

# 9

## Sañcetanika Suttas 1+2

**Paṭhama Sañcetanika Sutta** The 1<sup>st</sup> Discourse on the Intentional<sup>1</sup> | **A 10.206**  
 = **Dutiya Sañcetanika Sutta** The 2<sup>nd</sup> Discourse on the Intentional | **A 10.207/5:297-299**

Theme: How karma is forestalled and destroyed  
 Translated & annotated by Piya Tan ©2003, 2010, 2017

### 1 Related suttas

**1.1 The Sañcetanika Sutta** is about karma and its fruition. I have rendered it in keeping with the teachings of **the (Kamma) Nidāna Sutta** (A 3.3/1:134-136),<sup>2</sup> a seminal discourse on the roots of karma, and of **the Loṇa,phala Sutta** (A 3.99/1:249-253). The latter sutta opens with its theme:

“Whoever, bhikshus, were to say thus:

‘Whatever karma this person<sup>3</sup> has done, he would experience *that very same karma*,’<sup>4</sup>

this being so, bhikshus, there is no living of the holy life,

there appears to be no opportunity for the utter ending of suffering.

But, bhikshus, whoever were to say thus:

‘Whatever karma experienceable in certain way that a person does,

**he would experience its ripening [fruiting] in just that way,’<sup>5</sup>**

then, there is the living of the holy life, the opportunity for the utter ending of suffering.

(A 3.99,1/1:249), SD 3.5

**1.2** Furthermore, in **the Sāleyyaka Sutta** (M 41),<sup>6</sup> §§7-10, 11-14 closely parallel §§1-6, 7.2-11 of the Sañcetanika Sutta respectively. **The Visuddhi,magga** defines the 3 kinds of karma in terms of fruition time [§1.1] but adds a fourth, non-effective karma (*ahosi kamma*) (Vism 19.14/601).

### 2 Key terms and concepts

#### 2.1 TYPES OF KARMA

**2.1.1 The Sañcetanika Sutta** (A 10.206)<sup>7</sup> and **the (Karaja,kāya) Brahma,vihāra Sutta** (A 10.208) open by stating that *the results of intentional deeds will inevitably have to be experienced*, with an early translation by Bhikkhus Nyanaponika and Bodhi, thus [the bullet sign “×” signifies a wrong view]:

<sup>1</sup> There are actually 2 identical discourses, **Sañcetanika S 1** (A 10.206/5:292-297) = **Sañcetanika S 2** (A 10.207/-5:297-299).

<sup>2</sup> See the important discussion in its Intro here.

<sup>3</sup> “This person,” *ayaṃ puriso*, ie, a human being.

<sup>4</sup> *Yathā yathāyaṃ puriso kammaṃ karoti tathā tathā taṃ patisaṃvediyati*. It is possible here that “karma” (*kamma*) also refers to the Vedic sacrifice. In that case, the Buddha is saying that there is no wholesome efficacy in such rituals.

<sup>5</sup> *Yathā vedanīyaṃ ayaṃ puriso kammaṃ karoti tathā tathāssa vipākam patisaṃvediyati*, see **Loṇa,phala S** (A 3.99,1), SD 3.5 for details.

<sup>6</sup> M 41/1:285-291 (SD 5.7).

<sup>7</sup> These are actually 2 identical discourses, **Sañcetanika S 1** (A 1.206/5:292-297) & **Sañcetanika S 2** (A 1.207/-5:297-299). The 2 paras both start and end these 2 discourses.

x I declare, bhikshus, that actions willed, performed and accumulated will *not* become extinct as long as their results have not been experienced, be it in this life, in the next life or in subsequent future lives.

x *Nāham bhikkhave sañcetanikānaṃ kammānaṃ katānaṃ upacitānaṃ appaṭisaṃviditvā vyantībhāvaṃ vadāmi, tañ ca kho diṭṭhe va dhamme upapajjaṃ vā apare vā pariyāye.*<sup>8</sup>

(A:B, 1999:265)

