2b

Matter and Moments

The phases of matter and the theory of moments by Piya Tan ©2006

1 Phases of mind and matter

1.1 SUTTA TEACHINGS ON THE "MOMENT" (THE MIND)

1.1.1 Early Buddhism on impermanence

1.1.1.1 The Pali term for "moment" is **khaṇa** (Skt kṣana). On the suttas, it has no technical sense, and simply and literally means "moment," a very short duration, almost the way we would use the word today. For example, we might say, "The moment she recalled the event, she smiled." We find this adverbial phrase of time, used non-technically, in the Vinaya and the suttas, thus: "at that very moment, in that very instant" (tena khaṇena tena layena tena muhuttena), or more briefly, "at that very moment, in that very instant" (tena khaṇena tena muhuttena).

Furthermore, we see "moment" (*khaṇa*) being used as a synonym of "impermanent: (*anicca*), as in the sentence, "Life is momentary" (*jīvitam khaṇikam*, Nm 1:44, 119). A well known descriptive and reflective definition of impermanence is found in this pericope: "Whatever is of the nature to arise, all that is of the nature to pass away" (*yaṁ kiñci samudaya,dhammaṁ*, *sabbaṁ taṁ nirodha,dhammaṁ*), spoken by the Buddha to the 5 monks at the starts of his dispensation, and amongst his famous final words, "Impermanent indeed are all conditioned things; they are of the nature to arise and pass away" (*aniccā vata saṅkhārā uppāda,vaya,dhammino*).

The same sentiment is famously uttered, for example, by the arhat Assaji to the wanderer Sāriputta, as:

Ye dhammā hetu-p,pabhavā tesam hetum tathāgato āha tesañ ca yo nirodho evam,vādī mahā,samano Whatever states that arise from causes, their causes the Tathagata [thus-come] has told, and their ending, too— thus spoke the great recluse. (Mv 1.13.5+10)⁶

1.1.1.2 In terms of reflecting on impermanence, early Buddhism, as a rule, speaks of reality, that is, the present moment of consciousness, as comprising **3 moments**, that is, arising ($upp\bar{a}da$), persistence (thiti) and dissolution ($bha\dot{n}ga$). As a technical set, this triad first appears in the Commentaries (such as in Buddhaghosa's Visuddhi,magga, Vism 431, passim), but there are close parallels in at least two suttas, which probably served as the source for the commentarial teaching of the 3-phased moment of consciousness.

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¹ For a modern attempt scientific attempt to measure such a moment, between action and reaction, by Benjamin Libet, see **Free will and Buddhism**, SD 7.7 (12).

² V 1:12,12; **Cūļa Gosiṅga S** (M 31,32/1:210,32), SD 44.11; **Dhamma,cakka Pavattana S** (S 56.11,19/5:424,3), SD 1.1; Pm 2:149.

³ V 3:19,4; **Parichattakûpama S** (A 7.65/4:120).

 $^{^4}$ V 1:10, 12, 13, 16×2, 18-20, 23, 37, 40, 42, 226, 2:157, 192, 200; D 1:110, 148, 2:41, 43, 44, 289; M 1:376, 501, 2:145, 3:280; S 4:47, 106, 192, 193, 5:423; A 4:186, 210, 213; U 49; Nm 1:95 passim; Nc passim; Pm 2:149; Kvu 109, 179, 186, 194, 220; Miln 16, 17.

⁵ V 2:157, 199; S 1:158, 2:192, 4:14, 5:30; A 1:286, 2:248; Ap 1:64, 274, 2:385; J 95.

⁶ Mv 1.13.5+10 @ V 1:40,28*+41,35* (VA 5:975) = Ap 1.146/1:25 (ApA 231) = Peţk 10 = ThaA 3:95.

1.1.2 The 3 phases of time. The best known reference is found in two closely related suttas, **the Saṅkhata Lakkhaṇa Sutta** (A 3.47a). It is a very short Sutta, and is here quoted in full, thus:

There are, bhikshus, these 3 conditioning characteristics of the conditioned. What are the three?

