The 5 Aggregates (2): Feeling

1.0 There is a common notion in western philosophy and popular belief that our behaviour is not fully determined by our conscious mind. Both Benedict de Spinoza\(^1\) and Sigmund Freud,\(^2\) for example, have remarked that our behavior is determined only partially by our conscious “will,” but very much more by something else. For Spinoza, this “something else” is our feeling, and for Freud it is our unconscious.\(^3\) Often, when these forces—volition versus feeling/unconscious—act, they bring about conflicts.

1.1 Definition of feeling. Firstly, we should have a working definition of “feeling” (vedanā), and how it is different from “emotion” [1.3]. In early Buddhist psychology, feeling refers to the affective (or hedonic) tone that arises in connection with sense-perception, that is, pleasant feeling (sukhā vedanā), painful feeling (dukkhā vedanā) and neutral feeling (adukkham-asukhā vedanā), which is the first classification of feeling in the Vedanā Sāraṇyutta.\(^5\)

Furthermore, a pleasant feeling, painful feeling or neutral feeling can be physical (kāyika) (arising through the 5 physical senses) or mental (cetasika) (arising through the mind), totaling 6 types of feelings in all.\(^7\) The Abhidhamma classification, however, has only five types of feeling, taking neutral feeling as being mental only, that is, we are only aware that a feeling is present (or not).\(^8\)

The Majjhima Commentary says that it is not easy to be mindful of neutral feeling, and that it should be best approached by way of inference, by noting the absence of both pleasant and unpleasant feelings. It illustrates with the example of a hunter seeing tracks before and after a rock, thereby inferring the tracks of an animal (MA 1:277).

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1 Spinoza (1632-1677), independent Rationalist philosopher and religious thinker of Portuguese Jewish descent, who formulated one of the most important metaphysical systems in Western philosophy.
2 Freud (1856-1939), an Austrian (of Jewish descent) neurologist and founder of the psychoanalytic school of psychology, best known for his theories of sexual desire, repression, dreams, and the unconscious mind.
3 This “unconscious,” of course, refers to Freud’s idea, but the term below refers to an early Buddhist teaching (esp anusaya). Unless otherwise stated or from the context, terms like consciousness, preconscious, unconscious, subconscious, etc, refer to early Buddhist teachings. On these terms, see Viññāṇa, SD 17.8a esp (6.1); The unconscious, SD 17.8b esp (1).
4 On consciousness, see Viññāṇa, SD 17.8a, and see also The unconscious, SD 18.8b.
5 Vedanā samosaranā sabbe dhammā (A 10.58/5:107), SD 57.20b. For comy, see SD 57.25 (1.2.2).
6 Samādhi S (S 36.1/4:204); see also Mahā Satipaṭṭhāna S (D 22.11/2:298), SD 13.2 = Satipaṭṭhāna S (M 10.32/-1:59) SD 13.3; and also D 3:275; S 2:53, 82, 4:207; A 3:400. See also SD 13.1 (5B).
7 Cūḷa Vedalla S (M 44,23/1:302), SD 40a.9; Sallatthena S (S 36.6/4:208), SD 5.5. Other classifications of feelings are given below [4].
8 Vbh 72; Dhs 133.

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The suttas say that pleasant and unpleasant sights, sounds, smells, and tastes, in turn, condition the arising of corresponding feelings of pleasure, or of displeasure. The Dhamma, saṅgaṇī, however, says that only the sense of touch is accompanied by pain or pleasure, while feelings arising at the other four sense-doors are invariably neutral.

As Analayo notes,

This Abhidhammic presentation offers an intriguing perspective on observing feeling, since it invites an inquiry into the degree to which an experience of delight or displeasure in regard to sight, sound, smell or taste is simply the outcome of one’s own mental evaluation.

(Anālayo 2003:171)

1.2 Feeling and sensation

1.2.1 Is feeling the same as sensation? How is feeling different from emotion, or are they the same? Vedanā is sometimes translated as “sensation,” rather than “feeling,” but is this right? Sue Hamilton, in her study of the 5 aggregates, Identity and Experience, notes that it could be argued that “sensation” is a word which is more readily associated with neutrality than is “feeling,” which is more associated in our minds with pleasure or pain. The word “sensation” also implies a connection with the senses, which might be said to be more appropriate to vedanā, which requires the coming together of a sense organ and its corresponding sense object in order to arise.

But “feeling” can be used neutrally: it is not uncommon to say “I feel indifferent about that.” And not only is it commonly accepted that feelings require sensory activity, even if this is not obviously implicit in the word itself, but in the Buddha’s analysis of the khandhas this does not apply only to the vedanākhandha but to all four of the arūpakkhandhas. The main reason I prefer the use of the word “feeling” rather than “sensation” in translating vedanā is, however, because I suggest that vedanā has a cognitive dimension which is conveyed by the word “feeling” but not by “sensation.”

(1996a:45)

1.2.2 This cognitive dimension of vedanā is clearly evident from its etymology. Vedanā is the abstract noun of vedeti, “he senses, knows,” and also the related forms vediyati, paṭisaṁvedeti and paṭisaṁvediyati, all of which have cognitive connotations of “experiencing.” As such, it is important to note that vedanā has both a cognitive dimension and an affective aspect, that is, an intellectual sense (to know)

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9 S 4:115, 119, 125, 126.
10 Dhs 139-145; Abhds 2.
12 On neutral feeling, see SD 55.4 (2.1.3).
13 Vedeti is from व्दित, “to know.” Usages incl: phuṭṭho vedeti, phuṭṭho ceteti, phuṭṭho sañjānāti, “contacted, one feels; contacted, one intends; contacted, one perceives” (S 4:68; S:B 1408 n67); or the form vediyati, “he knows (as) or calls,” as in tam … munim vediyati, “(the wise) know (or call) him as a sage” (Sn 211 f). More commonly, vediyati tr as “he feels or experiences a feeling,” usu as vedanaṁ vediyati (M 1:59, 2:70; S 2:82, 3:86 f, 4:207; A 1:41, 2:198). The form paṭisaṁvedeti, “he feels, experiences, undergoes,” is also common (D 1:43, 45; A 1:157 (domanassāṁ p), 4:406 (id); also the by-form, paṭisaṁvediyati (S 2:18, 75, 256; It 38).

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and an experiential sense (to feel). In early Buddhist psychology, the affective role of paṭisaṁvedeti, “to experience,” is of great significance.

Hamilton continues her helpful analysis of vedanā thus:

The cognitive role of vedanā is unsubtle: one might say that it is affective rather than intellectual cognition. It is nevertheless significant enough to be an important factor in understanding the role of the vedanākhandha [sic] correctly. From a psychological point of view, it is not difficult for us to understand that vedanā is part of the cognitive process. We know, for example, that feelings can be expressed cognitively: if we say we are feeling sad, we also mean that we know that we are experiencing sadness. We also commonly refer to feelings as a vague level of knowledge in expressions such as “I have the feeling that this is correct,” or “I feel there is something wrong here.” Thus vedanā plays a part, however nebulous, in the cognitive process of an individual.

It is perhaps significant that vedayita, the (irregular) past passive participle of the verb vedeti, from which vedanā comes, is often interpreted as meaning “experienced” rather than “felt.” And “experience” might be a better translation of vedanā when it is found in the context of the cognitive process as a whole: in English to state that cognition necessarily involves experience is more readily acceptable than stating that it necessarily involves feelings. (1996a:46)

1.2.3 Georges Dreyfus, in his paper, “Meditation as ethical activity,” makes a similar note on the overlapping of cognitivity and affectivity in Buddhist psychology:

Keown uses Aristotle’s binary opposition between the cognitive and the affective to explicate Buddhist ideas. Buddhists do recognize these aspects of mind, for instance, in the concept that wisdom is cognitive whereas attachment and compassion are affective. However, I would argue that applying a binary model to Buddhist psychology is inappropriate, for it forces a number of mental factors such as mindfulness, enthusiasm, and deliberation into one of the two sides of the dichotomy. The Buddhist view emphasizes that these mental factors are common to both affective and cognitive states. Any mental state in which the degree of attention is sufficient is said to contain these mental factors. I would like to argue that from a Buddhist perspective, these factors are neither strictly affective nor cognitive in and of themselves, but are best described as enabling either side. Buddhist models of the psyche do not conform to the opposition cognitive-affective, and forcing them into this mode distorts the picture. (Dreyfus 1995:36)

1.2.4 However, we cannot really avoid talking in dual terms, as it is the way of the world and we are communicating with the world. As such, it is vital (for keeping the Dharma as a living experience) that we understand this approach is only a conventional expedience, a way of talking and conveying the helping and liberating truth. We need two hands to loudly clap; a bird flies on two wings; but there is only one sound and only one bird. The purpose of understanding all this is to bring about a wise and joyful oneness of heart and mind.

See Hamilton 1996a:45 f. See also Viññāṇa, SD 18.8a.8.

On paṭisaṁvedeti, see eg SD 51.14 (2.2.2.5). See SD 55.1 (2.1.3.2).

Here, Dreyfus is criticizing Keown’s use [The Nature of Buddhist Ethics, 1992:210] of Aristotle’s binary opposition between the cognitive and the affective to explicate Buddhist ideas.

See SD 49.5b (0.3.4).
1.3 FEELING AND EMOTION

1.3.1 Then there is the question of the connection between feeling (vedanā) and “emotion.” Sadly, “emotion” is one of most nebulous of English words: “Historically this term has proven utterly refractory to definitional efforts; probably no other term in psychology shares its indefinability with its frequency of use.”\(^{18}\)

1.3.2 The word “emotion” comes from the Middle French mouvoir (to move), which in turn comes from Latin exmovēre, emovēre (to move out, move away).\(^{19}\) In other words, an emotion is a feeling, usually one that is overt or expressed, often directed to others to inform or influence them. The problem is compounded by the fact that there are the lay (common) usages of the word and the technical (specialist) senses of the term.

1.3.3 Here are examples of conventional usages of “emotion” taken from *Webster’s 3rd New International Dictionary*:

1a (obsolete): a physical or social agitation, disturbance, or tumultuous movement.

1b: turmoil or agitation in feeling or sensibility (the nerveless dreamer, who spends his life in a weltering sea of sensibility and “—William James).

1c: a physiological departure from homeostasis that is subjectively experienced in strong feeling (as of love, hate, desire or fear) and manifests itself in the neuromuscular, respiratory, cardiovascular, hormonal, and other bodily changes preparatory to overt acts which may or may not be performed—often used in [the] plural (how can I describe my ~s at this catastrophe—Mary W Shelley).

1d: a state of strong feeling (as of fear, anger, disgust, grief, joy, or surprise) (he felt a sudden rage, but controlled the “).

2a: the affective aspect of consciousness: FEELING (we are not men of reason, we are creatures of ~ —C C Furnas).

2b: a reaction of or effect upon this aspect of consciousness (the essential ~ of the play is the feeling of a son toward a guilty mother—T S Eliot).

3: the quality (as of a song or melody) that arouses an emotion, esp a pleasant one (the melody of the song voices the “, the appeal—Anatole Chujoy).

4: an expression of feeling, esp strong feeling (the king moves anonymously among his men listening to their ~s about the war—Delmore Schwartz). Syn see FEELING.

1.3.4 We cannot be certain even of the technical meanings of “emotion,” as evident from this selection and summary of definitions from A S Reber’s *The Penguin Dictionary of Psychology* (1985):

1. An umbrella term for any of a number of subjectively experienced, affect-laden states the ontological status of each being established by a label whose meaning is arrived at by simple consensus. This is the primary use of the term in both the technical and the common language. It is what we mean when we say that love, fear, hate, terror, etc are emotions.

2. A label for a field of scientific investigation that explores the various environmental, physiological and cognitive factors that underlie these subjective experiences... [Here,] nearly all contemporary theories of emotion recognize four classes of factors:

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\(^{19}\) From ex-, e- (out) + movère (to move).
(a) *investigating stimuli*: these may be exogenous (events in the world) or endogenous (thoughts, images);

(b) *physiological correlates*: included here are general biological systems (central and autonomic nervous-system activities) as well as more specific patterns of action (eg, thalamic-hypothalamic interactions);

(c) *cognitive appraisal*: the personal significance of an event dictates to a considerable extent the emotions aroused, thus snarling tigers behind clearly strong cage bars do not result in fear, panic or flight;

(d) *motivational properties*: emotional arousal is almost always viewed as playing a role in impelling activity.

In addition to these recognized correlates of emotion, the term generally carries a number of other connotations:

1. Emotional states are generally regarded as *acute*. They are accompanied by relatively short-lived levels of arousal and desire to act: fear, joy, disgust, pity, love, etc ... [motivate] activity and then subside. This sense helps to distinguish it from terms like *sentiment*.

2. Emotions are regarded as intensely experienced states; the point here is to distinguish an emotion from a *feeling*.

3. Emotional states are often behaviorally disorganized. This is particularly the case with extreme states of rage, terror, desperate grief and the like where the individual’s behavior may be erravit, chaotic and lacking in organization.

4. Emotions are, to a certain extent, evolutionarily determined and reflect species-specific survival strategies of considerable genetic antiquity.

5. Emotional reactions tend to be non-habitual and to result from particular constraints of the environment and how it is appraised ... [Compared to other biochemical behaviours such as hunger and thirst] emotional states are not cyclical or regular but are dependent on specific situations and how they are evaluated for their personal significance.


1.3.5 Neuroscientists have apparently discovered a good reason why the vast Buddhist psychological vocabulary does not include “emotion” (as understood by the scientists). The Buddhist exclusion of “emotion” from the language of the mind is quite consistent with what scientists have come to learn about the brain’s anatomy. Every region in the brain that has been identified with some aspect of emotion has also been identified with aspects of cognition.20 “The circuitry that supports affect and the circuitry that supports cognition are completely intertwined—an anatomical arrangement consistent with the Buddhist view that these processes cannot be separated.” (P Ekman et al 2005: 1)

1.4 *PERCEPTUAL ROLE OF FEELING*. *Vedanā*, often contrary to what the general overtness and expressiveness of an “emotion,” is essentially a *covert quality*. In fact, it is part of the mental process involving both perception (*saññā*)21 and consciousness (*viññāṇa*).22 Feeling (*vedanā*) is a key factor in the *perceptual process*.23 The canonical theory of the perceptual process comprises 6 stages, namely:24

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20 Eg Davidson & Irwin 1999.
21 See *Saññā*, SD 17.4.
22 See *Viññāṇa*, SD 17.8a.
23 Sue Hamilton, in *Identity and Experience*, 1996a, uses the term “cognitive process” (see index), while here I use “perceptual process.” I think it is better to reserve the former for the *viññāṇa, kicca or citta, viṭhi*. 

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(1) The 1st stage is that of sense-consciousness, for example, visual consciousness (cakkhu, viññāna), which arises with the eye and a visual object as its conditions. At this point, it is bare sensation before the object is fully apprehended (which is similarly understood in the Abhidhamma).

(2) The 2nd stage is the process of sensory impression (cakkhu, samphassa or phassa), defined as the conjunction of the sense-organ, the sense-object and sense-consciousness (tiṇṇam saṅgati phasso, M 18,16/1:111).