**2.1.2** Here, following Norman (1997:166), I adopt the reading *upapajjaṃ* or *uppajjaṃ* “in the next life” (rather than the variant *uppajje*). Buddhaghosa “corrects” *upapajjaṃ* here and elsewhere to be a tat-purusha,<sup>9</sup> as *upapajje* or *uppajje*.<sup>10</sup> The Commentary explains this sentence (wherever it occurs) as referring to “3 kinds of karma” (*ti kamma*), according to the time of their ripening (*vipāka*) or fruiting (*phala*), thus:<sup>11</sup>

- |  |                                |                               |
|--|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| (1) karma experienced in the present life,               | <i>diṭṭha,dhamma,vedanīya</i>  |                               |
| (2) karma experienced in the next [following] life, and  | <i>upapajja,vedanīya</i>       |                               |
| (3) karma experienced in a subsequent [some other] life. | <i>apara,pariyāya,vedanīya</i> | (AA 2:210, 222) <sup>12</sup> |

**2.1.3** However useful such an idea may be, it should be noted that it is not attested in the early Canon. Discourses such as **the Deva,daha Sutta** (M 101) simply speak only of 2 kinds of karma in terms of time of ripening or fruiting, that is,

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| (1) karma “to be experienced here and now,” and               | <i>diṭṭha.dhamma,vedanīya</i>           |
| (2) karma “to be experienced in a subsequent [another] life.” | <i>samparāya,vedanīya</i> <sup>13</sup> |

<sup>8</sup> As at A 10.206,1/5:297 = A 10.207/5:299. Qu at Kvu 466/12.2. Cf McDermott, 1975:427, Van Zeyst, 1965:654 notes that this statement does not allow much room for the later notion of “non-effective or lapsed karma” (*ahosi kamma*), mentioned at Pm 2:78 and explained at Vism 19.14/601. Similar (but not identical) statements can be found at Dh 127, U 51,16, and Sn 666. See also Har Dayal, 1970:190; McDermott, 1980:176; Yuvraj Krishan, 1997: 66-69.

<sup>9</sup> A **tatpurusha** (Skt *tatpuruṣa*; P *tappurisa*) is a dependent determinative cpd. See SD 17.8a (7.2.1) n.

<sup>10</sup> A 1:134,23,28 = 135,2; 5:292,4 = 294,28 = 297,10 = 298,17 = *anantare atta,bhāve*, AA 5:76; Vism 19.14/601; cf *upapajja,vedanīyaṃ kammaṃ* (Kvu 611,23).

<sup>11</sup> These are the 3 kinds of karma classified according to time of taking effect. See **(Kamma) Nidāna S** (A 3.33/ 1:134-136) + SD 4.14 (4), on causes and kinds of karma. See **Nibbedhika,pariyāya S** (A 6.63.12c), SD 6.11. See also **Visuddhi,magga** where these 3 types of karma are respectively named as *diṭṭha,dhamma vedanīya kamma*, *upapajja,vedanīya kamma* and *apara,pariyāya vedanīya kamma*—and a fourth, *ahosi kamma*, lapsed or ineffectual karma (Vism 19.14/601). See Vism:Ñ 19.14/696 n2. The first two kinds of karma may be without karmic result if the circumstances required for their ripening are missing, or because of the presence of a stronger counteractive karma; as such, they are called *ahosi,kamma*: cf **Loṇa,phala S** (A 3.99), SD 3.5. The next birth actually depends on the dying person’s last thought-moment. As such, one’s dying thoughts should be to recollect or reflect on the good deeds one has done: giving, moral virtue, lovingkindness, etc. **Mahā Rāhul’ovāda S** (M 62 @ SD 3.11) closes with the remark that for one who develops and often cultivates the Breath Meditation, “even the last breath leaves with your knowledge, not without it” (M 62,30/1:426)—that is, one dies mindfully with right view. See Vism 8.24/291 f. On academic attempts to show that orig there are only 2 kinds of karma (present and future), and its rebuttal, see Analayo 2005 at M 3:214. On habitual karma taking precedence at death, see **Sotānugata S** (A 4.191), SD 58.2 (1.1.2.3).

<sup>12</sup> See Nett §§206+207/37. Buddhaghosa, in his Comy to Sañcetanika S, too, takes the phrase *apare vā pariyāye* as *apara,pariyāya* (AA 5:76).

<sup>13</sup> M 101,20/2:221 (SD 18.4).