Arising is discerned; uppādo paññāyati passing away is discerned; vayo paññāyati

a becoming-other of its presence is discerned. thitassa aññathattam paññāyati

These, bhikshus, are the 3 conditioning characteristics of the conditioned.

(A 3.47a), SD 33.11(1.3)a

These are clearly instructions for reflecting on the fleeting event, say the breath: we breathe in (arising), we breathe out (passing away), then follows a pause as the breath "changes" into an in-breath. When we are more mentally focused and stilled, we can even apply these 3 stages to each phase of the breath: we notice the in-breath, then a pause or gap of seeming no-breath, out-breath, then a space of no-breath, and so on.

It is simply a practical guide to mental cultivation, without any technical philosophy behind it. In the commentaries and the Abhidhamma, these phases were formulated in a technical sense, along with various other philosophical details. In the Commentaries, for example, the last stage of "becoming other" (*thitassa aññathatta*) was viewed as "decay or aging (*jarā*)."

Such philosophical developments continued in the other sectarian schools, often displacing its original purpose as a guide to the perception of impermanence as our practice. What is taught in the suttas as an essential mental training became philosophized into a technical theory, and even later still, became ritualized and externalized. Such developments may be interesting, even useful, as academic pursuits, but if we value awakening, then we should go back to what the early suttas teach about them.

1.1.3 The impermanence of the aggregates. Another probable source of the post-Buddha theory of moments was probably found in the (Aññathatta) Ānanda Sutta 1 (S 22.37). The Buddha teaches Ānanda, and us, how to answer the question, "What are those things of which an arising is discerned, a passing away is discerned, a becoming-other in their presence is discerned?" Ānanda replies that they are all in connection with the 5 aggregates, thus:

When asked thus, bhante, I would answer thus:

'It is of <u>form</u> (feeling | perception | formations | consciousness) that
an arising is discerned,
a passing away is discerned,
a becoming-other of its presence is discerned.

'It is of <u>form</u> (feeling | perception | formations | consciousness) that

uppādo paññāyati

vayo paññāyati

thitassa aññathattam paññāyati

(S 23.37/3:37 f), SD 33.11

1.2 THE ABHIDHAMMA THEORY OF MOMENTS (MATTER)

1.2.1 The Abhidhamma 4 phases. The Abhidhamma extended the reflection of impermanence, by way of the theory of moments, to material things, that is, matter itself. According to Abhidhamma, the last four of the 28 material phenomena are the most significant, ¹⁰ namely:

⁷ "The conditioned characteristics of the conditioned," saṅkhatassa saṅkhata,lakkhaṇa.

⁸ SA 2:266; AA 2:252.

⁹ Katam'esaṁ, āvuso ānanda, dhammānaṁ uppādo paññāyati, vayo paññāyati, ṭhitassa [so Be; Ee Ke Se ṭhitā-naṁ] aññathattaṁ paññāyatī'ti?

¹⁰ See SD 17.2a, Table 9.

growth (production)	rūpassa upacaya	"growth of matter";
continuity	rūpassa santati	"continuity of matter";
decay	rūpassa jaratā	"decay of matter"; and
impermanence	rūpassa aniccatā	"impermanence of matter."

Although these phases clearly apply to matter in general, in the Abhidhamma scheme, they tacitly apply only to <u>living matter</u>. Understandably, this is because its purpose is that of seeing <u>the three characteristics</u> within oneself for the sake of training towards spiritual liberation.