(3) The 3rd stage is feeling (vedanā), which refers to the hedonic tone or affective value of the resultant experience. This is the weakest link in the cycle—when feeling arises but before we go on into perception—when we break the negative cycle (by, say, turning to the reflection on impermanence), or transforms it into a wholesome cycle (by, say, cultivating lovingkindness).

(4) The 4th stage is perception or apperception (saññā). The fact that viññāna (bare sensation) occurs before saññā [bare reaction] shows that saññā represents a more complex form of awareness. While viññāna refers to mere sensory awareness, saññā “suggests a state of awareness obtained by introducing distinctions to the earlier stage of bare awareness” (Karunadasa 2001: 211).

(5) The 5th stage is thinking (vitakka, often translated as “initial application (of thought)”), suggesting a stage where the perceived object is interpreted. Hence, there is both thinking (vitakka) and pondering (vicāra).

(6) The 6th and last stage is called mental proliferation (papañca) that “hints at the tendency of the individual’s imagination to break loose” (Ṇāṇananda 1971:4). This is a very complex level of experience that is coloured, filtered and flooded by our desires and prejudices.25

Having said that, it is helpful to understand that the 6th and last stage here is not necessarily always a thought “explosion” (how papañca can be imagined to work), but it can simply lead to a new or renewed perception, so that we are caught in a perceptual loop, spiralling into more perceptions. This whole process is of course a mental proliferation.

As we shall see below in the two chapters on perception (saññā)26 and consciousness (viññāna),27 they are both part of the perceptual process. Formations (saṅkhāra)28 are not directly involved in this process, and they are what we normally understand as “emotions.”29

2 Feeling, love and sex

2.1 Love

2.1.1 Feeling (vedanā), as we have seen [1.3], is not “emotion” as it is commonly understood, but refers to an important aspect of the 6 types of sense-experiences: seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching,

24 See Madhu,piṇḍika S (M 18), SD 16.14 (4). Discussed in greater detail in Saññā, SD 17.4 (8) + Table 8.1.1. See also Analayo, Satipatthāna: The direct path to realization, 2003:222-226. For original ref, see 3.1 below.
25 Karunadasa argues that in this sixfold process, the final stage of perception is not “mental proliferation” (as proposed by Sarathchandra, 1958 & Ṇāṇananda 1971:5 ff) but actually “perception” (stage 4) since “what follows saññā could be understood not as a process of sense-perception but as a purely ideational process set up by a process of perception. In point of fact, both Sarathchandra and Ṇāṇananda (1971:5 ff, 41 ff) explain the stages subsequent to saññā as a process of interpretation and judgement.” (2001:212).
26 See Saññā, SD 17.4. For comy on the perception/proliferation cycle, see SD 17.4 (Table 8.1.2).
27 See Viññāna, SD 17.8a.
28 See Saṅkhāra, SD 17.6.
29 For a comparative study of the western psychological “emotion,” see SD 57.25 (3.3).
and thinking.\textsuperscript{30} The feelings of each of these sense-experiences are evaluated or “toned” in different ways in English, and notice that they are subjective, covert qualities, for example:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>See</th>
<th>Craving [like]</th>
<th>Repulsion [dislike]</th>
<th>Delusion and ignorance [is ignored]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hear</td>
<td>soothing, sonorous</td>
<td>ugly, repulsive</td>
<td>plain, average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smell</td>
<td>sweet, fragrant, balmy</td>
<td>jarring, dull, grating</td>
<td>monotonous, uninteresting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taste</td>
<td>delicious, sweet, rich</td>
<td>offensive, rancid, acrid</td>
<td>odourless, deodorized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel</td>
<td>nice, soft, comfortable</td>
<td>hurting, smarting</td>
<td>neutral, numb, stiff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mind</td>
<td>interesting, stimulating</td>
<td>heavy, dull, boring</td>
<td>indifferent, apathetic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.1.2 The 3 kinds of feelings actually colour, even distort, the way we perceive the world and others, that is, as being loved, unloved and unthought of, or as friend, foe and stranger. In an almost simplistic predictable way, we regard those who arouse pleasure in us as our beloved or as friends; those who provoke an unpleasant feeling as the unloved or as foes; and those who bring about only neutral feeling (or “no feeling”), we disregard them or regard them as strangers.

2.1.3 Our understanding of love is often profoundly confusing. On a personal level, when someone falls in love and says, “I love so and so,” what he really means is that he is infatuated by that person’s form, sound, smell, taste, or touch, or by his perception of that person. “Falling in love” is really about the past because our attraction to another is really simply a reminder, usually subconscious, even subliminal, of someone we have been familiar with, whether in this life or before that.

2.1.4 Falling in love is like window-shopping and then buying an item on impulse, only to regret later because we have fallen out of love with it. It is staying in love, or even better, growing in love, that promises true happiness when both (a couple) or all parties (in the case of a family or community) bond closer in the discovery of one another’s more wholesome qualities, thus letting go of unwholesome ones. In short, we do not find friends, we have to make friends.\textsuperscript{31}

2.2 Why sex?

2.2.1 Wholesome love. The danger of falling in love is that we are only attracted to a part, often isolated piece, of a person. The disillusionment begins and grows as the other less familiar parts reveal themselves. The Saññoga Sutta (A 7.48) describes this in a graphically psychological way:

> WOMANLINESS. 2 A woman thinks about herself in terms of her womanly faculty, her womanly ways, her womanly looks, her womanly pride, her womanly desires, her womanly voice, her womanly adornments. She is aroused by this and delights in it.

\textsuperscript{30} “Thinking,” here referring to any mental activity: alt: “minding, mentation.”


\textsuperscript{32} “To herself,” \textit{ajjhattam}, lit “internally.”

\textsuperscript{33} “Womanly faculty,” \textit{itth'indriya}, lit “womanly sense-organ.” Here referring to the physical features that make one a woman, that is, “womanliness.” The term “femininity” usually refers to the psychological aspect of a woman, related to Jung’s notions of \textit{anima} and \textit{animus}.
Thus aroused, she considers another in terms of a man’s faculty, his manly looks, his manly pride, his manly desires, his manly voice, his manly adornments. She is aroused by this and delights in it.

Thus aroused, she desires external union, and she desires the [physical] pleasure and [mental] joy arising on account of such a union.

Bhikshus, attached to her womanliness, she enters into union with men. In this way, bhikshus, a woman does not rise above her womanliness.

MANKINDNESS. A man thinks about himself in terms of his own manly faculty, his manly ways, his manly looks, his manly pride, his manly desires, his manly voice, his manly adornments. He is aroused by this and delights in it.

Thus aroused, he contemplates another in terms of a woman’s faculty, her womanly ways, her womanly looks, her womanly pride, her womanly desires, her womanly voice, her womanly adornments. He is aroused by this and delights in it.

Thus aroused, he desires external union, and he desires the pleasure and joy arising on account of such a union.

Bhikshus, attached to his manliness, he enters into union with women. In this way, bhikshus, a man does not rise above his manliness.

2.2.2 Most creative, most destructive. Of all human qualities, sexual feeling is the most creative as well as the most destructive. It is the most creative in its biological function of bringing us forth, but beyond that when misunderstood and uncontrolled, it usually becomes the most destructive of emotions that can be displaced into the many guises of lust. One of the most tragic displacements of sexual feelings is

34 “Womanly ways,” itthi, kutta, eg seductiveness, coquetry, and wiles (AA 4:32). Many of such terms in this sentence and their cognates below are in the Pali singular, which however need to be rendered idiomatically into the English plural.

35 “Womanly looks,” itth’ākappa, ie, her physical looks and how she is dressed (AA 4:32).

36 “Womanly pride,” itthi, vidha, ie, her pride and conceit (AA 4:32).

37 “Womanly adornments,” itth’alaṅkāra. “adorning the head, the neck, the hands, the feet, the hips (kaṭi)” (sīsûpago gīvûpago hath’hūpago pādûpago kaṭûpago, V 4:340)

38 “She is aroused by this ... ” Here I have rendered tattha in the English singular, since such an unskillful person would attend to the features mentioned. In the cognate sentences below [4-5] tattha is rendered in the English plural, ie, referring to the various physical features, to which the skillful person remains unattracted.

39 “Another,” bāhiddhā, lit “outside (of herself).”

40 “Manly faculty,” puris’indriya, lit “manly sense-organ.” Here referring to the physical features that make one a man, that is, “manliness.” The term “masculinity” usually refers to the psychological aspect of a man. Note here in the Sutta that the reference is “in terms of a man’s faculty,” and not “in another man.” This is very significant as this reflects the fact that those sexually attracted to others, consciously or unconsciously, may look for such features that excite them in either sex.

41 “Manly looks,” puris’ākappa, ie, his physical looks and how he is dressed. “Looks” here includes his own perception of his own body and the other person’s body.

42 “Manly pride,” puris’a,vidha, ie, his pride and conceit.

43 “She desires external union,” bāhiddhā saṁyogam ākaṅkhāti. Note that she does not consider her sexual features, but her “womanliness.” It is possible to understand here that “man” and “woman” are both this person’s own perceptions of gender. See SD 8.7 (3.2).

44 “Attached to,” sattā (V 1:185; D 2:246; Nc 23, 34; Dh 342; J 1:376).

45 “He desires external union,” bāhiddhā saṁyogam ākaṅkhāti. Note that he does not consider his sexual features, but his “manliness.” It is possible to understand here that “man” and “woman” are both this person’s own perceptions of gender. See SD 8.7 (3.2).
when a person with unresolved sexual issues turns to the monastic life, thinking that it is the best way to be totally free from sexuality. Sadly, such repressive feelings often rear their ugly heads through psychological transference (by the devotee) and counter-transference (by the monastic), fuelled by the monastic’s charisma or by blind devotion, usually both.

2.2.3 The 2 kinds of pain. The Sall’atthena Sutta (S 36.6) makes an important observation here: when an untutored worldling suffers pain, he suffers twice: he feels it physically and also mentally, and then he reactively turns to sensual pleasure (sex, drunkenness, quarrels, violence, etc) as a means of escape, “because, bhikshus, the untutored ordinary person knows no other escape than through sensual pleasure.”

One cannot simply cast off the clothing of sexuality simply by donning monastic robes. We cannot really hide the nakedness of our sexuality behind the cloth. We must outgrow this narcissistic level of biological want or perception of existential lack. Indeed, sexual feeling is the most selfish of feelings, seeking only to satisfy itself in an insatiable manner. While we can surfeit of food, having eaten our fill, it is not the case with sex.

2.2.4 Self-lust. An important teaching of the Saññoga Sutta (A 7.48), not immediately apparent, is that we must overcome narcissism or self-lust, at least in the physical sense, and cultivate unconditional love or lovingkindness. We begin to be lovingkind by starting to see others as total beings and accepting them as they really are.

2.2.5 Solitude. Another way we can rise above attachment to sensual pleasure is through regular solitary meditation leading to inner stillness. Such stillness can lead us in due course to deeper and more joyful states of meditation, even into dhyana. In other words, we can only overcome sexual feelings by discovering a higher pleasure, that of mental calm and dhyana. Only then, we can really rise above our sexuality.

[Section 2.3, “Sexual abuse in religion,” has been transferred to SD 64.17 (10)]

3 Feeling and contact

3.1 How feeling arises. Vedanā is not mere feeling but part of the perceptual process. In other words, feeling does not arise by itself. According to the Phassa,mūlaka Sutta (S 36.10), feeling, whether pleasant, painful or neutral, are “rooted in contact” (phassa,mūlaka), rising in dependence on contact (phassa). In fact, contact plays a major role in the perceptual process, and we shall now examine it in some detail. The perceptual process is clearly described in the Madhu,piṇḍika Sutta (M 18), thus:

Friends, dependent on the eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is contact.

46 S 36.6.8c/4:208 (SD 5.5). Comy: The escape is mental concentration, the path and the fruit, but he does not know this, knowing only sensual pleasure. (SA 3:77)
47 On the words “lovingkindness,” and its adj “lovingkind,” see SD 38.5 (1.1.3).
49 See Dhyana, SD 8.4 esp (7); Nimitta & Anuvyāñjana, SD 19.14; & Nimitta, SD 19.7 esp (4).
50 S 36.10/4:215,
51 See Madhu,piṇḍika S (M 18,16/1:111 f), SD 16.14 (4). Discussed in greater detail in Saññā, SD 17.4. See also Analayo, Satipaṭṭhāna: The direct path to realization, 2003:222-226. For a paraphrase, see 1.4 above.
52 Tiṇṇham saṅgati phasso. For a discussion on this passage, see Bucknell 1999:318 ff.
With contact as condition, there is feeling (phassa, paccayā vedanā).
What one feels, one perceives.
What one perceives, one thinks about.\(^53\)
What one thinks about, one mentally proliferates.\(^54\)
What a person mentally proliferates is the source through which perceptions and notions due to mental proliferation\(^55\) impacts one regarding past, future and present forms cognizable through the eye.\(^56\)

The same process applies mutatis mutandis to all the other five remaining senses. It is from such a process that feeling arises: “with contact as condition, feeling arises” (phassa, paccayā vedanā). Contact is the proximate condition for the arising of feeling, and a necessary condition for the perceptual process as a whole.

3.2 FEELING AS THE ROOT OF ALL DOGMAS

3.2.1 Contact and feeling are crucial to the formation of views (diṭṭhi), especially wrong views. In the “wisdom” section of the Brahma, jāla Sutta (D 1), the Buddha explains how the 62 grounds for wrong views arise from the “feeling of those who know not, merely the agitation and vacillation of those overcome by craving” (§§105-117). Applying the principle of dependent arising, the Buddha goes on to explain such ignorant reactions are in turn caused by contact (phassa), that is, through misunderstanding sense-experience (§§118-130). Without contact, none of those views would arise; they all arise through the constant contact in the six sense-spheres (§§131-143). All these are speculative views (diṭṭhi, gata), arising from feeling, binding them to the rounds of speculative views and of suffering (§§144).\(^57\)

3.2.2 The Dvaya Sutta (S 35.93) explains how consciousness arises dependent on a dyad (dvaya) of sense-faculty and sense-object; for example, “dependent on the eye and forms, there arises eye-consciousness” (cakkhu ni ca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhu, viññāṇā). The meeting of these 3—sense-faculty, sense-object and sense-consciousness—is called contact (phassa): “contacted [touched], bhikshus, one feels; contacted, one intends; contacted, one perceives” (phuṭṭho vedeti, phuṭṭho ceteti, phuṭṭho sañjānati).\(^58\) And all these processes are impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise.

From all this, it is easy to see the roots of the Creator-God idea: it is extremely difficult to understand the nature of feelings, much less how they work on our lives. Lacking this understanding, humans seek some external form of power to liberate them from the vicissitudes due to feelings: joy and sorrow, pleasure and pain, fear and courage, stress and relief, and so on.

3.2.3 Understandably, the Creator-God idea, being deeply rooted in feeling, cannot be proven in any logical or scientific manner, and can only be sustained by “faith,” that is, surrender and obedience to its official definition. Whoever defines God, as such, commands power over their believers.\(^59\) What one

\(^{53}\) “One thinks about,” vitakketi. On how when thinking stops, desires do not arise, see Sakka, pañña S (D 21,2.2-2.277).