As such, while aware of the commentarial hermeneutics, I have here preferred the reading *upapajjāṃ* or *uppajjāṃ* (rather than vl *uppajje*) and rendered the passage in keeping with the sutta tradition [§1.2].

## 2.2 APARE VĀ PARIYĀYE

**2.2.1** The Commentaries generally read the phrase *apare vā pariyāye* as a split compound, that is, as *apara,pariyāya*, which is a somewhat problematic term. The Critical Pali Dictionary (CPD) defines ***apara,-pariyāya*** as

**apara-pariyāya** (m), a later course (of life), another existence; sometimes by confusion with *aparāpariya*, written *aparāpariyāya*; ~*vasena*: AA 2:369,34.

~**vedanīya** (mfn), to be suffered for later on: MA 3:339,22; AA 2:219,27; PvA 242,39 (*apar-āp~*); UA 292,16 (*aparāpariyāya-vedanīya-bhūta*).

~**vedanīya-kamma** (n), a deed to be suffered for later on: MA 3:339,19; AA 2:211,21.

~**vedayitabba-phala** (mfn), the result of which will be felt in other existences (PvA 242,30 (*aparāp~*)). (References normalized)

**2.2.2** It is useful to examine the occurrences of the phrase, ***apare vā pariyāye***, in three important discourses in the Pali Canon and note their respective contexts, as follows:

### **Mahā Kamma Vibhaṅga Sutta (M 136)**

“And because he has here harmed life, taken the not-given, indulged in sexual misconduct, spoken false words, spoken malicious words, spoken harsh words, spoken frivolous words, is covetous, has a mind of ill will, holds wrong view, he will experience their result either here and now, or in the next life, or **in a subsequent life.**”

...*tassa diṭṭhe’va dhamme vipākaṃ paṭisaṃvedeti upapajja vā **apare vā pariyāye*** (×4).  
(M 136/3:214-216), SD 4.16

### **(Kamma) Nidāna Sutta (A 3.33)**

“Bhikshus, an action [karma] done in greed, born in greed, caused by greed, arisen from greed, ripens wherever the individual is reborn. Wherever the karma ripens, there the individual feels the fruit of that karma, be it *in this life or, having been reborn, in some future life.*”<sup>14</sup>

[The same applies to “hate” and “delusion.”]

*Yattha taṃ kammaṃ vipaccati tattha tassa kammaṃ vipākaṃ paṭisaṃvedeti diṭṭhe vā dhamme upapajja vā **apare vā pariyāye*** (×6).  
(A 3.33/1:134 f), SD 4.14

### **Nibbedhika (Pariyāya) Sutta (A 6.63)**

And what, bhikshus, is the result of karma?

There are, bhikshus, these 3 kinds of karmic results,<sup>15</sup> I say!

<sup>14</sup> *Diṭṭhe’eva dhamme upapajjāṃ vā apare vā pariyāye*. Foll the reading *upapajjāṃ* or *uppajjāṃ* (rather than vl *uppajje*, & Norman 1997:166), I have here tr in keeping with the sutta tradition. Buddhaghosa “corrects” *upapajjāṃ* here and elsewhere to be a tatpurusha, as *upapajje* or *uppajje* (A 1:134,23,28 = 135,2; 5:292,4 = 294,28 = 297,10 = 298,17 = *anantare atta,bhāve*, AA 5:76; Vism 19.14/601); cf *upapajja,vedanīyaṃ kammaṃ* (Kvu 611,23). Comy explains this sentence (wherever it occurs) as relating “three kinds of karma” (*tīṇi kammāni*), according to the time of their ripening (*vipāka*) or fruiting (*phala*) (AA 2:210, 222): see (4).

Those that arise [ripen] here and now, or in the next life, or in a subsequent life.

*Katamo ca, bhikkhave, kammānaṃ vipāko?*

*Tividhāhaṃ, bhikkhave, kammānaṃ vipākaṃ vadāmi:*

*diṭṭhe’va dhamme, upapajje vā **apare vā pariyāye.***

(A 6.63/4:415), SD 6.11

**The Netti-p,pakarana** attributes this verse to the Buddha:

*Yaṃ lobha,pakataṃ kammaṃ karoti  
kāyena vā vācāya vā manasā vā,  
tassa vipākaṃ anubhoti diṭṭhe vā dhamme  
upapajje vā apare vā pariyāye ‘ti*

Whatever greed-tinged deed he does  
through the body, speech or mind,  
its fruit occurs here and now,  
in the next life, or in a subsequent life.