1.2.2 The Dhamma, sangan defines these 4 terms as follows:

Ch	aracteristic of matter	Dhamma,saṅgaṇī (Dhs 153 f)	Visuddhi,magga ¹¹
(1)	growth or production of matter (<i>rūpassa</i> upacaya)	"the increase [piling up] of the sense- bases is the growth of matter" (yo āyatanānaṁ ācayo, so rūpassa upacayo)	Production of matter has the characteristic of piling up [increase]. Its function is to make material instances emerge for the first time. It is manifested as launching or as the completed state. Its proximate cause is produced matter.
(2)	continuity of matter (rūpassa santati)	"the growth of matter is its continuity" (yo rūpassa upacayo, sā rūpassa santati)	Continuity of matter has the characteristic of occurrence. Its function is to anchor. It is manifested as non-interruption. Its proximate cause is matter to be anchored. ¹²
(3)	decay of matter (rūpassa jaratā)	"the ageing, decaying, broken teeth, grey hair, wrinkled skin, the dwindling away of one's years, the weakness of the sense-faculties of matter" (yā rūpassa jarā jīraṇatā khaṇḍiccaṁ pāliccaṁ valittacatā āyuno saṁhāni indriyānaṁ paripāko)	Decay has the characteristic of the maturing [aging] of material phenomena. Its function is to lead them on towards their termination. It is manifested as loss of newness without loss of being, like the state of old paddy. Its proximate cause is decaying matter. ¹⁴
(4)	impermanence of matter (rūpassa aniccatā)	"the destruction, decay [loss], breaking up, disintegrating, impermanence, disappearance of matter" (yo rūpassa khayo vayo bhedo paribhedo aniccatā antaradhānam)	Impermanence has the characteristic of the complete breaking up of material phenomena. Its function is to make them subside. It is manifested as destruction and falling away. 15 Its proximate cause is matter that is breaking up completely.

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¹¹ Vism 14.66-69/449 f: also at Abhs:BRS (Guide to §4) p242.

¹² Cf Dhs 133, 144.

¹³ Dhs 144: this is stock: **Mahā Satipaṭthāna S** (D 22.18(2)/2:305), SD 13.2; **Sammā Diṭṭhi S** (M 9.22/1:49), SD 11.14; **(Paṭicca,samuppāda) Vibhaṅga S** (S 12.2/2:2), SD 5.15.

¹⁴ This is said in reference to decay evident in changes in teeth, etc, as their brokenness, etc (cf Dhs 644). Vism also refers to <u>inanimate decay</u>: changes in the formless dharmas is called "hidden decay" (*paţicchanna jarā*); changes in the earth, water, rocks, the moon, the sun, etc is called "incessant decay" (*avīci jarā*). (Vism 14.68/449) ¹⁵ Cf Dhs 645.

1.2.3 Definition of terms

1.2.3.1 Let us first examine (1) and (2). While the first factor, "growth" is defined as "the increase of sense-bases" (āyatanānaṁ ācayo), the second factor, "continuity" is simply identified with the first, "growth." Both appear to express the same thing, but they are separately listed. In fact, the first refers to "the growth or integration of matter and the second its continuity or subsistence." (Karunadasa 1967: 79)

- **1.2.3.2** The Visuddhi,magga explains that both (1) "growth of matter" and (2) "continuity of matter" refer to matter at its birth (*jāti*). ¹⁶ The Abhidhamm'attha,saṅgaha Vibhāvinī Ṭīkā clarifies further that the first refers to the bodily growth (of the embryo) from conception until the full development of the 10 physical senses beginning with the eyes. ¹⁷ This is understandable because when the term *āyatana* is used by itself, it usually refers to the six internal (*ajjhatika*) sense-faculties. However, here, it is used in a more restricted sense to refer to only the 5 physical sense-faculties.
- **1.2.3.3** The word ācaya means "heaping, piling up, accumulation." As such, āyatanānaṁ ācayo refers the gradual development of the 5 sense-faculties. This is confirmed by **the Kathā,vatthu** discussion on the development of the senses. The Kathā,vatthu Commentary says that the Pubba,seliya and the Apara,seliya¹8 hold the view that the sixfold sense-spheres arise in a being all at once (apubbaṁ acarimaṁ). The Theravādins reject this view on the grounds that it is neither logical nor supported by scripture. Their view is that only the mind-base (manâyatana) and the body-base (kāyâyatana)—that is, only the mental processes and the physical body—arise at the moment of conception. The other four—the eye-base (cakkh'-āyatana), ear-base (sot'āyatana), nose-base (ghan'āyatana), and tongue-base (jivh'āyatana)—arise subsequently in this order.¹9