\(^{54}\) This verse up to here is also found in (Samuday’atthaṅgama) Loka S (S 12.44/2:71-73), SD 7.5 and (Sabb’upādāna) Pariñña S (S 35.60/4:32 f), SD 6.17 in different contexts.

\(^{55}\) Papañca, sañña, saṅkhā, see SD 6.14 (3).

\(^{56}\) This important passage is the earliest statement on the Buddhist theory of perception. See SD 25.1 (4).

\(^{57}\) D 1,105-144/1:40-45. See Sue Hamilton 1996a:47 f.

\(^{58}\) S 25.93/4:68; S:B 1408 n67.


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83
The greatest fear of those who do not understand the true nature of feeling is change. Seeing change working through birth, life, decay and death, they think life begins only at birth and ends at death. And since death seems to take away their lives, loved ones, possessions and pleasures, they fear death. Fearing change and death, they fabricate or believe in a Creator God who is eternal and life-giving. The point is whatever exists can only exist in change: without change nothing exists; unless that state is beyond change and stasis—that is, nirvana.

4 Classifications of feelings

4.1 NUMERICAL GROUPS. “Feelings” (vedanā) are complex states of mind, not merely “bare awareness” or “anoetic sentience,” that is, “pure” feelings or emotions. They have some specific content: pleasure, pain, neutral feeling; and that vedanā is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition, for the arising of craving (the subsequent link in the dependent arising cycle). They arise through contact with external sense-objects, namely, the seen, the heard, the sensed (smelling, tasting, touching), and the known (diṭṭha suta muta viññāta).

The Aṭṭha,sata Sutta (§ 36.22) categorizes feelings into various numerical groups “along the lines that became prominent in the Abhidhamma,” thus:

The 2 kinds of feeling: bodily and mental. [4.2]
The 3 kinds of feeling: pleasant feeling, painful feeling, and neutral feeling. [4.3]
The 5 kinds of feeling: the physical pleasure faculty, the physical pain faculty, the joy faculty, the displeasure faculty, the equanimity faculty. [4.4]
The 6 kinds of feeling: feeling born of eye-contact, born of ear-contact, born of nose-contact, born of tongue-contact, born of body-contact, born of mind-contact. [4.5]
The 18 kinds of feeling: 6 examinations accompanied by joy, 6 examinations accompanied by displeasure, 6 examination accompanied by equanimity. [4.6]
The 36 kinds of feeling: 6 types of joy of the household life, 6 types of joy of renunciation, 6 types of displeasure of the household life, 6 types of displeasure of renunciation, 6 types of equanimity of household life, 6 types of equanimity of renunciation. [4.7]
The 108 kinds of feeling: The above 36 feelings in the past, in the future, in the present. [4.8]

(S § 36.22/4:231 f)

Let us now examine each of these groups in some detail.

4.2 THE 2 KINDS OF FEELING

4.2.1 Feeling and the awakened. The teaching of the two kinds of feeling—the bodily and the mental—is a psychologically and spiritually very important one. The locus classicus of this teaching is the Sall'—

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61 On necessary and sufficient conditions, see SD 5.16 (6) & 35.1.
62 D 3:134 = Nc 276 = It 121; D 3:232; Sn 1080, 1122.
63 S 8 1129.
64 This same list is briefly stated in Pañcak’aṅga S (§ 36.19/4:224 f), SD 30.1 = Bahu Vedanīya S (M 59,5/1:398), SD 30.4. See [4.3] below.
atthena Sutta (S 36.6), where the Buddha says that both the unawakened worldling and the arhat experience pleasant feeling, painful feeling and neutral feeling, but each with a difference.

The worldling reacts to pleasant feeling with delight, reinforcing his latent tendency of lust; he reacts to painful feeling with displeasure, reinforcing the latent tendency of ill will; and he fails to notice neutral feeling, reinforcing the latent tendency of ignorance.65

The arhat, however, simply notes those feelings as they arise in his body without reacting to them [7.2]. As such, although his body is affected by the vicissitudes of feelings, his mind is constantly calm and clear. A similar teaching (S 22.1), but a very short one, is given by the Buddha to the layman Naku-la, pitā, and which is elaborated by Sāriputta to him.66

4.2.2 Feeling is a mental event. It is important to understand that although we speak of feeling of the body and of the mind, a feeling is always a mental event. It is part of “name” (nāma) as “name-and-form” (nāma, rūpa).67 Without a mind, we can never feel any sensation. These very same feelings, however, are not felt only in the mind. Any bodily feeling of pain obviously involves the body; we feel bodily pains. In our daily lives, we know that even a mental feeling of anger, for example, also affects the body (we grimace our face, our heart-rate rises, etc). Similarly, mental displeasure, such as being rebuked or having failed a task is reflected in drooping shoulders and dropping the head in dismay, or more happily, mental feelings of zest and joy during dhyana affect the whole body.68

As such, it is important to understand that it is not that some feelings are only experienced in the body while some are only in the mind. The true situation is where the feeling arises from, that is, which sense-door is the basis for the arising of the pleasant or the painful feeling. Such experiences understandably must involve both the body and the mind. In other words, it is how the mind responds to the feeling, whether wholesomely or unwholesomely in terms of mindfulness and wisdom.70

4.3 THE 3 KINDS OF FEELING

4.3.1 In early Buddhist psychology, feeling refers to the affective (or hedonic) tone that arises in connection with sense-perception, that is, a pleasant feeling (sukhā vedanā), a painful feeling (dukkhā vedanā) and neutral feeling (dukkham-asukhā vedanā), which is the first classification of feeling in the Vedanā Saṁyutta.71 This is the most common way in which feelings are classified in the Sutta.72

The simplicity of this classification facilitates the perception of impermanence where one notices not only that feelings quickly change, but also that pleasure is the absence of pain, that pain is the absence of pleasure. Neutral feeling is noticed when both pleasurable and painful feelings are present (they do not occur at the same time, but are juxtaposed or occur in close succession). The three kinds of feelings are examined in the Indriya, bhāvanā Sutta (M 152), but there instead of adukkham-asukha

65 S 36.6/4:207-210 (SD 5.5).
66 S 22.1/3:1-5 (SD 5.4).
67 See Sammā Diṭṭhi S (M 9,54/1:53,11), SD 11.14. For def of feeling, see (Paṭicca, samuppāda) Vibhaṅga S (S 12.2.11/2:3 f) n, SD 5.15.
69 D 2,75-81/1:73-75, 22,21/2:313 f, M 27,19-22/1:181 f, 141,31/3:252.
70 See Analayo 2011:161.
71 (Vedanā) Saṁmādi S (S 36.1/4:204), SD 61.4.
72 See Mahā Satipaṭṭhāna S (D 22,11/2:298), SD 13.2 = Satipaṭṭhāna S (M 10,32/1:59), SD 13.3; also D 3:275; S 2:53, 82, 4:207; A 3:400. See also SD 13.1 (5B).
(neither pleasant nor painful, ie neutral), the term *manāpāmanāpa* (both agreeable and disagreeable) is used.\(^{73}\)

### 4.3.2 A remarkable example of the Buddha’s tolerance and skillful means is found in the *Pañca-kāṅga Sutta* (S 36.19).\(^{74}\) When the monk Udāyi teaches the carpenter Pañcak’ānga that there are three kinds of feelings—the pleasant, the painful, and the neutral—Pañcak’ānga refuses to accept that there is such a thing as neutral feeling. When the Buddha is told about this, he generously replies that both Udāyi and Pañcak’ānga are right: he has himself taught the various classifications of feeling (two kind, three kinds, and so on) [4.1]. The Buddha goes on to say that it is *not wise to delve into differences*:\(^{75}\)

> When the Dharma has been taught by me in such a way through various methods, it might be that there will be those who will not concur, will not allow, will not approve of what is well said and well spoken by others, so that strife will arise, quarrels will arise, disputes will occur, so that they dwell stabbing each other with verbal daggers.

But when the Dharma has been taught by me in such a way through various methods, it might be that there will be those who will concur, will allow, will approve of what is well said and well spoken by others, so that they will live in concord, in mutual appreciation, without disputing, mixing like milk and water, looking at each other with kindly eyes.\(^{76}\)

\(^{73}\) See n at M 152.4/3:299 (SD 17.13).

\(^{74}\) Also found as Bahu,vedanīya S (M 59/1:396-400), SD 30.4.

\(^{75}\) *Evam pariyoja,desito kho ananda maya dhammo, evam pariyoja desite kho ananda maya dhamme ye anīnam-anīnassa subhāsitaṁ sulapatitāna samanuñānissanti na samanuñānissanti na samanumodissantā; tesam etam pāṭikaṅkhaṁ bhāndana, jātā kalaha, jātā vivādāpanā aṇīnam-aṇīnam mukha, sattihi vitudantā viharissati ti.* | *Evam pariyoja,desito kho ananda maya dhammo, evam pariyoja desite kho ananda maya dhamme ye aṇīnam-aṇīnassa subhāsitaṁ sulapatitāna samanuñānissanti samanuñānissanti samanumodissantā, tesam etam pāṭikaṅkhaṁ, samaggā sammodamāṇā avivadāmāṇā khīrodkhi bhūtā aṇīnam-aṇīnam piya, cakkhūhi sampassantā viharissanti ti.*

\(^{76}\) On this last simile, “mixing like milk and water,…,” see Dhamma,cetiya S (M 89.11/2:120 f), SD 8.1.6.

\(^{77}\) Vbh 72; Dhs 133. See 1.1 above for the Abhidhamma explanation for there being only one kind of neutral feeling.
mentally pleasant feeling  
\( \text{somanassa} = \text{cetasikā sukhā vedanā}; \)

mentally unpleasant feeling  
\( \text{domanassa} = \text{cetasikā dukkhā vedanā}; \)

neutral feeling  
\( \text{upekkhā} = \text{adukkham-asukhā vedanā}. \)

4.4.3 The details of these 5 kinds of feelings are given the suttas of the Sukh'indrya Vagga of the Samyutta Nikāya. More specifically, the (Indriya) Vibhaṅga Sutta 1 defines these 5 kinds of feelings, thus:

**SD 17.3(4.4) (Indriya) Vibhaṅga Sutta 1**

*Paṭhama (Indriya) Vibhaṅga Sutta* The First Discourse on the Analysis (of the Faculties)

\[ \text{S 48.35/5:208 f = SD 56.21a} \]

Theme: The 5 feeling faculties

2 Bhikshus, there are these 5 faculties. What are the five?
   The pleasure faculty.  
   The pain faculty.  
   The joy faculty.  
   The displeasure faculty.  
   The equanimity faculty.

3 (1) And what, bhikshus, is *the pleasure faculty*?  
Whatever bodily pleasure there is, bhikshus, whatever **bodily comfort**, the pleasant comfortable feeling born of body-contact—  
This, bhikshus, is called the pleasure faculty.  

4 (2) And what, bhikshus, is *the pain faculty*?  
Whatever bodily pain there is, bhikshus, whatever **bodily discomfort**, the painful uncomfortable feeling born of body-contact—  
This, bhikshus, is called the pain faculty.  

5 (3) And what, bhikshus, is *the joy faculty*?  
Whatever mental pleasure there is, bhikshus, whatever **mental comfort**, the pleasant comfortable feeling born of mind-contact—  
This, bhikshus, is called the joy faculty.  

6 (4) And what, bhikshus, is *the displeasure faculty*?  
Whatever mental displeasure there is, bhikshus, whatever **mental discomfort**, the painful uncomfortable feeling born of mind-contact—  
This, bhikshus, is called the displeasure faculty.  

7 (5) And what, bhikshus, is *the equanimity faculty*?  
Whatever feeling there is, bhikshus, whether bodily or mental, that is **neither comfortable nor uncomfortable**—  
This, bhikshus, is called the equanimity faculty.  

8 These, bhikshus, are the 5 faculties.

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\[ \text{78 Sukh'indrya Vagga (S 48.31-40/5:207-216).} \]
The Commentary explains that, in the expression, “bodily discomfort” (kāyika sāta), “bodily” means “based on bodily sensitivity” (kāya-p, pasāda, vatthuka); “comfort” is merely a synonym for pleasure: it means “sweet” (madhura). (SA 3:241)

4.4.4 According to the Abhidhamma, all bodily feelings, that is, feelings arising through bodily sensitivity (kāya-p, pasāda), are either pleasant or painful, and there is no neutral feeling based on bodily sensitivity.79 As such, the Sutta Commentary explains “bodily equanimity” as arising based on the other 4 senses (the eye, ear, nose and tongue) (SA 3:241). Here, upekkhā is translated as equanimity, and has two main denotations:

(1) affective (relating to feeling), which denotes neutral feeling (adukkham-asukha);
(2) cognitive (as a mental quality), which denotes mental neutrality or impartiality (tatra, majjhattatā).

The Abhidhamma calls (2) tatra, majjhattatā, and classes it as part of the formations aggregate (saṅkhāra-k.khandha). This is the equanimity (upekkhā) that is the fourth divine abode (impartiality towards all beings), the 7th awakening factor (mental equipoise) and as a mental quality mentioned in the 3rd and 4th dhyanas.80

4.5 THE 6 KINDS OF FEELING

The 6 kinds of feelings are those arising through the six senses, that is, born of eye-contact, born of ear-contact, born of nose-contact, born of tongue-contact, born of body-contact, born of mind-contact. They are listed in the Saṅ-āyatana Vibhaṅga Sutta (M 137.7).81

4.5.1 The (Anicca) Vedanā Sutta (S 25.5). This is a short, simple but very important text in the Okkanta Samyutta, where the reflection on impermanence is prescribed as a sure way of descending (okkanti) into the stream to awakening. Due to its importance, the Sutta is given in full here.82

SD 17.3(4.5.1)

(Anicca) Vedanā Sutta
The (Impermanent) Feeling Discourse | S 25.5/3:226
S 3.4.1.5 = Samyutta Nikāya 3, Khandha Vagga 4, Okkant(ik)a Saṁy 1, Cakkhu Vg 5

1 At Sāvatthi.
2 There the Blessed One said:

Feelings are impermanent

3 “Bhikshus,

feeling born of eye-contact is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise.
Feeling born of ear-contact is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise.
Feeling born of nose-contact is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise.
Feeling born of tongue-contact is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise.

79 See S:B 1934 n212.
80 For a discussion on the 10 kinds of upekkhā, see Vism 4.156-170/160-162.
81 M 137,7/3:216 (SD 29.5).
82 The first sutta in this important chapter is (Anicca) Cakkhu S (S 25.1), SD 16.7.

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Feeling born of body-contact is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise.
Feeling born of mind-contact is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise.

The faith-follower

4 83Bhikshus, one who has faith thus, who firmly believes these truths [is convinced of these truths], is called a faith-follower.

4.2 84He has gone beyond the plane of the worldlings. 85 He is descending into the plane of true individuals; 87 descending into the certainty of rightness [the fixed course to rightness]. 88

4.3 He is incapable of doing any intentional deed by which he might be reborn in hell, or in the animal birth, or in the preta realm.