(Untraced quote attributed to the Buddha, Nett §206/37; cf **Nidāna Sutta**, A 3.33.1/1:134)

**2.2.3** It is clear for all these passages, that *apare vā pariyāye* is a split infinitive, synonymous with *apara,-pariyāya*. However, often *apara,pariyāya* is confused with **aparāpariya** (from *aparâparam*, “another and another, various, ever following”), which then means “a series (of rebirths)”; the locative form, **aparā-pariye**, “at some later time” (KhpA 143,15) (*diṭṭha,dhamme...sampparāye...~*).<sup>16</sup> However, either way, the sense of the sentence remains basically the same, that is, meaning “in another or subsequent future lives.”

### **2.3 APPAṬISAMVIDITVĀ**

Another key word, **appaṭisamviditvā**, is glossed by the Commentary on the Sañcetanika Sutta as “without knowing the results of those karma” (*tesaṃ kammānaṃ vipākaṃ avediyitvā*, AA 5:76).

The sum effect of taking the Pali passage in this way, and translating, as Nyanaponika and Bodhi (and many other translators) have done, is that we have the notion that *the results of intentional deeds will inevitably have to be experienced*. This is clearly problematic, as it suggests that we must face the fruits of *all* our karma before we can be liberated—which would be impossible! [4.1]

## **3 Hermeneutical problem**

### **3.1 TRADITIONAL TRANSLATIONS**

**The Sañcetanika Sutta 1** (A 10.206) and **the (Karaja,kāya) Brahma,vihāra Sutta** (A 10.208) seem to say that *all the results of intentional deeds will inevitably have to be experienced*. The traditional Thai and Sinhala translations, too, do not seem to offer much help. The trilinear Pali-Thai-English and Pali-Sinhalese-English translations are given here:

<sup>15</sup> “Three kinds of karmic results,” see **(Kamma) Nidāna S** (A 3.33/1:134-136) on causes and kinds of karma. See **Mahā Kamma Vibhaṅga S** (M 136.17-21) tr in Sutta Discovery series 2004. See also **Visuddhi,magga** where these three types of karma are respectively named as *diṭṭha,dhamma vedanīya kamma, upapajja,vedanīya kamma* and *apara,pariyāya vedanīya kamma*—and a fourth, *ahosi kamma*, lapsed or ineffectual karma (Vism 19.14/601). The first 2 kinds of karma may be without karmic result if the circumstances required for their ripening are missing, or because of the presence of a stronger counteractive karma; as such, they are called *ahosi,kamma*: cf **Loṇa,phala S** (A 3.99/1:249-253), SD 3.5. See Vism:Ñ 19.14/696 n2.

<sup>16</sup> See CPD: *aparâpariya*.

(1) *Nâham bhikkhave sañcetanikānaṃ kammānaṃ katānaṃ upacitānaṃ appaṭisaṃveditvā vyanti, bhāvaṃ vadāmi.*

เราไม่รู้แล้วยอมไม่กล่าว ความสิ้นสุดแห่งกรรม ที่สัตว์ตั้งใจกระทำสั่งสมขึ้น ก็วิบากนั้น อันสัตว์ผู้ทำพึงได้เสวย<sup>17</sup>

Not knowing, I do not declare the ending of karma that beings have consciously done and built up and the fruit that beings have to experience. (Thai Tipiṭaka Dhammadāna CD ed 24/271)

(2) *Nâham bhikkhave sañcetanikānaṃ kammānaṃ katānaṃ upacitānaṃ appaṭisaṃveditvā byanti bhāvaṃ vadāmi. | Tañ ca kho diṭṭhe va dhamme upapajjaṃ vā apare vā pariyaye. Na tv’evaṃ bhikkhave sañcetanikānaṃ kammānaṃ katānaṃ upacitānaṃ appaṭisaṃveditvā dukkhassa antakiriyaṃ vadāmi.*

