the eight?

(1) One with physical form sees physical forms.123 This is the 1st liberation.

---

122 “8 liberations,” aṭṭha vimokkhā; also at Saḷāyatana S (M 137,26/3:222). These 8 also constitute “mental liberation” (ceto,vimutti); see Jhānabhiññā S (S 16.9,29 n), SD 50.7. For further details, see Intro (10).

http://dhammafarer.org
(2) One does not see physical form internally, but sees physical forms externally. This is the 2nd liberation. [71]

(3) One is liberated after contemplating the idea of the beautiful. This is the 3rd liberation.

(4) Through the utter transcending of the perception of physical form, the passing away of the perception of impingement, and non-attention to the perception of diversity, (contemplating,) ‘Space is infinite,’ one enters and dwells in the base of infinite space. This is the 4th liberation. [126]

(5) Through the utter transcending of infinite space, (contemplating,) ‘Consciousness is infinite,’ one enters and dwells in the base of infinite consciousness. This is the 5th liberation.

(6) Through the utter transcending of the base of infinite consciousness, (contemplating,) ‘There is nothing,’ one enters and dwells in the base of nothingness. This is the 6th liberation.

(7) Through the utter transcending of the base of nothingness, one enters and dwells in the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception. This is the 7th liberation.

(8) Through the utter transcending of the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, one enters and dwells in the cessation of perception and feeling. This is the 8th liberation. [127]

The arhat freed both ways

36 Ánanda, when a monk attains these 8 liberations in a forward order, or in a reverse order, or in both forward and reverse order, when he attains to them and emerges from them, wherever he wishes, in whatever way he wishes, for as long as he wishes, 36.2 and by realizing for myself through direct knowledge, right here and now, with the destruction of the influxes, [128]

attain and dwell in the influx-free freedom of mind, freedom by wisdom [129]—

---

123 Rūpī rūpāni passati. Perceiving form on one’s own body, one sees forms externally. This is said in connection with kasina meditation. This is one of the “spheres of sovereignty” (abhibhāyatana), ie, one of the 8 stages of mastery over the senses through dhyana (jhāna); see D 2:110; M 77/2:13; A 8.675/4:305, 10.29/6:61. See Intro (10).

124 Ajjhattaṁ arūpa, saññī bhahiddhā rūpāni passati. Not perceiving forms on one’s own body, one sees forms externally. See Intro (10).

125 ‘Subhan’ t’eva adhimutto hoti. This consists of concentrating the mind on perfectly pure and bright colours as kasina-object. See Intro (10).

126 On these 4 formless dhyanas and cessation, see also Cūla Go,siṅga S (M 31,13-18), SD 44.11.

127 This last stage requires both concentration and insight, and can be attained only by non-returners and arhats who have mastered the formless attainments. See Bodhi, 1984:47-51.

128 Āsavānam khāyā anāsavam ceto, vimuttim paññā, vimuttim diṭṭhe va dhamme sayam abhiññā sacchikatvā upāsamaippa viharaṭi. This is stock, found throughout the 4 Nikāyas. Āsava (lit “inflow, outflow”) comes from ā-savati “flows towards” (ie, either “into” or “out” towards the observer). It has been variously tr as taints (“deadly taints,” RD), corruptions, intoxicants, biases, depravity, misery, bad (influence), or simply left untranslated. The Abhidhamma lists 4 influxes: of (1) sense-desire (kām’āsava), (2) desire for eternal existence or becoming (bhav’āsava), (3) views (diṭṭh’āsava), (4) ignorance (avijjāsava) (D 16.2.4, Pm 1.442, 561, Dhs §§1096-1100, Vbh §937). These 4 are also known as “floods” (oghā) and “yokes” (yogā). The list of 3 influxes (omitting the influxes of views) is probably older and is found more frequently in the suttas (D 33.1.10(20)/3:216; M 1.55, 3:41; A 3.59, 67, 6.63). The destruction of these influxes is equivalent to arhathood. See BDict: āsava.