4.4 He is incapable of dying without having attained the fruit of streamwinning. 89

The truth-follower

5 Bhikshus, one who accepts these truths after pondering over them with some wisdom thus, 90 is called a truth-follower.

5.2 He has gone beyond the plane of the worldlings. He is descending into the plane of true individuals; descending into the certainty of rightness [the fixed course to rightness].

5.3 He is incapable of doing any intentional deed by which he might be reborn in hell, or in the animal birth, or in the ghost realm.

5.4 He is incapable of dying without having attained the fruit of streamwinning.

The streamwinner

6 One who knows and sees these truths thus is called a streamwinner, no longer bound for the lower world, 91 sure of going over to self-awakening. 92

83 Yo bhikkhave ime dhamme evaṁ saddahati adhimuccati, ayaṁ vuccati saddhā′nusāri okkanto sammatta, niyāmaṁ sappurisa, bhūmin okkanto viṭṭavatta putthujjana, bhūmin. The operative verbs here are saddahati (“he has faith [in]”) and adhimuccati (“he resolves, adheres to, is sure of”). I have rendered adhimuccati here as “(he) firmly believes...”. On the streamwinner’s faith, see Entering the stream, SD 3.3(5).

84 Okkanto sammatta, niyāmaṁ sappurisa, bhūmin okkanto viṭṭavatta putthujjana, bhūmin. On the meaning of this sentence [1.6.1]; on the translation of this key passage [1.6.4].

85 “Worldlings,” putthujjana, ie, “born of the crowd”; more fully called assutavā putthujjana, “untutored worldling,” one unskilled (akovida), having only a little theoretical knowledge of the Dharma, undisciplined (avīnīta), and lacking practical training in the Dharma. He is not a “seer of the noble ones” (ariya, dassavi), has no regard for the Buddha and the noble disciples (the saints), because he lacks the wisdom-eye that discerns the truth they have seen. “Noble ones” (ariya) and “true individuals” (sappurisa) are often synonymous. See also MA 1:20-25; SA 2:98-101, 2:251 f; AA 1:61-63; Nc 75-78; Pm 2:445-449; DhsA 348-354.

86 Okkanto (mfn; past part of okkamati): see (1.6.1.3).

87 “True individuals,” sappurisa, also “superior person,” “virtuous person,” “ideal person”; often syn with “noble disciple,” ariya, sāvaka, but here clearly includes those, although not yet on the path, but is assured of it, viz, the faith-follower and the truth-follower. The qualities of the sappurisa are given in Sappurisa S (M 113/3:37-45), SD 29.6; see also D 33.2.6(6)/3:252, 34.1.8(7)/3:283; M 110, 14-24/3:23 f; A 7.64/4:113, 8.38/4:144.

88 Sammatta, niyāmaṁ. See (1.5). On the translation of this key passage [1.6.4]

89 Abhappho tāhī kammāṁ yāva na sotāpatti phalam sacchikaroti. This is the Sutta’s key statement and clearly refers to what, after the Buddha’s time, is referred to as a “lesser streamwinner” (cūla, sotāpanna, culla, sotāpanna, cullaka, sotāpanna). See Entering the stream, SD 3.3(6).

90 Yassa kho bhikkhave ime dhammā evaṁ paññāya mattaso nijjhānam khamanti.
4.5.2 The Cūḷa Vedalla Sutta (M 44). There is another set of six kinds of feeling, that is, according to whether they are physical or mental. A pleasant feeling, painful feeling or neutral feeling can be physical (kāyika) (arising through the five physical senses) or can be mental (cetasika) (arising through the mind), making six types of feelings in all. The Abhidhamma classification, as noted above [1.1], has only five types of feeling, taking neutral feeling as being mental only, that is, one is only aware that a feeling is present (or not).

The 6 kinds of feeling are defined by the nun Dhamma,dinnā in the Cūḷa Vedalla Sutta (M 44). After defining the 6 kinds of feeling in the manner mentioned above, instructive catechism follows:

“Now, ayya,94 regarding pleasant feeling, what is pleasant, what is painful,? regarding painful feeling, what is painful, what is pleasant,? regarding neutral feeling, what is pleasant, what is painful,?”

Avusō Visākha,
painful feeling is pleasant when it persists, painful when it changes;
neutral feeling is pleasant when there is knowledge of it, painful when there is no knowledge of it.”

(M 44,24/1:303), SD 40a.9

4.6 THE 18 KINDS OF FEELING

4.6.1 The 18 kinds of feeling are the following 18 examinations:

6 examinations accompanied by joy. somanass’upavicāra
6 examinations accompanied by displeasure, domanass’upavicāra
6 examinations accompanied by equanimity. upekkh’upavicāra

Each type becomes sixfold by arising in relation to the 6 sense-objects. The Saḷ-āyatana Vibhaṅga Sutta (M 137) describes the 18 kinds of feelings as “mental examination” (upavicāra), thus:

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91 Avinīpāta, alt tr “not fated for birth in a suffering state”; opp of vinīpāta, “the world of ruin/suffering,” another name for the 4 woeful courses (duggati) or the 4 lower worlds (apāya), esp as niraya,tiracchāna,pettivisa,yasura-kāya (KhpA 189,12 = DA 2:496,11) = SA 2:97,5 (on S 2:92,16); Vism 13.92 f. Sometimes 5 courses (pañca,gati) (D 33,2.1(4)/3:234; A 9.68/4:459) are mentioned: the hells (niraya), the animal birth (tiracchāna,yoni), the ghost realm (petti- or pitti,visaya), the human world (manussa) and the heavenly world (deva). Of these, the first three are woeful, with the asura-demons (asura,kāya) as the fourth woeful course. The remaining two are “happy courses” (sugati). For a discussion, see A:NB 1999:14-19. See Pañca,gati S (A 9.68/4:459), SD 2.20. See also a late work, Pañca,gati, dipana, ed L Feer (JPTS 1884:152 ff); tr Feer, Annales du Musée Guimet 5, 1883:514-528: sv Naraka,kanda, Tiracchāna-, Peta-, Manussa-, Deva-.

92 Yo bhikkhave ime dhamme evam jānāti evam passati ayam vuuccati sotāpanno avinīpāta,dhammo niyato sam-bodhi,parāyano ti. “This statement makes it clear how the stream-enterer [streamwinner] differs from those on the way to stream-entry. The faith-follower accepts the teachings on trust (with a limited degree of understanding), the Dhamma-follower through investigation; but the stream-enterer has known and seen the teachings directly. I read Se: evam jānāti evam passati.” (S:B 1099 n270)

93 Cūḷa Vedalla S (M 44.23/1:302), SD 40a.9; Saḷ’atthena S (S 36.6/4:208), SD 5.5. See below, for other classifications of feelings.

94 Anglicization of ayyā or ayye (“venerable lady”) is the feminine equivalent of bhante (“venerable sir”). In the Buddha’s time, both forms were common ways of addressing any seniors. Only in later times, they were specifically used for monastics.
On seeing a form with the eye, one examines (upavicarati) a form productive of joy, one examines a form productive of displeasure, one examines a form productive of equanimity.

On hearing a sound with the ear, one examines a sound productive of joy, one examines a sound productive of displeasure, one examines a sound productive of equanimity.

On smelling a smell with the nose, one examines a smell productive of joy, one examines a smell productive of displeasure, one examines a smell productive of equanimity.

On tasting a taste with the tongue, one examines a taste productive of joy, one examines a taste productive of displeasure, one examines a taste productive of equanimity.

On touching a touch with the body, one examines a touch productive of joy, one examines a touch productive of displeasure, one examines a touch productive of equanimity.

On cognizing a mind-object with the mind, one examines a mind-object productive of joy, one examines a mind-object productive of displeasure, one examines a mind-object productive of equanimity.

(M 137,8/3:216 f), SD 29.5

4.6.2 The Majjhima Commentary says that “mental examination” (manāpavicāra) is a common term for initial application (vitakka) and sustained application (vicāra). One examines or investigates (upavicarati) the object by the occurrence of sustained application, and initial application is associated with sustained application (MA 5:22). The Tīttāyatana Sutta (A 3.61) defines the third satipatthana—the contemplation of the mind (cittānupassanā)—as being these 18 mental examinations or investigations.95

4.7 THE 36 KINDS OF FEELING

4.7.1 The 36 kinds of feelings are explained in detail in the Saḷāyatana Vibhaṅga Sutta (M 137). They are of 2 broad categories: those of the household life and those of renunciation; and they relate to the 3 kinds of feeling: pleasant, painful and neutral. Each in turn becomes sixfold in terms of the 6 sense-objects.96

4.7.2 The Kiṭāgiri Sutta (M 70) summarizes into 6 categories, the detailed teaching given in the Saḷāyatana Vibhaṅga Sutta. The Kiṭāgiri Sutta speaks of 2 kinds of feelings (without their technical terms): those of the householder (that conduce to unwholesome states), and those of the renunciant (that conduce to wholesome states), thus:97

JOY OF THE HOUSEHOLD LIFE. Here, when one feels a certain pleasant feeling, unwholesome states grow in him, and wholesome states lessen.

JOY OF THE RENUNCIENT’S LIFE. But here when one feels a certain pleasant feeling, unwholesome states lessen in him, and wholesome states grow.

PAIN OF THE HOUSEHOLD LIFE. Here, when one feels a certain painful feeling, unwholesome states grow in him, and wholesome states lessen.

PAIN OF THE RENUNCIENT’S LIFE. But here when one feels a certain painful feeling, unwholesome states lessen in him, and wholesome states grow.

EQUANIMITY OF THE HOUSEHOLD LIFE. Here, when one feels a certain neutral feeling, unwholesome states grow in him, and wholesome states lessen.

EQUANIMITY OF THE RENUNCIENT’S LIFE. But here when one feels a certain neutral feeling, unwholesome states lessen in him, and wholesome states grow. (M 70,7/1:475), SD 11.1

95 A 3.61.8/1:176 (SD 6.8).
96 M 137,9-15/3:217-219 (SD 29.5).
97 M 70,6-7/1:475 (SD 11.1). See Boisvert 1995:74-76 for the Sutta passage with Comy.
4.7.3 The Commentary to the Saḷāyatanasutta (M 137) explains that the expression “of the household life” (geha,sita) means “connected with the cords of sense-pleasure,” while “of renunciation” (nekkhamma,sita) means “connected with insight.” This latter joy arises when we have set up insight and are watching the break-up of formations with the flow of clear and bright insight knowledge focused on formations. (MA 5:22)

The same Commentary adds that the householder’s equanimity (gehasitā upekkhā)98 is the equanimity of unknowing [ignorance] that arises in one who has not broken the barriers created by defilements or the future karmic fruits. It “does not go beyond form” (rupāṁ sā ativattati) because it is stuck, glued to the object like flies to a ball of sugar. On the other hand, the renunciant’s equanimity (nekkhamma,-sitā upekkhā)99 is the equanimity of insight knowledge. It does not lust after desirable objects that fall within the range of the senses, nor does it feel ill will toward undesirable objects. (MA 5:24)

4.8 The 108 Kinds of Feeling

4.8.1 The listing of 36 feelings over the past, the future and the present is not only comprehensive, but more importantly, it points to the eternal truth that these feelings arise and pass away. They exist in time and space, both of which entail change and flux. Feeling is a feature of this constant universal change. According to the Aṭṭha,sata Sutta (S 36.22), the 108 kinds of feeling are these very same 36 feelings in the past, in the future, and in the present. The Bahu,vedaniya Sutta (the Discourse on the Many Kinds of Feelings. M 59), the Pañcak’aṅga Sutta (S 36.19), and the Bhikkhū Sutta (S 36.20), and their commentaries, also mention the 108 kinds of feelings.100

4.8.2 In fact, Dhammapāla says, feeling (vedanā) is sixfold, by way of the 6 types of contacts, that is, feeling born of eye-contact, of ear-contact, of nose-contact, of tongue-contact, of body-contact, and of mind-contact. They form a total of 108 kinds, thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>preoccupation (upavicāra)</th>
<th>support (nissita)</th>
<th>time (kāla)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>desirable</td>
<td>6 internal sense-faculties</td>
<td>past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>undesirable</td>
<td>eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind</td>
<td>present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>neutral</td>
<td>6 external sense-objects</td>
<td>future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>form, sound, smell, taste, touch, mind-objects</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 × 12</td>
<td>36 × 3 = 108 feelings</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.7 The 108 feelings (DAaṬ:VRI 1:463)

The 6 internal sense-faculties, of course, refer to our own feelings towards these faculties during the 3 period of time: past, present and future. It can also refer to the feelings that arise from contemplating on our own faculties.

98 Technically, this should tr as “the equanimity of the householder.”
99 Technically, this should tr as “the equanimity of the renunciant.”
100 M 59.5/1:399; S 36.19/4:224 f (SD 30.1); S 36.20/4:229; S 36.22/4:231 f; MA 3:114; SA 3:82-84.
The 6 external sense-objects refer to the feelings that arise stimulated by some external objects. In the case of the mind, it refers to feeling arising when it revels in some memory or perception of some mental object.

4.9 Carnal Feelings and Spiritual Feelings

4.9.1 A number of texts mention another classification of feeling, namely, that of the sensual or carnal (s'āmisa) and the non-sensual or spiritual (nirāmisa). The well known satipatthana passage on the contemplation of feelings (vedanā'nupassanā) of the Satipaṭṭhāna Suttas (D 22; M 10) mentions them:

And how, bhikkhus, does a monk dwell observing feelings in the feelings?
Here, bhikkhus, a monk,
(1) feeling a pleasant feeling, understands, “I feel a pleasant feeling”;
    feeling a painful feeling, understands, “I feel a painful feeling”;
    feeling a neutral feeling, understands, “I feel a neutral feeling”;
(2) feeling a pleasant sensual [carnal] feeling, he understands, “I feel a pleasant sensual feeling.”
    feeling a pleasant non-sensual [spiritual] feeling, he understands, “I feel a pleasant non-sensual feeling”;
(3) feeling a painful sensual feeling, he understands, “I feel a painful sensual feeling”;
    feeling a painful non-sensual feeling, he understands, “I feel a painful non-sensual feeling”;
(4) feeling a neutral sensual feeling, he understands, “I feel a neutral sensual feeling”;
    feeling a neutral non-sensual feeling, he understands, “I feel a neutral non-sensual feeling.”
(D 22,11/2:298 = M 10,32/1:59 @ SD 13.2-3)

4.9.2 In the phrase “pleasant sensual [carnal] feeling” (s'āmisāṁ sukhaṁ vedanāṁ), “sensual” (s'āmisa = sa-āmisa), literally means “with flesh,” thus connoting some sense of the carnal, that is, it is connected to the pleasures of the 5 senses (kāma,guna) (S 4:235, 236). In the phrase “pleasant non-sensual [spiritual] feeling” (nirāmīsam sukhaṁ vedanāṁ), nirāmisa means “non-sensual, non-carnal, spiritual,” which, according to the Commentary, refers to the six joyful feelings connected with the sense-doors, but not dependent on sense-desire (MA 1:279).