මහණෙනි, මම දැන කළ වැඩු කර්මයන්ගේ විපාක හෝ විඳි විගනාන්න භාවයක් නොකියමි | හෙ ද වනාහි දිට්ඨකමයෙහිම හෝ උපපායෙහි හෝ අපරාපරයෙහි හෝ වෙයි. මහණෙනි, මම දැන දැන කළ වැඩු කර්මයන්ගේ විපාක හෝ විඳි දුඃඛයාගේ කෙළවර කිරීමක් නො කියමි මැයි.<sup>18</sup>

I do not say, bhikkhus, that actions consciously performed and accumulated will become extinct without experiencing [the results of] those actions, | whether in this life, in the next life or in subsequent future lives. I do not say, bhikkhus, that suffering is extinct without experiencing the [results of] actions that were consciously performed and accumulated.

Here I take “not knowing” (*appaṭisaṃveditvā*, vl *appaṭisaṃveditvā*, “not experiencing”) as not meaning the Buddha’s “ignorance,” but rather in the sense of “such not being the case.”

### 3.2 MODERN INTERPRETATIONS

Nyanaponika and Bodhi (*Numerical Discourses of the Buddha*) [2.1] render the whole paragraph (following F L Woodward, A:W 5:189) as follows:

I declare, monks, that actions willed, performed and accumulated will not become extinct as long as *their results have not been experienced* [*appaṭisaṃveditvā*], be it in this life, in the next life or in subsequent future lives. And as long as these *results of* actions willed, performed and accumulated have not been experienced, there will be no making an end to suffering, I declare. (1999: 265, my emphases)

An endnote of the *Numerical Discourses* remarks that

The Buddha’s statement—that there is no making an end to suffering without experiencing the results of all actions performed—must be understood with some reservation (which AA makes explicit in connection with ‘kamma ripening in future lives’) that reference is to “kamma that is actually capable of yielding a kammic result’ (*vipākāraha-kamma*). But under certain circumstances kamma can be annulled by a counteractive or destructive kamma, and the arahant, by terminating the conditions for rebirth, extinguishes the potential for ripening of all his past kamma. (A:ÑB 1999:315 n70)

<sup>17</sup> The Thai font here is AngsanaUPC.ttf.

<sup>18</sup> I thank Ven Soorakkulame Pematatana (Bodhiraja Buddhist Society, Geylang, Singapore) for his assistance in providing this Sinhalese tr. The fonts here are *FMBindumathi.ttf*: <http://www.fontsaddict.com/font/fmbindumathi-x.html>.

## 4 Analayo's analysis

### 4.1 KARMA IS EXPONENTIAL

**4.1.1 Analayo Bhikkhu**, a German monk scholar who specializes in the Pali Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas wrote a very insightful paper, entitled "Karma and Liberation" (2009), discussing the problem of the opening paragraph of **the Sañcetanika Suttas** (A 10.206+207) and **the (Karaja,kāya) Brahma,vihāra Sutta** (A 10.208). The discourse's opening sentence is generally translated as follows:

× "Bhikkhus, there is no destruction of deeds intentionally done and built up, I say, without one's experiencing them [their fruits], whether right here in this life or, having been reborn, in some future life."

× *Nāham bhikkhave sañcetanikānaṃ kammānaṃ katānaṃ upacitānaṃ appaṭisaṃviditvā vyantībhāvaṃ vadāmi, tañ ca kho diṭṭhe va dhamme upapajjaṃ vā apare vā pariyāye.*

(A 10.208,1/5:299), SD 2.10

This statement clearly suggests that the results of intentional deeds will inevitably have to be experienced. Similar (but not identical) statements on the definite relationship between karma and its fruit can be found elsewhere in the Pāli canon.<sup>19</sup> [7.2]

**4.1.2** Such statements on karma, says Analayo (2009: 2), need to be contextualized with other passages which clarify that this relationship does not operate in a deterministic manner.<sup>20</sup> They should be understood, for example, in the light of **the Loṇa,phala Sutta** (A 3.99.1) and its Madhyama Āgama parallel. According to the salt crystal simile, found in the Loṇa,phala Sutta, just as when a crystal of salt is put into a cup of water, it would become too salty for drinking, a similar crystal of salt thrown into the river Ganges (or any large body of water) would not affect it in any way. Even so, the effect of a particular karmic deed depends on the overall moral development of the doer.<sup>21</sup>

**4.1.3 The Mahā Kamma Vibhaṅga Sutta** (M 136) and its parallels confirm that the habitual moral virtue takes such a precedent that even when we do a bad deed, we may still be reborn in a heaven or happy state.<sup>22</sup> Conversely, when we have done a great good deed, we may be still reborn in a hell due to having habitually done bad deeds. This teaching means that we need to be habitually doing good, so that it is a *natural* habit to us.