Based on this understanding, the fact that $\bar{a}yatan\bar{a}na\dot{m}$ $\bar{a}caya = r\bar{u}passa$ upacaya becomes clear. The sequential arising of the first 5 senses is the growth and integration of the body $(r\bar{u}passa\ upacaya)$. To borrow a simile from the Commentaries, increase is like the welling up of water in a spring, and growth is the overflowing of the spring. In other words, "growth" (or production) refers to the arising and full development of the sense-faculties, and "continuity" refers to their continued maintenance and functionality. It should, however, be understood that these sense-faculties do not have any independent

¹⁶ Vism 14.66 f/449.

¹⁷ Tattha paṭisandhito paṭṭhāya yāva cakkh'ādi,dasakānam uppati, etthantare rūp'uppādo upacayo nāma (AbhsVṬ 114).

¹⁸ Skt Pūrvaśaila, and Apara, śaila; KvuA 148.

¹⁹ Comy adds that the remaining physical senses (eye and ear, smell and taste) take 77 days to arise, which is partly due to the karma that brought about the conception, and partly due to other karma (KvuA 148). The former is generative (or productive) karma (*janaka kamma*), and the latter supportive karma (*upaṭṭhambhaka kamma*) (Abhs: SR 143 f; Abhs:BRS 5.18/200-202). Generative karma (ie wholesome or unwholesome volition) produces resultant mental states and karma-born materiality, both at the moment of rebirth (generates rebirth-linking consciousness and the materiality of the new being) and in the course of existence (maintaining the sense-faculties, sexual determination, and heart-base). Supportive karma does not produce its own results, but augments some other karmic results. For example, when one is reborn a human, wholesome supportive karma may contribute to a longer lifespan, better health and living conditions. Or, if one is reborn as an animal, unwholesome supportive karma may facilitate the ripening of more unwholesome karma, and may also extend one's lifespan so that the unwholesome results endure longer.

²⁰ Vism 14.67/449; DhsA 327. Karunadasa's simile is "the gathering of people is the growth of the crowd" (1967:79).

existence as they are derived matter ($up\bar{a}d\bar{a},r\bar{u}pa$), that is to say, they only rise along with the four elements.

1.2.3.4 Now we come to (3) "decay of matter," which is a well known stock passage. The general sense of the passage, especially suggested by the phrase "the dwindling away of one's years" ($\bar{a}yuno sa\dot{m}h\bar{a}ni$), is that this is a new stage: while the previous stages have to do with production, continuity and maturity, this third stage is that of the beginning of decline.

1.2.3.5 The last stage, (4) "<u>the impermanence of matter</u>" signifies the break-up of the body with life's end (Dhs 144). The moment of death is when the "material life-faculty" (*rūpa,jīvit'indriya*), or more simply "life-force," ceases to function.²¹

2 The 3 characteristics of existence

- **2.1** These 4 types of derived matter, expressed as the four phases of matter, are clearly an elaboration of 3 "characteristics of the conditions" (saṅkhata,lakkhaṇa) as stated in **the Saṅkhata,lakkhaṇa Sutta** (A 3.47a).²² All conditioned things—all existence, animate and inanimate (but not nirvana)—have these <u>3 characteristics</u>: those of arising (uppāda), of ending (vaya) and of change in state (thitassa aññathatta).
- **2.2** Here, arising (*uppāda*) clearly corresponds with (1) "growth of matter," and ending (*vaya*) with (4) "impermanence of matter." *Thitassa aññathatta* literally translates as "the otherwiseness of that which exists," or continuous change. This third characteristic needs some elaboration: it has to do with the notion of the moment (*khaṇa*; Skt *kṣana*).
- **2.3** If the final, irreducible, state of matter is the "atom" (paramāṇu or kalāpa), ²³ then the final, irreducible, state of the mind is the "dharma" (dhamma; Skt dharma), or a "mind-moment" (citta-k,khaṇa). ²⁴ This theory is not found in the early texts, but as Mrs Rhys Davids notes, "it was inevitable that later exegesis would so develop the theme." ²⁵ The rationale behind her insight is clear enough from the spirit of early Buddhism as reflected as such passages as this excerpt from **the Assutavā Sutta 1** (S 12.61):