4.9.3 In the Saññīyatan Vibhaṅga Sutta (M 137), “sensual” (s'āmisa) refers to the household life and “non-sensual” (nirāmisa) to the renounced life. Elsewhere, as in the Buddhika Nirāmisa Sutta (S 36.-29), non-sensual zest (nirāmisa pīṭhī), non-sensual happiness (nirāmisa sukha) and non-sensual equanimity (nirāmīsa upekkhā) are experienced in the dhyānas. Sujato’s comments are helpful here:

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101 Sukhaṁ vedanaṁ, either bodily or mental.
102 Dukkhaṁ vedanaṁ, either bodily or mental.
103 Adukkham-asukhaṁ vedanaṁ, which is mental only: one is only aware that a feeling is present. Comy says that it is not easy to be mindful of neutral feeling, and that it should be best approached by way of inference, by noting the absence of both pleasant and unpleasant feelings. Comy illustrates with the example of a hunter seeing tracks before and after a rock, thereby inferring the track of an animal (MA 1:277). Dhamma,saṅgaṇi says that only the sense of touch is accompanied by pain or pleasure, while feelings arising at the other 4 sense-doors are invariably neutral (Dhs 139-145; Abhds 2). The suttas however speak of pleasant and unpleasant sights, sounds, smells, and tastes, that in turn condition the arising of corresponding feelings of pleasure or displeasure (S 4:115, 119, 125, 126). “This Abhidhammic presentation offers an intriguing perspective on observing feeling, since it invites an inquiry into the degree to which an experience of delight or displeasure in regard to sight, sound, smell or taste is simply the outcome of one’s own mental evaluation” (Anālayo, Satipaṭṭhāna, 2003:171).
104 S 36.29.8-15/4:236). See D 2:298; M 1:59; S 4:235, 236 (x2); A 1:81, 3:412l Pm 2:233. See also Sue Hamilton 1996a:43 f.
In addition to the usual threefold analysis of feelings, the satipatthana material introduces the distinction between “carnal” and “spiritual” feelings. This distinction is not explained in the context of satipatthana as such; the detailed discussion is in the Vedanā-saṁyutta.105 Since “carnal” and “spiritual” are unusual terms in this context, it seems likely that the Vedanā-saṁyutta passage was specifically intended to explain the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta material.

This impression is reinforced by another unusual feature, the inclusion of “rapture” [pīti, “zest”] as a kind of feeling. Rapture is not mentioned in the feeling section of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, but it does fall under feelings in anāpānasati. Again, this is an unusual if not unique usage, and suggests that the Vedanā-saṁyutta passage was intended to synthesize and explain the feelings sections in both satipatthana and anāpānasati.

The explanations that concern us here are as follows. Carnal feelings are those connected with the senses. Spiritual rapture is in the first two jhanas, spiritual pleasant feeling is in the first three jhanas, while spiritual neutral feeling is in the fourth jhana. Spiritual painful feeling is described as depression arising as one longs for the peaceful liberations one has not yet realized — a feeling I’m sure many are familiar with! (Sujato 2004b:149; emphases added)106

5 Feeling as suffering

5.1 The 3 kinds of suffering

5.1.1 It is a universal fact that feeling is impermanent, and what is impermanent is dukkha (unsatisfactory, suffering).107 The Dukkha Sutta (S 38.14) categorizes suffering into 3 kinds:

(1) affective suffering (due to physical and mental pain) (dukkha, dukkhatā, literally, “the suffering of suffering” or pain as psychosomatic suffering),
(2) temporal suffering or “suffering due to change” (that is, due to the ending of a pleasant feeling”) (viparināma, dukkhatā), and
(3) existential suffering or “suffering due to formations,” in the inherent inadequacy in conditioned existence (saṅkhāra, dukkhatā). (S 38.14/4:259; also S 45.165/5:56; D 3:216)

Here, (1) refers to bodily pain and mental pain (or displeasure); (2) is pleasant feeling, which brings about suffering when it ends, and (3) is all conditioned phenomena of the three worlds (of existence) because they are oppressed by the rise and fall of events.

5.1.2 The Dhamma, cakka Pavattana Sutta (S 56.11), in defining the 1st noble truth, gives some details, as follows:

Now this, bhikshus, is the noble truth that is suffering:
birth is suffering,
decay108 is suffering,
disease is suffering,109
death is suffering;

105 S 36.31/SĀ 483
106 On the further implications of Sujato’s remarks here, see The Satipaṭṭhāna Suttas, SD 13.1(58.1).
107 Eg Anatta Lakkhaṇa S (S 22.59.13/3:68), SD 1.2. For a contemporary discussion on pain, see Susan Blackmore 2003:236-241.
108 Jarā, old age, aging.
109 Only in the Vinaya & Saṁyutta versions; not mentioned in Comys.
Compendium of Feeling
(Vedanā, saṅgaha)

Analysis of Feeling


In the compendium of feeling there are first three kinds of feeling, namely, pleasant, painful, and that which is neither painful nor pleasant. Again, feeling is analyzed as fivefold: pleasure, pain, joy, displeasure, and equanimity.

Guide

Analysis of feeling. As we have seen, feeling (vedanā) is a universal mental factor, the cetasika [mental factor] with the function of experiencing the “flavour” of the object. Since some sort of feeling accompanies every citta [mind-moment], feeling serves as an important variable in terms of which consciousness can be classified. In this section the author’s main concern is to classify the totality of cittas by way of their concomitant feeling.

The 3 kinds of feeling. Feeling may be analyzed as either threefold or fivefold. When it is analyzed simply in terms of its affective quality, it is threefold: pleasant, painful, and neither-painful-nor-pleasant. In this threefold classification, pleasant feeling includes both bodily pleasure and mental pleasure or joy, and painful feeling includes both bodily pain and mental pain or displeasure.

Feeling is analyzed as fivefold. When feeling is analyzed by way of the governing faculty (indriya), it becomes fivefold. These five types of feelings are called faculties because they exercise lordship or control (indra) over their associated states with respect to the affective mode of experiencing the object.

When the fivefold analysis of feeling is considered, the pleasant feeling of the threefold scheme becomes divided into pleasure and joy, the former bodily and the latter mental; the painful feeling of the threefold scheme becomes divided into pain and displeasure, again the former bodily and the latter mental; and neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling becomes identified with equanimity or neutral feeling.

In the Suttas the Buddha sometimes also speaks of feeling as twofold, pleasure (sukha) and pain (dukkha). This is a loose or metaphorical method of analysis, arrived at by merging the blameless neutral feeling in pleasure and the blameworthy neutral feeling in pain. The Buddha further declares that whatever is felt is included in suffering (yam kiñci vedayitam tam dukkhasmin, S 36.11/4:216). In this statement the word dukkha does not bear the narrow meaning of painful feeling, but the broader meaning of the suffering inherent of all conditioned things by reason of their impermanence.

Pleasure (sukha) has the characteristic of experiencing a desirable tangible object, the function of intensifying associated states, manifestation as bodily enjoyment, and its proximate cause is the bodily faculty.

Pain (dukkha) has the characteristic of experiencing an undesirable tangible object, the function of withering associated states, manifestation as bodily affliction, and its proximate cause is also the bodily faculty.

Joy (somanassa) has the characteristic of experiencing a desirable object, the function of partaking of the desirable aspect of the object, manifestation as mental enjoyment, and its proximate cause is tranquillity.

Displeasure (domanassa) has the characteristic of experiencing an undesirable object, the function of partaking of the undesirable aspect of the object, manifestation as mental affliction, and its proximate cause is the heart-base.

Equanimity (upekkhā) has the characteristic of being felt as neutral, the function of neither intensifying nor withering associated states, manifestation as peacefulness; its proximate cause is consciousness without zest.


110 Tranquility (passaddhi), it seems, is the proximate cause only for the joyful feeling that arises in meditation.
111 Pali comys tell us that the heart serves as the physical support for all cittas other than the two sets of fivefold sense-consciousness, which take their respective sensitivities as their bases. In the canonical Abhidhamma the heart-base is not expressly mentioned. The Paññāna, the book of the Abhidhamma Pīṭaka, simply speaks of “that matter in dependence on which the mind element and mind-consciousness element occur” (1.4). Comys, however, subsequently specify “that matter” to be the heart-base, a cavity situated within the physical heart (Vism 8.111).
112 These defs of the 5feelings are found at Vism 14.128.
Pañca-khandha 2: Vedanā

The 5 Aggregates (2): Feeling

grief, lamentation, physical pain, mental pain and despair are suffering,113
to be with the unpleasant114 is suffering;
to be without the pleasant115 is suffering;
not to get what one desires is suffering,
—in short, the 5 aggregates of clinging116 are suffering.  (S 56.11/5:421 = SD 1.1)

In this list, the categories of suffering are as follows:
(1) affective suffering: birth, decay, disease, death, grief etc;
(2) temporal suffering: to be with the pleasant, to be without the pleasant;
(3) existential suffering: the 5 aggregates.
The 3 kinds of suffering are elaborated in the Visuddhi, magga (Vism 16.34 f/499).

5.2 TWO WAYS OF SEEING FEELINGS

Ñañābhivaṁsa, in his New Subcommentary (Abhinava,ṭīkā) to the Dīgha,117 gives two methods of interpretation as regards suffering and feeling. According to the 1st method of interpretation, the term “impermanent” (anicca) refers to equanimous feeling (upekkhā,vedanā) or to all feelings, by way of existential suffering (saṅkhāra,dukkha); the term “suffering” (dukkha) refers to painful feelings, by way of affective change (dukkha,dukkha); and the term “subject to change” (vipariṇāma,dhamma) refers to pleasant feelings, by way of temporal change (vipariṇāma,dukkha).

The 2nd method applies all three terms to all 3 types of feeling (pleasant, painful and equanimous).

Of this, Bodhi notes:

This interpretation gives a clear example of the intricate interconnections of the diverse categorical schemes underlying the Buddha’s teaching, and the exactness in the Master’s selection of words to bring home the significance of his discourse. (Bodhi 1978:153 n2)

5.3 PAIN AND SUFFERING

5.3.1 At this point, it is useful to remind ourselves of the teaching of the two kinds of pains, bodily pain and mental pain, famously declared by the Buddha to Nakula, pitā in the Nakula, pitā Sutta (S 22.1), in this reflection: “My body may be sick but my mind will not be sick.” The meaning of this brief statement is then detailed by Sāriputta in the rest of the Sutta in terms of not owning any of the 5 aggregates.118

5.3.2 On a simpler level, this meditation mantra means that there are 2 kinds of aggregates: the bodily and the mental. Since our body is physical, it is naturally subject to stresses and strains of daily living, and to decay in the long run, as the Buddha often declares.

This body is form made up of the four elements [3.3], born from mother and father, built up on rice and porridge, subject to impermanence, rubbing, pressing, breaking up, and crumbling.

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113 Found in most MSS but not in Be and Ce.
114 “The unpleasant,” appiya, also tr “what one loves not.”
115 “The loved,” piya, also tr “what one loves.”
116 Pañc’upadāna-k,khandha, namely, form, feeling, perception, formations and consciousness (S 3:47 Vbh 1). What is briefly mentioned here is elaborated in the second discourse, Anatta,lakkhaṇa S (S 22.59), SD 1.2.
118 S 22.1/3:1-5 (SD 5.4).
And this consciousness of mine is supported here and bound up here.

(D 2; M 23, 109; S 35.105; A 9.15, 55.21; J 12)\textsuperscript{119}

5.3.3 Through wrong or unskillful perception (saññā),\textsuperscript{120} we define or measure such feelings (vedanā) in terms of past feelings. Based on a memory of a painful past experience, we see our present similar one as being painful, too; based on a memory of a pleasant past experience, we see the present one as being pleasant, too. In other words, we are reacting to our experiences in terms of stereotypes that we have ourselves defined from past experiences. In this way, we do not really experience the present; we are living in the past! We are simply reprising old memories and acting out familiar roles: we are caught in the rut of predictable behaviour.

On a deeper level, we have prevented ourselves from understand that when physical pain arises in our body, we could, by not identifying with the pain (such as relating it to past experiences), simply regard it as a present but passing experience. Indeed, all experiences are passing event, if we really see them for what they are. Pain is a physical or bodily experience, liking and disliking are our past memories trying to manipulate us. Suffering is when we fail to see this. In short, pain is natural, suffering is optional.

5.4 \textbf{The Daṭṭhabba Sutta (S 36.5)}

The Daṭṭhabba Sutta summarizes our discussion thus far to serve as a reflection:

\textbf{SD 17.3(5) Daṭṭhabba Sutta}

The Discourse on What Should be Seen

Theme: Dealing with feelings

Traditional: S 4.2.1.5 = Saṁyutta Nikāya 4, Saḷāyatana Vagga 2, Vedanā Saṁyutta 1, Sagāthā Vagga 5

3 Bhikshus, there are these 3 feelings. What are the three?
   Pleasant feeling.
   Painful feeling.
   Neither pleasant nor painful [Neutral] feeling.

A pleasant feeling, bhikshus, should be seen as painful.\textsuperscript{121}
A painful feeling should be seen as a dart.
A neutral feeling should be seen as impermanent.

4 Bhikshus, insofar as a monk has seen a pleasant feeling as painful,
a painful feeling as a dart, and
a neutral feeling as impermanent,
he is called a monk who sees rightly, who has cut off craving, who by fully breaking through conceit, destroying it, has made an end of suffering.\textsuperscript{122}

One who has seen the pleasant as painful;
Who has seen the painful as a dart;

\textsuperscript{119} See SD 29.6a (3.4).
\textsuperscript{120} See Saññā, SD 17.4.
\textsuperscript{121} On account of change (viparināmana, vasena). (SA 3:76)
\textsuperscript{122} Ayaṁ vuccati bhikkhave bhikkhu sammaddaso acchejjī tanham vivattayi saṁyojanam sammamānābhisamayā antam akāsi dukkhassā ti.

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The neither painful nor pleasant, as peaceful, \(^{123}\)
Who sees it as impermanent: 
He is a monk who rightly sees, 
Who thoroughly knows feeling. 
He has fully understood feeling. 
He is without cankers in this very life. 
Standing in the Dharma, when the body breaks up, 
The master of knowledge cannot be reckoned.

— evaṁ —

### 6 Feeling and feeling-content

#### 6.1 The nature of feeling

6.1.1 Sue Hamilton, in *Identity and Experience*, makes an important note on the nature of feeling:

There are many different descriptions of the types of *vedanā*. By far the most commonly referred to are the three types covered by the term *tisso vedanā*: agreeable, disagreeable and neutral. \(^{124}\) It is this analysis which stands in the *Vedanā Samyutta* [S 4:204]. It is also stated that *vedanā* which is agreeable, disagreeable and neutral is experienced (*vedayita* \(^{125}\)) either bodily or mental [*kāyika* \(^{127}\) *va cetasika* \(^{128}\) *vā*], making six types in all. \(^{125}\) And in the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* it states that agreeable, disagreeable and neutral feelings can be experienced with regard to material (*sāmisa*) or non-material (*nirāmisa*) things [M 1:59].