### 4.2 NOT EVERYTHING IS DUE TO KARMA

**4.2.1 The Sīvaka Sutta** (S 36.21) and its parallels in the two Chinese Saṃyukta Āgama translations give a complementary perspective. They point out that *not everything is due to karma*; for, in addition to the fruition of former deeds, there are other factors (such as bodily disorders, change of climate, or external

<sup>19</sup> Dh 127, U 51,16, and Sn 666.

<sup>20</sup> Early Buddhist teaching on karma has always been non-deterministic: see eg de Silva 1991: 273; Fujita 1982: 151; Gómez 1975: 82; Halbfass 2000: 102; Harvey 2000: 23, 2007: 59; Hershock 2005: 6 f; Jayatilleke 1968; Jayawardhana 1988: 408; Ñāṇaponika 1975: 91; Nelson 2005: 4; Pāsādika 2007: 319; Siderits 1987: 153; Siridhamma 1998: 62-67; and Story 1975: 74.

<sup>21</sup> A 3.99.1/3:250 @ SD 3.5; MĀ 11 = T1.433a21.

<sup>22</sup> M 136/3: 214,20; MĀ 171/ T1.708b16 and Tib (Beijing ed) *mñon pa, thu* 10b2 (D ju 267a7); cf also Mahā,prajñā,-pāramitā,(upadeśa,)śāstra, T1509/T25.238b17, tr in Lamotte 1944: 1535.

violence) that could be conditioning the nature of the present moment's experience.<sup>23</sup> The point of these discourses is that the inevitability of karmic retribution is only operational within a network of various causes and conditions without a linear or single-cause effect.

**4.2.2** The two **Sañcetanika Suttas** (A 10.206+207) and **the (Karaja,kāya) Brahma,vihāra Sutta** (A 10.208) continue with another statement, that is,

Yet, bhikshus, I do *not* say that there is a making an end of suffering without having experienced (the fruits) of intentional deeds done and accumulated.

*Na tv-evāhaṃ, bhikkhave, sañcetanikānaṃ kammānaṃ katānaṃ upacitānaṃ appaṭisaṃ-viditvā dukkhass' antakiriyaṃ vadāmi.*<sup>24</sup>

(A 10.206,1.1/5:292 = 10.207,1/5:297 = A 10.208,1/5:299)

This statement, as **Analayo** notes, is surprising, since elsewhere the discourses associate such a position with Jain thought. **The Deva,daha Sutta** (M 101) and its Madhyama Āgama parallel, for example, report that Jains of the Buddha's time (and earlier), observed ascetic practices viewing that the karmic fruition of former bad deeds needs to be expiated. They reason that no new deeds are undertaken, all sufferings can be eradicated and liberation will be won.<sup>25</sup>

**4.2.3** These texts continue by criticizing the assumptions for such a belief. The Buddha questions the Jains if they had any knowledge of their former bad deeds or were aware of the resultant karma lessening. Since the Jains have to deny both, the Buddha concludes that their belief is unfounded and their ascetic practices fruitless.

### 4.3 THE PURPOSE OF THE HOLY LIFE

Another discourse, **the (Kamma) Mahā Koṭṭhita Sutta** (A 9.13), clearly shows that the Buddhist training deeply differs from that of the Jain by stating that the goal of holy life (of celibacy) (*brahma,-cariya*) in early Buddhist monasticism is *not to change or end karmic retribution*, but to cultivate insight into the 4 noble truths.<sup>26</sup> The distinctive nature of the early Buddhist teaching on the relation of karma and liberation is clearly shown in the story of the serial killer **Aṅguli,māla**.

<sup>23</sup> S 36.21,13/4:230 (SD 5.6); SĀ 977/T2.252c21 & SĀ2 211/T2.452b14. Keown sums up: "the Buddhist theory of karma does not rule out the possibility of accidents and adventitious misfortune." (1996: 340).