Bhikshus, it would be better that the untutored worldling were to take this body comprising the 4 elements, rather than the mind (citta), to be the self [soul] ($att\bar{a}$).

What is the reason for this?

The 4-element body, bhikshus, is seen persisting for a year, or two, or three, or four, or five, or ten, or twenty, or forty, or fifty, or for a hundred years, or even longer. But, bhikshus, that which is called the mind (citta), or mentation (mano), or consciousness ($vi\tilde{n}\tilde{n}ana$), arises as one thing, ceases as another, night and day.²⁶ (S 12.61,6 f/2:94), SD 20.2

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²¹ Cf Kathā,vatthu Comy, which says that at the moment of death, both form (*rūpa*) and the formless life-faculties (*arūpa jīvit'indriya*) cease to function simultaneously (*cuti-k,khaṇasmiṁ dve pi jīvitāni sah'eva bhijjanti*) (KvuA 113).

²² A 3.47a/1:152 (SD 33.11(1.3a)).

²³ See **Buddhist atomism**, SD 26,2.

²⁴ For a helpful discussion, see Karunadasa 1967:81-91.

²⁵ CAF Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Psychology*, London, 1918:14.

²⁶ Yañ ca kho etaṁ bhikkhave vuccati cittam iti pi mano iti pi viññāṇam iti pi taṁ rattiyā ca divassa ca divasassa ca aññad eva uppajjati aññaṁ nirujjhati. It is possible to freely render this as: "But, bhikshus, that which is called consciousness ... arises as one thing, ceases as another, like night and day." See also Bodhi's n: S:B 769 n157.

Or, this passage from the Panihita Acchanna Vagga of the Anguttara Nikāya (A 1.5.8):

Bhikshus, I do not see any other single state (*eka,dhamma*) that is so quick to change, that is to say, bhikshus, as this mind.

(A 1.5,8/1:10)

2.4 The early and mediaeval Theravadin Abhidhammists (c 300 BCE-300) all agree on the momentariness of the mental elements, ²⁷ and do not reject the relative permanence of the body or matter in general. This was also generally the case with the other early Indian Buddhist schools. However, there were many, notably the Sarvāstivāda, the Mahīśāsaka, the Pūrvaśaila, and the Apara, śaila, who rejected this distinction, postulating that *both* mental and physical elements are instantaneous. ²⁸

As such, the early Buddhist sectarians were divided into two general groups: (1) those who accepted the momentariness of mental elements but relative permanence to material elements, and (2) those who rejected such a distinction, postulating that both mental *and* physical elements were momentary.

2.5 The Theravadin Abhidhammists did not accept that material elements, too, were momentary like mental events. They seem to have taken *thitassa aññathatta* ("continuous change") in a general sense, and kept faithful to the early doctrine of "the characteristics of the conditioned" (*saṅkhata,lakkhaṇa*), where both the mental and the material are treated as equally impermanent. Their view of the 3 characteristics in terms of the 4 derived matter may be diagrammatically summarized as follows:²⁹




Table 2 The early Abhidhammist view of impermanence (based on Karunadasa 1967:83)

[Key: $aniccat\bar{a}$ = impermanence; $jarat\bar{a}$ = decay; santati = continuity; thitassa $a\tilde{n}\tilde{n}athatta$ = continuity of change; upacaya = growth or production; $upp\bar{a}da$ = arising; vaya = ending.]