These last two sentences have been interpreted as meaning that feelings have both a physical and a mental aspect. \(^{126}\) In my view, however, it seems more likely that the first refers to the fact that feelings have a tactile origin are experienced bodily (*kāya* is the object corresponding to the sense of touch) and feelings that have a non-tactile origin are experienced mentally: so, for example, the agreeable feelings we experience as a result of hearing or seeing something nice are not in this sense “bodily” feelings. \(^{1996a:43 f}\)

6.1.2 It is stated in the *Mahā Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* (D 22) that physical pain arises through bodily contact (*kāya, samphassa, ja*) and that displeasure (mental pain) arises through mental contact (*mano, samphassa, ja*). \(^{127}\) The key word to note here is “contact” (*samphassa*, or simply *phassa*), which refers to the impingement of the sense-object on its sense-faculty. The question here is not whether there are two kinds of feeling (bodily or mental), but that all feelings arise from contact: *phassa, paccayā vedanā*. \(^{128}\)

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\(^{123}\) *Adukkham-asukhaṁ santaṁ*, where *santaṁ* is glossed by Comy as *santa, sabhāvaṁ*, “a state of peace” (SA 3:76). PED gives 2 forms of *santa*: (1) “calmed, tranquil, peaceful, pure,” as pp of *sammati* (*ŚAM*; Dhtp 436 = *upasama*) (V 1:4; D 1:12; S 1:5; A 2:18; Sn 746), or (2) “tired, wearied, exhausted, fatigued” pp of *sammati* (*ŚRAM, Vedic śramyatī; Dhtp 220 = parissama, 437 = kheda) (Dh 60; J 1:498; P 2:9.36); and possibly (3) “working, satisfactory,” pp of *sammati* (*ŚAM*, to labour; present śmyati; pp Vedic śamita (V 2:119, 278). None of these senses is reflected in the Comy gloss.

\(^{124}\) Eg D 3:275; S 2:53, 82, 4:204, 207, etc; A 3:400.

\(^{125}\) M 1:302; S 4:208; cf Vbh 72; Dhs 133.

\(^{126}\) This is suggested by NR Reat 1987:23.

\(^{127}\) D 22.18/2:306 @ SD 13.2.

\(^{126}\) *Kāya* *Na Tumha S* (S 12.37/2:64), SD 5.14; *Paṭicca, samuppāda* *Vibhaṅga S* (S 12.2/2:2), SD 5. 15.
6.2 Pain can be unlearned

6.2.1 In this connection, in the Nakula,pitâ Sutta (S 22.1), we find the Buddha admonishing the aging Nakula,pitâ to train himself (by constantly reflecting) thus: “My body may be sick, but my mind will not be sick” (ātu râ,kāyassa me sato, cittam anãturãm bhavissati). In other words, there are body-based feelings and mind-based feelings: the body-based feelings arise from the impingement of a physical sense-object on any of the physical sense-faculties: in short, this is physical sense-stimuli.

This is the area of pain that medical science is familiar with, and can be divided into two kinds: acute and chronic. Acute pain is caused by a specific disease or injury, serves a useful biologic purpose, is associated with skeletal muscle spasm and sympathetic nervous system activation, and is self-limited. Chronic pain, in contrast, may be considered a disease state. It is pain that outlasts the normal time of healing, if associated with an injury or disease. Chronic pain may arise from psychological states, serves no biologic purpose, and has no recognizable end-point.

6.2.2 Chronic pain is technically called “nociceptive pain,” and troubles us painfully over a long period. Chronic pain is mostly biological, and are of two kinds—the visceral and the neuropathic. So altogether we have the following 3 kinds of pain:

- Nociceptive pain: Nociceptors are the nerves that sense and respond to those areas of the body where pain, infection or trauma (damage) occur, such as cuts, sprains, fractures, burns, bumps, bruises, inflammation (eg due to infection or arthritis), obstruction, and myofascial (muscular) pain. This kind of pain, also called “somatic pain” (or acute bodily pain), because it involves the destruction of bodily tissue that is time-limited or episodic.

- Visceral pain: This is a sub-type of nociceptive pain involving the internal organs. Visceral pain is usually diffuse and difficult to locate. It may be accompanied by nausea and vomiting, and may be described as sickening, squeezing, throbbing, deep or dull.

- Neuropathic pains: Pain resulting from an injury or malfunction in the peripheral or central nervous system. It is often triggered by an injury, but there may be no damage to the nervous system (eg, the nerves could just be infiltrated or compressed by tumours, strangulated by scar tissue, or inflamed by infection). This kind of pain is normally chronic. Such pain does not really reflect an injury, but simply that the alarm system itself is not working well.

6.2.3 Pain, on the other hand, could also arise from any of the 6 sense-faculties, like one hears some bad news and has a heart attack, or one thinks of a loved one and weeps as a result: these are mind-based feelings. As such, pain is not just a feeling: it is an experience, one that is not only mind-based, but also psychologically, culturally and environmentally determined. It might be said to be a “learned pain,” sometimes called psychogenic (mind-generated) pain. Thus, the reflection, “my mind will not be sick” means that one trains oneself not to be led by unwholesome sense-objects, but to wisely consider them to be impermanent and not to “own” them. One can unlearn this kind of pain.

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129 S 22.1/3:1 @ SD 5.4.
131 In Nakula,pitâ S (S 22.1), Sâriputta explains to Nakula,pitâ how to “disown” the 5 aggregates (S 22.1,6-25/3:2-5), SD 5.4.
6.3 ALL FEELINGS ARE FELT MENTALLY

6.3.1 The next key point to note is that all feelings are experienced in the mind: the sense-faculty and the sense-object are not sufficient conditions for feeling to arise, as clearly stated by Mahā Kaccāna in the Madhu,piṇḍika Sutta (M 18): 132

Friends, dependent on the eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is contact. 133

With contact as condition, there is feeling. What one feels, one perceives. What one perceives, one thinks about. 134

What one thinks about, one mentally proliferates. 135 What a person mentally proliferates is the source through which perceptions and notions due to mental proliferation 136 impacts one regarding past, future and present forms cognizable through the eye.

Friends, dependent on the ear and sounds, ear-consciousness arises ....
Friends, dependent on the nose and smells, nose-consciousness arises ....
Friends, dependent on the tongue and tastes, tongue-consciousness arises ....
Friends, dependent on the body and touches, body-consciousness arises ....

Friends, dependent on the mind 137 and mind-objects, mind-consciousness 138 arises. The meeting of the three is contact. With contact as condition, there is feeling.

(M 18,16/1:111 f), SD 6.14

This important passage clearly shows that all feelings are mentally experienced. The difference amongst the feelings—whether they are bodily or mental—depends on where they arise: a bodily feeling arises in the body (that is, the eye, ear, nose, tongue or body), and a mental feeling arises in the mind. Hence, there is no need, as Sue Hamilton attempts, to show “that feeling that have a tactile origin are experienced bodily ... and feelings that have a non-tactile origin are experienced mentally” (1996a:44). All feelings are experienced mentally: if there is no attention (sense-consciousness), there is no feeling.

6.3.2 This explanation is further supported by the very first two verses of the Dhammapada:

Mano,pubb’arigamā dhammā mano,seṭṭhā mano,mayā
Manasā ce paduṭṭhena bhāsati vā karoti vā
Tato nam dukkham anveti cakka’va vahato padāṁ

Phenomena are preceded by the mind [consciousness], for them the mind is supreme, they are mind-made,

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132 Similar passages are found in Pariññā S (S 35.60/4:32 f), SD 6.17, and Mahā Hatthi, padopama S (M 28,27-38/1:190 f) SD 6.16.

133 Tinnaṁ saṅgati phasso.

134 “One thinks about,” vitakketi. On how desire arises from thinking, see Sakka, pañha S (D 21,2.2/2:277).

135 This verse up to here is also found in (Samuday’atthaṅgama) Loka S (S 12.44/2:71-73), SD 7.5, and (Sabb’upā-dāna) Pariññā S (S 35.60/4:32 f), SD 6.17, in a different context.

136 Papañca, saññā, sankhā, see SD 6.14 (3).

137 “The mind,” mana. Here Comy glosses as bhavaṅga, citta (MA 2:79), the life-continuum, sometimes called the subconscious (DEB qv).

138 “Mind-consciousness,” mano, viññāna. Here Comy glosses as “adverence” (āvajjana) and impulsion (javana) (MA 2:77).
If one speaks or acts with a defiled mind,
Suffering follows one like the wheel the ox’s hoof.  
(Dh 1)

Mano,pubb’āngamā dhammā mano, seṭṭhā mano, mayā
Manasā ce pasannena bhāsatī vā karoti vā
Tato nam sukhām anveta chāyā’va anāpayinī

Phenomena are preceded by the mind [consciousness],
for them the mind is supreme, they are mind-made,
If one speaks or acts with a clear [undefiled] mind,
Happiness follows one like an undeparting shadow.  
(Dh 2)

6.3.3 The term "phenomena" (dhammā) here refers to whatever we experience through our senses. The Dhammapada Commentary defines dhammā as the non-material aggregates: feeling (vedanā), perception (saññā), and formations (saṅkhāra) (DhA 1:22). Form (rūpa) is not mentioned because we do not experience “form” in itself: we only have a bare awareness of them (viññāṇa, consciousness), then we form images or percepts of them (saññā, perception), and then volitionally act on these perceptions (saṅkhāra, formations). In this sense, it is all in the mind: all phenomena are mind-made.

6.4 NOT EVERYTHING WE FEEL IS DUE TO PAST KARMA

6.4.1 One of the important modern debates on Buddhism is whether dependent arising occurs over three lives (past, present and future). Both side of the divide are famously represented: we have well known proponents (like Bodhi139 and Brahmavamso140) as well as prominent opponents (like Ñāṇavīra141 and Buddhadasa142). My own stand is that the three-life dependent arising is true, that is, if we are to accept both karma and rebirth.

6.4.2 An examination of the Titth’āyatana Sutta (A 3.61)143 will help us understand the problem better. As Brahmavamso has noted, some interpret this Sutta as stating that vedanā is not caused by karma-formations (saṅkhāra) done in a past life. Therefore, the link called saṅkhāra in dependent arising (which does cause vedanā) cannot mean karma-formations of a previous life. Brahmavamso goes on to show that this is a misreading of the Sutta.144 The Sutta opens with the Buddha pointing out three common wrong views in his days:

Monks, there are three sectarian doctrines145 which when fully examined, investigated, discussed by the wise, even if taken in any other way,146 will remain a doctrine of non-action (akiriya,vāda).147 What are the three?

140 See eg Brahmavamso 2003:66-69.
141 See Channovāda S (M 144), SD 11.12.
142 Buddhadasa, Paṭiccasamuppada: Dependent origination, 1986:49; Paṭiccasamuppada: Practical dependent origination, 1992:77. He also argues that the three-life model of dependent arising was introduced by Buddhaghosa, who still had brahminical inclinations: 1992:78-104.
143 A 3.61/1:173-177 (SD 6.8).
146 “Even if taken in any other way,” param pi gantvā. I have taken the Pali as it is pace Comy which glosses it as yañ kiñci paramparaṇ gantvā pi, “even if adopted because of tradition” (A:ÑB 61).
147 Sāmañña,phala S ascribes the doctrine of non-action to Pūrana Kassapa (D 2.17/1:52 f). “Although on first encounter the view seems to rest on materialistic premises..., there is canonical evidence that Pūraṇa Kassapa sub-
(a) There are, monks, some recluses and brahmins who teach and hold this view: “Whatever a person experiences, whether pleasurable, painful or neutral, all that is caused by past action [done in past lives] (pubbe kata, hetu).”\(^{148}\)

(b) There are, monks, others who teach and hold this view: “Whatever a person experiences ... all that is caused by God’s creation (issara, nimmaṇa, hetu).”\(^{149}\)

(c) There are, monks, others who teach and hold this view: “Whatever a person experiences ... all that is uncaused and unconditioned (ahetu appaccaya).”\(^{150}\) (A 3.61,1/1:173, SD 6.9

### 6.4.3 Philosophical terms

#### 6.4.3.1 In modern philosophical terms, the three wrong views are respectively called

(a) determinism (everything is due to past action),\(^{151}\) niyati, vāda

(b) theism (everything is due to God),\(^{152}\) and issara, nimmaṇa, vāda

(c) fatalism (no causality),\(^{153}\) ahetu, vāda

They all fall under the category of “the doctrine of non-action” (akiriya, vāda).

#### 6.4.3.2 The first view—that everything that one feels now is due to what one did in the past—is pertinent to our present discussion. This view is discussed in detail in the **Devadaha Sutta** (M 101), where it is said to be a view of the Jains.\(^{154}\) They held that all suffering one experiences in this life is due to bad karma from a previous life. The Devadaha Sutta disproves this wrong view.

According to the Buddha, some of what one feels are caused by present karma-formations, some by past karma-formations earlier in this life, and some by karma-formations being performed right now.

What the Buddha is denying is that *all* happiness, suffering, and neutral feelings are caused by karma from a previous life.

#### 6.4.3.3 It should be noted here that the Buddha is referring to the *type of feeling*, not than to feeling itself. It is true that whichever of the 3 feelings that we experience—happiness or suffering or neutral—is not always due to past karma, even karma from a past life. However, the fact that we experience any feeling at all—that feeling exists—is due to both past karma and present conditions.

Suppose we have a television set. The fact that we have one is due to our having bought it on some time before. Its presence, as it were, is due to past karma (the result of our past action). However, which of the three channels that appears on the screen—Channel Happiness or Channel Suffering or Channel Neutral—is not due to what we did on some previous day (other than simply turning the TV on and selecting the channel). The content is not at all due to past-life karma.

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\(^{148}\) This determinist view is ascribed by the Buddhists to the Jains; but cf *Sāmaṇṇa, phala Sutta* (D 2,28-30/1:57 & nn), where Nigaṇṭha Nataputta is ascribed a different set of teachings. For rebuttal, see *Devadaha Sutta* (M 101).

\(^{149}\) This theist view is common among the brahmins.

\(^{150}\) This fatalist view (that denies causality) was taught by Makkhali Gosāla, a contemporary of the Buddha who held that all things are fated (D 2,20/1:198, 36,5/1:238, 36,48/1:250, 60,21/1:407, 76,53/1:524, 77,6/2:2 ff). This doctrine, together with the doctrine of non-action (or inaction) belongs to the “wrong views with a fixed destiny” (*niyata michchā, ditthi*), ie, a wrong view leading to a bad rebirth (Tkp 168).

\(^{151}\) See *Titth’āyatana Sutta* (A 3.61,4), SD 6.8.

\(^{152}\) SD 1.8 (5).

\(^{153}\) See *Titth’āyatana Sutta* (A 3.61,2), SD 6.8.

\(^{154}\) M 101/2:101-228 (SD 18.4).

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Similarly, the Buddha teaches that the existence of feeling in this life is due to past karma-formations. But the particular kind of feeling—happiness or suffering or neutral—is not always due to past-life karma. It depends on present conditions, especially how we view them when they occur or after they have occurred.

Hence, it helps to see the distinction between feeling and feeling-contents (happiness, suffering or neutral). This means that feeling is not necessarily caused by past-life karma-formations. Neither does it disprove the traditional teaching of dependent arising as spanning 3 lives.