<sup>24</sup> A 10.208/5:299,14 (Be reads *appaṭisaṃveditvā*).

<sup>25</sup> "Thus, by eliminating past karma [deeds] by asceticism, and by doing no new deeds, there will be no further flood of karma. Without any more flood of karma, there is the destruction of karma. With the destruction of karma, there is the destruction of suffering. With the destruction of suffering, there is the destruction of feeling. With the destruction of feeling, all suffering will be exhausted" (*purāṇānaṃ kammānaṃ tapasā vyanti,bhāvā, navānaṃ kammānaṃ akaraṇā āyatim anavassavo, āyatim anavassavā kamma,k-khayo, kamma-k,khayā dukkha-k,khayo, dukkha-k,khayā ... sabbam dukkham nijjinṇam bhavissati* (M 101,2/2:214,8), SD 18.4. MĀ 19/T1.442c3: "If those former deeds are eradicated through ascetic practice and no new ones are created, then all deeds [will be] eradicated, [if] all deeds have been eradicated, then the eradication of \**dukkha* is attained, [if] the eradication of \**dukkha* is attained, then the end of \**dukkha* is attained," 若其故業 *ruò qí gù yè*, 因苦行滅 *yīn kǔ xíng miè*, 不造新者 *bú zào xīn zhě*, 則諸業盡 *zé zhū yè jìn*, 諸業盡已 *zhū yè jìn yǐ*, 則得苦盡 *zé dé kǔ jìn*, 得苦盡已 *dé kǔ jìn yǐ*, 則得苦邊 *zé dé gǔ biān*. Analayo takes this as a fairly accurate record of Jain thought (2009:3 n9): For a discussion of some other Pāli discourses that report Jain theories about karma, cf Jain 1966.

<sup>26</sup> A 9.13/4:382-385 (SD 39.11).

Even a bad-doer can reach full awakening within the same life time, too short a time for fully exhausting the karmic fruition of serial killing.<sup>27</sup> Although intentional acts of murder (and similar precept-violation) are inevitably followed by karmic retribution, once full awakening has been attained, such karma can *only* fruit during the rest of that single life-time.<sup>28</sup> [7.2.3]

#### 4.4 THE JAIN CONCEPTION OF KARMA

In sum, argues Analayo, the above quote from **the (Karaja,kāya) Brahma,vihāra Sutta** (A 10.208.1) does not fit well with what can be gathered about the conception of karma and its relationship to liberation in early Buddhist discourse.<sup>29</sup> The reality is this statement appears to represent the Jain position. The ancient Jains perceived karma as a material substance that, as a result of a person's activity, adheres to the self but will fall away again once its effect has been experienced.<sup>30</sup> Such karmic fruition, they believed, can only be expiated through asceticism.

In this connection, **the Dasaveyāliya Sutta** (Daśavaikālika Sūtra), one of the four Mūlasūtras of the Jain canon, states that liberation can only be attained when one's past bad karma has been experienced, strongly asserting that *it is impossible to reach liberation without karmic retribution being either experienced or expiated through asceticism*.<sup>31</sup> This statement corresponds closely to the opening paragraph of the (Karaja,kāya) Brahma,vihāra Sutta, that to make an end of suffering, karmic retribution has to be fully experienced.

#### 4.5 CHINESE ĀGAMA PARALLELS

**4.5.1** The (Karaja,kāya) Brahma,vihāra Sutta has a Chinese parallel in the Madhyama Āgama,<sup>32</sup> translated near the end of the 4<sup>th</sup> century, based on an original probably of the Sarvāstivāda tradition.<sup>33</sup> Another parallel is a sutra quotation in Śamatha,deva's commentary on the Abhidharma,kośa, extant in a Tibetan translation, dating perhaps to the 11<sup>th</sup> century, and belonging to the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda tradition.<sup>34</sup> Both these parallels begin by affirming the inevitability of karmic fruition, but differ from the (Karaja,kāya) Brahma,vihāra Sutta in not declaring that karmic retribution must be fully experienced before suffering can be abandoned.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>27</sup> That he had *not* yet exhausted the karmic retribution of his killings is reflected in M 86/2:104,14; EĀ 38.6/T2.-721a29 and T119/T2.511c27, which take his being attacked while on alms-round, occurring after he has become an arhat, to be a fruition of his past bad deeds.