129 “Freedom of mind and freedom by wisdom,” respectively: ceto, vimutti (or, freedom by concentration, ie, through the destruction of the mental hindrances) and paññā, vimutti (freedom through insight). One who is freed by wisdom “may not have reached the 8 liberations (vimokkha = jhāna) in his own body, but through seeing with wisdom, his mental influxes are destroyed” (M 70,16/1:478). All arhats are perfectly freed in the same way from ignorance and suffering, but are distinguished into two types on the basis of their proficiency in concentration. Those who can attain the 8 liberations (attha, vimokkha), which include the 4 formless attainments and the attainment of cessation, are called freed both ways, ie, freed from the physical body by means of the formless dhyanas, and from all defilements by the path of arhathood. Arhats like Sāriputta and Mogallāna “are freed both ways” (ubhato, bhūga, vimutta). The differences between the 2 types of freedom are given in Mahā, nidāna S (D 2:70 f), Kiṭāgiri S (M 1:477 f), and esp. Jhānābhīṣa S (S 16.9,29 n), SD 50.7.
then, he is called a monk who is **freed both ways** [dual-freed].

36.3 Ānanda, there is no other “freedom both ways” that is higher or more excellent than this freedom both ways.”

36.4 The Blessed One said this. The venerable Ānanda joyfully approved of the Blessed One’s word.

—— evam ——

**Bibliography**

Bodhi, Bhikkhu

1984  *The Great Discourse on Causation* [Mahā Nidāna Sutta tr & exegeses]. Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1984. [Incl all the doctrinally important passages from its Commentary and Subcommentary. A long and important introductory essay discusses the sutta’s rich doctrinal and philosophical implications, and an appendix explains the treatment of dependent arising according to the Abhidhamma system of conditional relations (*pañṭhāna*).]

Brahmavamso, Ajahn


Bucknell, Roderick S


Brekke, Torkel


Gethin, Rupert


Gombrich, Richard F


**Aṅguttara** mentions the 2 states that partake of spiritual knowledge (*dve vijjā, bhāgiyā*) as, namely, calm (*sama-tha*) and insight (*vipassanā*). The cultivation of calm leads to the destruction of passion and the cultivation of insight to the destruction of ignorance (A 2.4.10/1:61). The distinction between the two is expressed by “freedom of mind” (*ceto,vimutti*) and “freedom by wisdom” (*paññā,vimutti*) respectively. “However, these two expressions are not simply equivalent in value relative to realization. While ‘freedom by wisdom’ (*paññā,vimutti*) refers to the realization of *Nibbāna*, ‘freedom of the mind’ (*ceto,vimutti*), unless further specified as ‘unshakeable’ (*akappa*), does not imply the same. ‘Freedom of the mind’ can also connote temporary experiences of mental freedom, such as the attainment of the four absorptions, or the development of the divine abodes (*brahma,vihāra*) [e.g M 1:296]. Thus this passage is not presenting two different approaches to realization but two aspects of the meditative path, one of which is not sufficient by itself to bring realization” (Analayo, Satipaṭṭhāna: The direct path to realization, 2003:89 f). See Lily de Silva, “Cetovimutti, paññāvimutti and ubhatobhāgavimutti,” *Pāli Buddhist Review* 3,3 1978:118-145.

For a full list of the 8 liberations, see *Mahā Nidāna S* (D 15.35/2:70 f). For full list of the 8 liberations, see *Mahā Nidāna S* (D 15.35/2:70 f), SD 5.17.35. See also D 3:262, 228; *Vimokkha S*, A 8.66/4:306; also M 120,37/ 3:103 (SD 3.4).

130 “One freed both ways,” *ubhato, bhāga vimutta*. In simple terms, “freedom of mind” (*ceto,vimutti*), encompasses what the later Mahāyāna regard as the destruction of “the afflictive obstructions” (*klesāvaraṇa*), ie, sense-based defilements, and “freedom by wisdom” (*paññā,vimutti*) encompasses the Mahāyāna notion of the destruction of “noetic obstructions” (*jñeyāvaraṇa*), or simply ignorance. On types of saints, see (10).

131 “Joyfully approved,” *attamanā ... abhinandum.*

[http://dharmafarer.org](http://dharmafarer.org)
Hamilton, Sue

Harvey, Peter

Jurewicz, Joanna,

Kearney, Patrick

Khantipalo [Laurence Mills]

Mizuno, Kögen

Naṇananda, Bhikkhu

Payutto, P[rayudh] A[r[yankura]

Reat, N Ross

Smith, Brian K

Sujato, Bhikkhu [Ajahn Sujato or Sujata]

Waldron, WS

Watsui, Tetsurō

Yamada, Ishii

Yinshun, Shi