Indeed, the Tīthṭ’āyatana Sutta (A 3.61) introduces dependent arising from the very physical composition of our being: the 4 elements, thus:

“Dependent on the 6 elements (earth, air, fire, water, wind and consciousness), there is the descent into the womb; when there is descent, there is name-and-form; with name-and-form as condition, there are the 6 sense-bases; with the 6 sense-bases as condition, there is contact; with contact as condition, there is feeling.” (A 3.61,9/1:176), SD 6.8.\(^\text{155}\)

Thus, the Buddha clearly shows that feeling (vedanā) arises due to the descent of the being-to-be-born (gandhabba) into the womb. We have feelings on account of our being born, which is a present condition.

6.4.3.4 We can, then, go on to compare this with the definition of nāma, rūpa in the Mahāniddāna Sutta (D 15):

“It is said: ‘With consciousness as condition, there is name-and-form.’
Ānanda, how consciousness conditions name-and-form should be known in this manner:
If there were no consciousness to descend into a mother’s womb, would name-and-form take shape in the womb?”\(^\text{156}\)

“Certainly not, bhante.” (D 15,21/2:62 f), SD 5.17

Viññāṇa, paccayā nāma, rūpa\(^\text{157}\) ti iti kho pan’etam vuttaṁ.
Tad Ānanda iminā p’etaṁ pariyāyena veditabbam, yathā viññāṇa, paccayā nāma, rūpaṁ. Viññāṇam va hi Ānanda mātu kucchimīṁ na okkamissattha, api nu kho nāma, rūpaṁ mātu kucchimīṁ samucchissathā tī
No h’etam bhante.

We can conclude that this passage clearly shows that the descent of the being-to-be-born of the Tīthṭ’āyatana Sutta is the same as the descent of rebirth-linking consciousness into the womb of the Mahāniddāna Sutta.

\(^{155}\) Cf Brahmavamso 2003:67 f.

\(^{156}\) Cf Tīthṭ’āyatana S (A 3.61) where the Buddha declares: “Based on the 6 elements, there is descent into the womb; | On account of such a descent, there is name-and-form; | With name-and-form as condition, there is contact; | With contact as condition, there is feeling. | Now, it is for one who feels that I make known [the 4 noble truths]” (A 3.61,9/1:176), SD 6.7. This clearly shows that feeling arises with the descent of the gandharva (rebirth consciousness) into the womb. However, this is not a common interpretation of viññāṇa-nāma, rūpa dyad, where “viññāṇa” in this context became the consciousness that descends into the mother’s womb at conception, while nāma, rūpa became the body complex that takes shape and, after developing sense-organs (sālāyatana), experiences contact (phassa) and so on.” (Bucknell 1999:339). More commonly, viññāṇa is “the consummation of the 6 types of consciousness associated with the sense organs, which makes the version read like an account of the psychological process of sensory perception.” (Bucknell 1999:327): see Madhu, piṇḍika S (M 18,16-18/1:111-113), SD 6.14. See discussion on nāma, rūpa in (Paticca, samuppāda) Vibhaṅga S (S 12.2.11/2:3 f) n, SD 5.15.

\(^{157}\) Here and next line, Brahmavamso’s article reads nāma, rūpa, paccayā viññāṇam. It has been corrected.
6.4.3.5 Thus, the Titth’ayatana Sutta [6.4.3.3] says that feeling arises with consciousness first arises in this life, whose cause can only be found in a previous life. As such, the Titth’ayatana Sutta (A 3.61) is sometimes wrongly quoted as teaching that dependent arising does not span more than one life. But when the Sutta is fully and carefully read, it actually proves otherwise. The situation that feeling exists at all is due to ignorance and karma-formations from the previous life, and dependent arising, as taught by the Buddha, does indeed span more than a single life.158

7 Arhats are in full control of their feelings

7.1 AVIJĀ PAHĀNA SUTTA

7.1.1 The suttas are full of references to the fact that saints, including arhats, experience feelings and are not bereft of them like some zombie-like automata. In the Avijjā Pahāna Sutta 2 (S 35.80), a monk asks the Buddha a very interesting question on spiritual development and the Buddha’s answer shows how the saints know and see things “as other” (aññato), that is, as “non-self”:

“But, bhante, how should a monk know, how should he see, for ignorance to be abandoned by him, and for true knowledge to arise?”

“Here, bhikshu, the monk has learned [heard] that nothing is worth clinging to. And a monk has thus learned that nothing is worth clinging to, he directly knows all things. Having directly know all things, he fully understands all things.

Having fully understood everything, he sees all signs as other.”160 (S 35.80/4:50), SD 16.9

7.1.2 The Buddha then goes on to say that the practitioner sees each of his sense-faculties as other; he sees the sense-objects as other; he sees the sense-consciousnesses as other, and “Whatever feeling—whether pleasant, or painful, or neutral—that arises with tongue-contact as condition, that, too, he sees as other...when a monk knows and sees thus, ignorance is abandoned by him and true knowledge (vijjā) arises.” (S 35.80).161

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158 See also Brahmavams 2003:69.
159 “He fully understands,” pariñjānati, meaning “he comprehends, knows fully for certain.” This spiritual knowledge is called “full understanding” (pariññā), of which there are 3 kinds: (1) Full understanding of the known (haṭta,pariññā), ie, the discernment of the specific characteristics of a phenomena (“Form as the characteristic of being oppressed’ feeling has the characteristic of being felt, etc”); (2) Full understanding by investigating (tīrana,-pariññā), ie, insight wisdom (vipassanā,paññā) which as the 3 universal characteristics (impermanence, unsatisfactoriness, not-self) as its objects, and which arises when attributing a universal characteristic to a physical and mental state, eg “Form is impermanent; feeling is impermanent, etc”; (3) Full understanding as overcoming (or abandoning) (pahāna,pariññā), ie, the insight-wisdom that has the universal characteristics as its objects, and arises after one has overcome the idea of permanence, etc” (Nm 52; Vism 20.3/606 f). Comy says that “full understanding” here refers to tīrana,pariññā (AA 4:43). The contemplation of impermanence (aniccānapassanā), etc, are given in the final tetrad (Dhammānapassanā, contemplation of mind-objects) of the breath meditation of the Ānāpāna,sati S (M 118.21/3:83), SD 7.13.

160 Sobbaṃ dhāmman pariññāya sabba,nimittāni aññato passati; cakkhum aññato passati, rūpe aññato passati, cakkhu,viññānam aññato passati;...yam p’idaṁ mano samphassa,paccayā uppajjati vedayitaṁ sukham vā duk-kham vā adukkham asukham vā. Tam pi aññato passato. Comy: “He sees all signs differently” (sabba,nimittāni aññato passati) means that he sees the signs of formations (sankhāra,nimittāni) differently from those who have not fully understood the worldly inclinations (abhīnivesā). For such people see all signs as self, but one who has fully understood the worldly inclinations, sees them as not-self, not as a self. Thus is the characteristic of not-self discussed in this sutta. (SA 2:370).

161 S 35.80,6/4:50 & SD 16.9 (2).
7.2 Sukhumāla Sutta

7.2.1 The story of the Bodhisattva’s seeing the four sights (or signs) is the hypostatization (the turning into concrete images) of his reflections on the three great evils of life, described in the Sukhumāla Sutta (A 3.38), thus:

(1) Bhikshus, amidst such splendour and wealth, and because of such an exceedingly delicate life, this thought arose in me:

“An ignorant ordinary person, though by nature would decay himself and unable to escape decay, would feel pained, ashamed, disgusted when seeing an old or aged person, being forgetful of himself [his own situation].

Now I, too, by nature, will age and cannot escape ageing. If, bhikshus, when seeing an old or aged person, I were to feel pained, ashamed, disgusted, that would not be proper for one like myself.”

When I reflected thus, bhikshus, all my intoxication with youth vanished.

(2) (Again I reflected:)

“An ignorant ordinary person, though by nature will suffer disease himself and unable to escape disease, would feel pained, ashamed, disgusted when seeing an ill person, being forgetful of himself.

Now I, too, by nature, will suffer disease and cannot escape disease. If, bhikshus, when seeing an ill person, I were to feel pained, ashamed, disgusted, that would not be proper for one like myself.”

When I reflected thus, bhikshus, all my intoxication with health vanished.

(3) (Again I reflected:)

“An untutored ordinary person, though by nature will die himself and unable to escape dying, would feel pained, ashamed, disgusted when seeing a dead person, being forgetful of himself.

Now I, too, by nature will die and cannot escape dying. If, bhikshus, when seeing a dead person, I were to feel pained, ashamed, disgusted, that would not be proper for one like myself.”

When I reflected thus, bhikshus, all my intoxication with life vanished. (A 3.38/1:145 f)

7.2.2 Understandably, an ordinary person would feel “pained, ashamed, disgusted” at the sight of decay (especially the human ageing process), disease and death. Here, however, the Bodhisattva (as reported by the Buddha later) feels that, “for one like myself,” he should not feel that way, that is, for 2 reasons:

(1) if he were to remain in the home life, he should not be pained, ashamed, or disgusted at the 3 great evils because they are a part and parcel of such a life;
(2) if he were to seek the way out of these 3 evils, he should not be troubled by them either, but face them squarely.

In short, he should not be troubled by his feelings at all. The Indriya,bhāvanā Sutta (M 152), too, says that the saint on the path (sekha pātipada, that is, a saint who is not yet an arhat), feels “pained, ashamed, disgusted” at a sense-experience, whether they are agreeable, disagreeable or neutral.

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162 “Splendour and wealth,” iddhi, or in a word “majesty.”
163 “Would feel pained, ashamed, disgusted,” aṭṭiyeyyaṁ harāyeyyaṁ jeguccheyyaṁ. For fuller analyses of these terms, see Kevāḍha S (D 11,5/1:213), SD 1.7 n sv.
164 See SD 1.11 (3.2) & esp “Dependent arising,” SD 5.16.19d.
7.2.3 The Buddha responds in the same manner towards the “miracles” (pāṭihāriya) of psychic power and of mind-reading, as recorded in the Kevaldhā Sutta (D 11), that is, he feels “pained, ashamed, disgusted” regarding them. However, the context here is more specific: the Buddha is referring to the fact that it is not wise to place our faith in miracles; for they could be performed by others by their own means, and as such fails as a way of authenticating our claims. “Seeing this danger,” the Buddha thus feels “pained, ashamed, disgusted” towards them.

What is expressed here is not merely an oblique way of expressing an opinion, but that it reflects an urgent feeling towards situations that do not conduce to spiritual development. This is somewhat the reverse of samvega and of pasāda (bright faith), discussed elsewhere.166

7.3 SALL’ATTENA SUTTA

7.3.1 The best known passage attesting to the fact that feelings do arise in the arhat is clearly the Sall’-attena Sutta (S 36.6), where the Buddha explains the difference between how the worldly person and how the arhat responds to feeling. The Sutta opens with the Buddha asking this question:

    “Bhikshus, the untutored ordinary person feels pleasant feeling, painful feeling, neutral feeling.167
    But, bhikshus, the instructed noble disciple, too, feels pleasant feeling, painful feeling, neutral feeling.
    Bhikshus, what then is the distinction, the disparity, the difference between the instructed noble disciple and the untutored ordinary person?” (S 36.6.3-5/4:207 f), SD 5.5

7.3.2 The untutored ordinary person, that is, the worldling, as a rule predictably reacts to the 3 kinds of feelings, thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feeling</th>
<th>Reaction</th>
<th>Reinforces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Painful</td>
<td>He sorrows, grieves, laments, beats his breast, becomes confused</td>
<td>latent tendency of aversion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleasant</td>
<td>He delights in sensual pleasure</td>
<td>latent tendency of lust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>He does not understand [does not know] it</td>
<td>latent tendency of ignorance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.3a The worldling’s reaction to feelings

165 M 152,10/3:300 f (SD 17.13).
166 See Mahā,parinibbāna S (D 16), SD 9 (7f) & Somanassa S (It 2.1.10), SD 16.14 (3+4).
167 Comy to Mahā Satipaṭṭhāna S says that it is not easy to be mindful of neutral feeling, and that it should be best approached by way of inference, by noting the absence of both pleasant and unpleasant feelings. Comy illustrates with the example of a hunter seeing tracks before and after a rock, thereby inferring the track of an animal (MA 1:277). Dhamma,sāṅgāni says that only the sense of touch is accompanied by pain or pleasure, while feelings arising at the other four sense-doors are invariably neutral (Dhs 139-145; Abhds 2). The suttas however speak of pleasant and unpleasant sights, sounds, smells, and tastes, that in turn condition the arising of corresponding feelings of pleasure or displeasure (S 4:115, 119, 125, 126). “This Abhidhammic presentation offers an intriguing perspective on contemplation of feeling, since it invites an inquiry into the degree to which an experience of delight or displeasure in regard to sight, sound, smell or taste is simply the outcome of one’s own mental evaluation” (Anālayo, Satipaṭṭhāna, 2003:171). See §8e n.

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As for the instructed noble disciple, that is, the arhat, he responds to the 3 kinds of feelings thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feeling</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Benefit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Painful</td>
<td>He shows no aversion towards painful feelings.</td>
<td>He knows an escape other than through sensual pleasure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleasant</td>
<td>He does not delight in sensual pleasure.</td>
<td>He understands, according to reality, the arising, the passing away, the gratification, the danger and the escape with regards to feelings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>He understands it according to reality.</td>
<td>Ignorance does not lie latent in him.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.3b The arhat’s response to feelings

7.3.3 The Buddha concludes by saying that for the arhat, “If he feels a pleasant feeling, he does not feel that it is yoked to him. If he feels a painful feeling, he does not feel that it is yoked to him. If he feels a neutral feeling, he does not feel that it is yoked to him.” (S 36.6). Feeling, as such, is not a sufficient condition for craving (tanhā). Even in ordinary people, not all feelings produce craving.

7.4 INDRIYA,bhĀVANĀ SUTTA (M 152)

7.4.1 How “differently” the saints know and see things is comprehensively and clearly explained in the Indriya,bhāvanā Sutta (M 152), as summarized in this table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The practitioner</th>
<th>Feeling</th>
<th>Cultivation of the faculties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) The supreme cultivation of the faculties in the noble one’s discipline</td>
<td>When a monk (experiences a sense-object) with (the sense-organ), (in him) the agreeable arises, the disagreeable arises, both the agreeable-and-disagreeable [the neutral] arises.</td>
<td>He notes the sensation, and regards it as “conditioned, gross, and dependently arisen.” And he notes its momentariness or impermanence. (M 152.4-9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) The learner on the path (sekha pāṭipada): the streamwinner, once-returner, or non-returner</td>
<td></td>
<td>“He is pained, ashamed, revulsed” by the sensation (pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral). (M 152.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) The noble one developed in the cultivation of the faculties (ariya bhāvita indriya,bhāvanā): the adept or arhat</td>
<td></td>
<td>He is a master of the 5 perceptions, applying them “as he wishes.” (M 152,11-16)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.4a Summary of the Indriya,bhāvanā Sutta teaching.

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168 See Sall’atthena S (S 36.6,8.4/4:208) + n, SD 5.5.