3 The theory of moments

3.1 One of the most remarkable developments in world philosophy is the application by the Abhidhamma scholiasts of the atomic theory to time.³⁰ Long before modern science, perhaps for the first time in

²⁷ See C A F Rhys Davids 1914:204-208. 458 f, 620 f.

²⁸ Origin and doctrines of early Indian Buddhist Schools (Xuanzang's version of Vasumitra's treatise), tr J Masuda, Asia Major 2 1925:54; A Bareau, Les Sectes Bouddhiques de Petit Véhicule, BEFEO 38, 1955:103, 105, 144, 186. See Documents d'Abhidharma, tr L de la Vallée Poussin, Mélanges Chinoises et Bouddhiques 5 1937:137-140, where Saṅghabhadra strongly criticizes the thesis that matter is not of momentary duration. See also L Silburn, Instant et Cause, Paris, 1955:227-274.

²⁹ See Karunadasa 1967:78-91.

 $^{^{30}}$ For a more detailed treatment, see SD 26.1-2. Discussed in detail by Collins, 1982:237-261.

human history, "[t]ime was reduced to a series of atomic moments, and the only actually existent time was the present moment."³¹

Interestingly, the idea was actually rejected by the Theravadins at first: towards the end of **the Kathā,-vatthu** (a mid-3rd century BCE work),³² the notion that "all things are single mind-moments" (*eka,citta-k,khaṇikā sabbe dhammā*), held by the Pūrvaśaila, and the Apara,śaila, is criticized and refuted.³³ In due course, however, as history has witnessed, the Theravadins would go on not only to adopt that <u>mental dharmas are momentary</u>—as we will be examining here—but, after Buddhaghosa's time, accept that even <u>material dharmas</u>, too, are momentary (that is, the theory of the *kalāpa*).³⁴

3.2 What is most striking about the Theravāda theory of moments (*khaṇika,vāda*) is that each dharma (state) has three moments (or sub-moments), namely,

the nascent moment	(arising)	uppāda-k,khaṇa
the static moment	(staying), and	ṭhiti-k,khaṇa
the cessant moment	(ending)	bhaṅga-k,khaṇa

These are not three different dharmas, but $\underline{3 \text{ phases}}$ (avatth \bar{a}) of a single dharma. The Theravadins, however, continue to hold that the static moment (thiti-k,khaṇa) of matter is longer than that of the mental dharma.

3.3 The Anguttara Commentary explains the 3 characteristics of the conditioned (*sankhata lakkhana*) [2], thus:

arising,	uppāda	=	birth	jāti
ending, and	vaya	=	destruction, and	bheda
continued change	ṭhitassa aññathatta	=	decay	jaratā

and goes on to say that these three are represented by the nascent moment (*uppāda-k,khaṇa*), the cessant moment (*bhaṅga-k,khaṇa*) and the static moment (*thiti-k,khaṇa*) respectively (AA 2:252). This means that the static moment is also the moment of decay, and that there is some kind of change even during the static moment. This table summarizes the explanation:

Aṅguttara ³⁷	Aṅguttara Commentary (AA 2:252)		
arising (uppāda)	birth (<i>jāti</i>)	nascent moment (uppāda-k,khaṇa)	
ending (vaya)	destruction (bheda)	cessant moment (<i>bhaṅga-k,khaṇa</i>)	
continued change (thitassa aññathatta)	decay (<i>jaratā</i>)	static moment (ṭhiti-k,khaṇa)	

Table 3. The 3 characteristics of the conditioned and the 3 moments

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³¹ Thomas 1933:165.

³² The text is said to have been composed "218 years after the Nirvana" (DhsA 4,25). On the date of Kvu, see E Frauwallner, "Die buddhistischen Konzile," ZDMG 102,2 1952:258 (= Kleine Schriften, Wiesbaden, 1982).

³³ Kvu 22.8/620 f; KvuA 195 f.