169 S 36.6.10f/4:209 f @ SD 5.5.

170 On formations and latent tendencies, see SD 17.6(6.2).

171 M 152/3:298-301(SD 17.13).

172 Here the 5 perceptions are powers accomplished in the arhat. Elsewhere, the Buddha teaches them to his unawakened disciples as a way to overcome the three unwholesome roots (greed, hate and delusion), ie, in Metta-sahagata S (S 46.54,12-13/S 5:119), SD 10.11 (2) & at Tikaṇḍaki S (A 5.144.2/3:169), SD 2.12, where they are explained in some detail. In both cases, however, the sequence of the perceptions are 2, 1, 4, 3, 5. For further details, see Paṭisambhidā,magga (Pm 22.26/2:212 f) and Vism 12.36/381 f.

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7.4.2 According to the Indriya, bhāvanā Sutta, the good worldling (kalyāṇa putthijjana), when experiencing a feeling, whether pleasant, painful, or neutral, sees it as being “conditioned, gross, and dependently arisen,” and is as such only momentary and impermanent. The saint-on-the-path “is pained, ashamed, revulsed” by the sensation whether they are pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral. The arhat is a master of the 5 perceptions, applying them “as he wishes.”173

7.4.3 Let us examine the arhat’s 5 perceptions, summarized in Table 7.3b. This “training” of arhat is an interesting one. The Sutta says he may cultivate any of the five perceptions. He knows just what to do with regard to whatever state confronts him, whether it is attractive (“unrepulsive,” apatikkula) or unattractive (“repulsive,” patikkula). Two significant points should be noted here.

Firstly, the arhat’s actions are spontaneous, that is, not rooted in greed, hate or delusion, and he does not measure others (that is, he has no conceit, māna).174 Secondly, feelings (pleasant, unpleasant, neutral; pain, tiredness, etc) do arise in the arhat, but he always knows them as they really are, and as such lets them come, lets them go, just as a mirror reflects an image but is in no way affected by it. Elsewhere, the Buddha teaches them to his unawakened disciples as a way to overcome the 3 unwholesome roots (greed, hate and delusion).175

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If the arhat wishes thus: ‘May I dwell’</th>
<th>He perceives it</th>
<th>Method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Perceiving the repulsive in the unrepulsive’ [ie, seeing what is unattractive in an attractive object, eg, a sensually attractive person]</td>
<td>as repulsive</td>
<td>He sees it as foul or as impermanent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Perceiving the unrepulsive in the repulsive’ [ie, seeing what is attractive in an unattractive object, eg, a hostile person]</td>
<td>as unrepulsive</td>
<td>He shows it loving-kindness or sees it as primary elements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Perceiving the repulsive in the unrepulsive and in the repulsive,’ [ie, letting go of both the attractive and the unattractive signs]</td>
<td>as repulsive</td>
<td>He sees them as foul or as impermanent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Perceiving the unrepulsive in the repulsive and in the unrepulsive’ [ie, regarding both the unattractive and the attractive in the same way]</td>
<td>as unrepulsive</td>
<td>He shows them loving-kindness or see them as primary elements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Rejecting both the unrepulsive and the repulsive, he dwells in equanimity, mindful and clearly comprehending,’ [ie, disregarding either sign as attractive or as unattractive]</td>
<td>equanimously, mindful and clearly comprehending</td>
<td>He is neither glad nor sad, but is equanimous, mindful and clearly comprehending.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.4b. The 5 perceptions (Metta, sahagata Sutta, S 46.54.12c/5:119), SD 10.11.

173 M 152/3:298-301 (SD 17.13).
174 One sees the arhat’s natural goodness in that he does not even have the notions of “great vehicle” (mahā-yāna) or “low vehicle” (hīna-yāna), terms that clearly reflect complexes of superiority, inferiority and equality.
175 In Metta, sahagata S (S 46.54.12-13/S 5:119), SD 10.11 (2) & Tikāṇḍaki S (A 5.144.2/3:169), SD 2.12, where they are explained in some detail. In both cases, however, the sequence of the perceptions is 2, 1, 4, 3, 5. For further details, see Paṭisambhidā, magga (Pm 22.26/2:212 f) and Vism 12.36/381 f.
7.5 Mahā,parinibbāna Sutta

In the Mahā,parinibbāna Sutta (D 16), the Buddha, just before relinquishing the remainder of his natural life-span, makes this remark that clearly reflects that he has feelings for the beauty of nature:

> 176Then, when it was morning, the Blessed One dressed and, taking bowl and robe, entered Vesālī for alms. Having walked in Vesālī for alms, he had his meal, after which he addressed the venerable Ānanda:
> “Bring along a mat, Ānanda. We will go to the Cāpāla Shrine for the midday rest.” 177
> “Yes, bhante,” the venerable Ānanda replied in assent to the Blessed One. Holding the mat, the venerable Ānanda followed the Blessed One as he walked.
> Then the Blessed One, having arrived at the Cāpāla Shrine, sat down on the prepared seat. Then the venerable Ānanda, having saluted the Buddha, sat down at one side. When the venerable Ānanda was thus seated at one side, the Blessed One said this to him:
> “Ānanda, delightful is Vesālī, delightful is the Udena Shrine, delightful is the Gotamaka Shrine, delightful is the Satt’ambaka Shrine [of the Seven Women], delightful is the Bahu,puttaka Shrine [of Many Sons], delightful is the Cāpāla Shrine.” 178

7.6 Parivīmaṁsana Sutta

The Parivīmaṁsana Sutta (S 12.51) describes the liberation of the arhat who understands the true nature of feeling in these words: 179

> 14 When he neither creates nor forms volitional formation, he does not cling to anything in the world. Not clinging to anything in the world, he is not agitated. 180 Not agitated, he attains nirvana by himself. 181 He understands,
> “Destroyed is birth. The holy life has been lived. What needs to be done has been done. There is (for me) no more of arising in any state of being.” 182
> 15 If he feels a pleasant feeling, he understands, “It is impermanent”; he understands, “It is not hanker after”; he understands, “It is not delighted in.” 183

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176 This episode, which immediately precedes the Buddha’s relinquishment of the remainder of his lifespan at the Cāpāla shrine (D 16.3.1-10/2:102 f), is also found in Cetiya S (S 51.10/5:258-263)—SA 3:251-255 parallel DA 2:554-558—and Āyu,sama S (U 6.1/62-64), commented on at UA 322-330; also at Nett 60. See Mahā,parinibbāna S (D 16.3.1-2), SD 9 for nn.
177 “For the midday rest,” divā,vihārāya. The term divā,vihāra, lit “day residence” has sometimes been tr as “siesta” (D:W 246), but the word suggests that it is a time for a nap. The Buddha often speaks against monastics sleeping in the day time (D 3:185*; cf V 1:295). There are many references to monks and nuns resting in meditation during such a midday rest (S 1:128 f, 130, 131 f).
178 “Delightful,” ramaṇiyā, alt tr “beautiful, charming.” This shows that the Buddha appreciates natural beauty, here def as any quality that conduces to mental peace, stability and clarity uninfluenced by greed, hate or delusion.
179 S 12.51.14-18/2:82 f @ SD 11.5.
180 “When he neither creates nor forms,” anabhisaṅkharanto anabhisañcetayanto. The word abhisaṅcetayati means “he thinks out, plans.”
181 “He is not agitated,” na paritassati. See SD 11.5(§14) for nn.
182 “By himself,” paccattam, ie, through his own effort, not through the power of another. (SA 2:78)
183 This quote is the arhat’s reviewing knowledge (paccavekkhaṇa,ñāṇa), for which, see S:B I n376.
184 Comy: After the arhat’s reviewing knowledge has been shown, this passage then shows his constant dwelling (satatā,vihāra). (SA 2:78). From hereon to the end, the text recurs with a different simile (that of an oil-lamp) in

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If he feels a painful feeling, he understands, “It is impermanent”; he understands, “It is not hankered after”; he understands, “It is not delighted in.”

If he feels a neutral feeling, he understands, “It is impermanent”; he understands, “It is not hankered after”; he understands, “It is not delighted in.”

16 If he feels a pleasant feeling, he feels it in a detached manner. If he feels a painful feeling, he feels it in a detached manner. If he feels a neutral feeling, he feels it in a detached manner.

17 When he feels a feeling ending with the body, he understands, “I feel a feeling ending with the body.”

When he feels a feeling ending with life, he understands, “I feel a feeling ending with life.”

18 Bhikshus, just as a person would remove a hot clay pot from the potter’s kiln and place it on level ground so that its heat would dissipate right there, leaving only earthenware, even so, bhikshus, when a monk feels a feeling ending with the body, he understands, “I feel a feeling ending with the body.”

When he feels a feeling ending with life, he understands, “I feel a feeling ending with life.”

He understands, “With the breaking up of the body following the ending of life, all that is felt, not delighted in, will be cooled right here—only physical bodies will remain.”

(S 12.51,14-18/2:82 f), SD 11.5

7.7 (SAṂYOJANA) KOṬṬHITA SUTTA

7.7.1 In the Koṭṭhita Sutta (S 35.232), Sāriputta explains to Mahā Koṭṭhita that the Buddha has all the sense-faculties—eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind—and he experiences all the sense-objects, ... yet there is no desire and lust in the Blessed One. The Blessed One is well liberated in mind.

Assajī S (S 22.88,22-25/3:126) = Gelañña S 1 (S 36.7,9-12/4:213) = Gelañña S 2 (S 36.8,7-12/4:213) = Dīpa S (S 54.8,30-31/5:319 f).

185 “Detached,” visaññuto, alt tr “unyoked.”

186 “A feeling ending with the body,” kāya,pariyantikaṁ vedanāṁ. Comy: This means delimited by the body. As long as the body with its five sense-doors continues, the feelings arising there continue. (SA 2:78).

187 “A feeling ending with life,” jīvita,pariyantikaṁ vedanāṁ. Comy: This means delimited by life. As long as life continues, the feelings arising at the mind-door continue. (SA 2:79).

188 “Will be cooled right here,” idh’eva...sīti,bhavissati. Comy: They will be cooled right here, without having gone elsewhere by way of rebirth, subject to no further occurrence, without the struggle and distress of their occurrence. (SA 2:80).

189 “Physical bodies,” sarirāni, sg sarīra. Comy glosses it as dhātu,sarirāni, “bodily elements,” ie, bones (aṭṭhika,-kākāla, SAPT).

190 The pot simile. Comy: The potter’s fiery kiln represents the three realms of existence; the potter is the meditator; and his rod the knowledge of the path to arhathood. The level ground represents nirvana. The time when the potter removes the hot clay pot from the kiln and places it on the ground is like when the meditator, having attained the supreme fruit of arhathood, removes his individual form from the four realms of misery and places it on nirvana’s plain through the attainment of fruition. Just like a clay pot is not baked at once or is broken at once, even so the arhat does not attain (final) nirvana on the same day as he attains arhathood. He lives on for 40 or 50 years striving to sustain the Buddha’s Dispensation. When he reaches his last thought-moment, with the break-up of the aggregates, he attains the nirvana-element without residue. Then, as with the potsherds, only inanimate bodily remains are left behind. (S 2:80 f). For the lamp parable, see Parivīmaṁsana S (S 12.51/2:80-84), SD 11.5 (2).

191 “Earthenware,” kapallāni, also “pot, bowl, pan.” S:B (see also 766 n140) has “potsherds” which does not seem to fit here although Comy uses it in the sense of “potsherds” here (SA 2:80).
In this way, friend, it can be understood how (the sense-faculty) is not the fetter of (sense-objects), nor (sense-objects) the fetter of (the sense-faculty), but rather the desire and lust that arises there in dependence on both is the fetter there. (S 35.232/4:163 f), SD 28.4

7.7.2 While it would be wrong, as a matter of fact, to say that arhats, and even the Buddha, have feelings, it is correct to say that all the three kinds of feeling do arise in them, not due to their past or present karmic formations, but simply as a matter of course due to their lingering 5 aggregates (their form, feeling, perception, formations and consciousness). The saints, especially the arhats, as far as we know from the Suttas, lead profoundly happy lives, and they live on for only one purpose: for the benefit of the unawakened—a role latter attributed to, or rather appropriated by, the Mahāyāna Bodhisattva. 192

7.8 BEYOND FEELING

7.8.1 At the close of the Pañcak’aṅga Sutta (S 36.19), the Buddha, after mentioning the various classifications of feelings, speaks of the levels of dhyanic bliss up to those of the formless dhyanas up to the cessation of perception and feeling. He goes on to declare that he experiences a greater bliss even beyond that:

Now it is possible, Ānanda, that outside wanderers might say thus:
“The ascetic Gotama speaks of the cessation of perception and feeling, and he declares that it is included in happiness. What is that? How is that?”
When outside wanderers say thus, Ānanda, they should be told thus:
“The Blessed One, friends, does not describe a state as being included in happiness only with reference to pleasant feeling. But rather, friends, wherever there is happiness and in whatever way, the Tathagata describes that as being included in happiness.”
(S 36.19,21/4:228), SD 30.1

7.8.2 The Commentary explains that “cessation” (nirodha) is called happiness in the sense that it is unfelt happiness (avedayita, sukha, or happiness of non-feeling). 193 While felt happiness (vedayita, sukha) arises through the cords of sense-pleasures and the 8 meditative attainments, cessation is unfelt happiness. Whether it is felt or not, it is exclusively happiness in that happiness consists in the absence of suffering (niddukkha, bhāva). (SA 3:80)

7.8.3 A similar sentiment, on a more mundane level, is later expressed in English poetry. After viewing the Elgin Marble in the British Museum in 1817, the English poet, John Keats (1795–1821), wrote:

Heard melodies are sweet, but those unheard
Are sweeter; therefore, ye soft pipes, play on;
Not to the sensual ear, but, more endear’d,
Pipe to the spirit ditties of no tone. “Ode to a Grecian Urn” (1817)

192 It should be noted that in the Mahāyāna, the term bodhi, sattva is taken in two broad senses: (1) as the ideal of Buddhahood that is regarded as the best kind of spiritual awakening to aspire to, and (2) hypostates or embodiments of various noble qualities (compassion, as in Avalokiteśvara) or Buddha-events (the great awakening, as in Amitābha, ie, the light symbolism). Very often such developments were the result of external socio-religious challenges.

193 “The happiness of non-feeling” here means that the happiness is not dependent upon feeling: a feeling-free happiness. Yet, it is not a “joy of unfeeling.” As such, the arhats are profoundly compassionate.
7.8.4 The (Sāriputta) Nibbāna Sutta (A 9.34) opens with Sāriputta exulting: “This nirvana, avuso, is happiness! This nirvana, avuso, is happiness!” (sukham idam āvuso nibbānam, sukham idam āvuso nibbānam). Udāyi then asks him how there can be happiness when there is no feeling. Sāriputta replies:

Indeed, avuso, it is just that: where nothing is felt, that is truly happiness!

etad eva khv-etta āvuso sukham, yad ettha n’atthi vedayitam (A 9.34/4:414 f)

Sāriputta goes on to mention the various levels of happiness beginning with sense-pleasures, through the dhyanas, up to the cessation of feeling and perception, and one seeing the last is an arhat. In short, the happiness of the arhat is beyond any feeling that the worldling knows.\(^{194}\)

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