³⁴ See SD 17.2d.

³⁵ VbhA 7 f, 25-29; Vism 291 f, 613 f. On how the theory of perception is explained on the basis of the theory of moments, see Sarachchandra, *Buddhist Psychology of Perception*, 1958:42 ff.

³⁶ See Karunadasa 1967:85 f, 132 f.

³⁷ Saṅkhata Lakkhaṇa S (A 3.48/1:52) [10.2].

3.4 Both Buddhaghosa (author of **the Visuddhi,magga**, early 5th century) and Buddhadatta (author of **the Abhidhammâvatāra**, 5th century), in almost identical words, however, are careful to note that "<u>decay</u>" (*jaratā*) is manifested as "<u>the loss of 'newness'</u> (*nava,bhāva*) (of a dharma), not the loss of its intrinsic nature (*sabhāva*): it is like new paddy becoming old (*vīhi,purāṇa,bhāvo viya*)."³⁸

4 Impermanence of all existence

4.1 The open secret of the phenomenal success of early Buddhism as a philosophy of the mind, or more importantly, as a system of self-awakening, is that in its discourse, the spirit always given priority over the letter: the meaning is above the means.³⁹ This is especially true of the development of the Buddhist teachings regarding the phases of matter and the theory of moments.

The 4 phases of matter, despite their ordered sequence, and also the canonical <u>3 characteristics of existence</u>, are really only one and the same process, that of **decay**. From the moment of conception, decay begins: all the developmental terms of the four stages are simply stages of decay. Decay is the first half of an average life-span is conventionally called "growth," while the latter half, "decline"; but they are decay all the same: decay by any other name works just the same.

4.2 The Ratha Vīnita Sutta (M 24)⁴⁰ contains a delightful dialogue between two great disciples of the Buddha, Sāriputta and Puṇṇa Mantāni,putta. Sāriputta questions Puṇṇa on the purpose of the spiritual life, and this dialogue ensues:

Seated thus at one side, the venerable Sāriputta said this to the venerable Puṇṇa Mantāṇi,-putta:

"Avuso, is the holy life lived under the Blessed One?"

"Yes, avuso."

"And is the holy life, lived under the Blessed One, for the sake of <u>the purification of moral</u> virtue?"

"No, avuso."

"Then, avuso, is the holy life lived under the Blessed One for the sake of the purification of mind?"

"No, avuso."

"Then, avuso, is the holy life lived under the Blessed One for the sake of the purification of view?"

"No, avuso."

"Then, avuso, is the holy life lived under the Blessed One for the sake of the purification by overcoming doubt?"

"No, avuso."

"Then, avuso, is the holy life lived under the Blessed One for the sake of the purification by knowledge and vision of what is and is not the path?"

"No, avuso."

"Then, avuso, is the holy life lived under the Blessed One for the sake of the purification by knowledge and vision of the path?"

"No, avuso."

³⁸ Vism 14.68/449; Abhv 71. See Karunadasa 1967:85-87.

³⁹ See **How the dhamma theory arose**, SD 26.1 (4).

⁴⁰ M 24/1:145-151 (SD 28.3).

"Then, avuso, is the holy life lived under the Blessed One for the sake of the purification of knowledge and vision?"

"No, avuso."

"... For the sake of what, then, avuso, is the holy life lived under the Blessed One?"

"The holy life, avuso, is lived under the Blessed One for the sake of <u>final nirvana without</u> <u>clinging</u>." (M 24,8-10/1:147 f), SD 28.3

Puṇṇa then presents $\underline{the\ parable\ of\ the\ relay\ of\ chariots}}$ to illustrate how through the different stages of inner purification, the true goal, final nirvana without clinging, is attained. The import of this important dialogue is very clear: $\underline{all\ wholesome\ states\ other\ than\ nirvana\ itself\ serve\ as\ means\ to\ attain\ \underline{it}.$

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Bibliography [See SD 17.17]

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