<sup>28</sup> *Pāpānāṃ ca khalu bhoḥ kṛtānāṃ karmaṇāṃ pūrvam duścīrṇānāṃ duṣpratīkrāntānāṃ vedayitvā mokṣaḥ—nāstyavedayitvā tapasā vā śoṣayitvā* This principle is summed up in **Samiti,gutta Tha**: "Whatever bad previously done by me in other births, it is to be felt here and now, as there exists no other occasion (for its fruiting)" (*yaṃ mayā pakataṃ pāpaṃ, pubbe aññā.sujātisū, idh'eva taṃ vedaniyaṃ, vatthu aññāṃ na vijjati*, Tha 81), Comy explains that the speaker is an arhat (ThaA 1:186,15). For further details, see {7.2} below.

<sup>29</sup> The idea that nirvana can be attained through good karma, stated in **Nidhi,kaṇḍa S** (Khṃ 8.9+13/7,19+27) or in Miln 341,23, is a later development: see McDermott 1973, 1977:466, 1984:118-122, & Schmithausen 1986:207.

<sup>30</sup> See Bronkhorst 2000:119; Dundas 1992:97-102; Halbfass 2000:75-85; Jain 2005:248-259; Jaini 1979:111-127; Johnson 1995; Kalghatgi 1965; Mehta 1957:13-30; Schubring 1962:172-185; Tatia 1951:220-260; Glasenapp 1915:19-20.

<sup>31</sup> Lalwani 1973: 212,1 (app 1 pt 1 verse 18).

<sup>32</sup> MĀ 15/T1.437b-438b.

<sup>33</sup> Cf Enomoto 1984, 1986:21; Lü 1963:242; Mayeda 1985:98; Thich Minh Chau 1991:27; Waldschmidt 1980:136 & Shi Yinshun 1962:703.

<sup>34</sup> Tib (Beijing ed) *mñon pa, tu* 270a-272b (D *ju* 236b-238b); on the tr, see Skilling 2005:699 [132].

<sup>35</sup> MĀ 15/T1.437b27 & Tib (Beijing ed) *mñon pa, tu* 270a5 (D *ju* 236b3), which instead point out that unintentional deeds do not entail karmic retribution.



**4.5.2** Here is the translation of the problem opening passage of the (Karaja,kāya) Brahma,vihāra Sutta as found in **the Madhyama Āgama**:

若有故作業。  
ruò yǒu gù zuò yè

If [someone] performs deeds intentionally,

我說彼必受其報。  
wǒ shuō bǐ bì shòu qí bào

I say that he will inevitably have to experience [their] fruits,

或現世受, 或後世受。  
huò xiàn shì shòu, huò hòu shì shòu

either in this life or in a later life.<sup>36</sup>

若不故作業。  
ruò bú gù zuò yè

If [someone] performs deeds unintentionally,

我說此不必受報。  
wǒ shuō cǐ bú bì shòu bào

I say that he will not necessarily have to experience [their] fruits.  
(MĀ 15 = T1.437b26-b28; tr Analayo. 2009: 5)

**4.5.2** It is important to note what is *not* said here: the phrase, “(there is) an ending” (*vyanti, bhavaṃ*), is not found. Furthermore, we do not see any negative marker in the Āgama version. As in a number of other Nikāya statements in similar vein, it declares that whatever karmic act we do, we will face its fruit at one time or other [7.2.1]. Following this Āgama passage, we could reconstruct the Nikāya passage [§1.1] (prefixed with an asterisk \*) as follows:

**1** \**“Bhikshus, I say that (the results of) intentional deeds done and accumulated, would be experienced, whether right here in the present, or in the next life, or in a subsequent life.*

*\*Sañcetanikānaṃ bhikkhave kammānaṃ katānaṃ upacitānaṃ paṭisaṃvideyya vadāmi, tañ ca kho diṭṭhe va dhamme upapajjaṃ vā apare vā pariyāye.*

1.2 Yet, bhikshus, I do *not* say that there is an ending of suffering *without* having experienced (the fruits) of intentional deeds done and accumulated.

## 5 SOLVING THE PROBLEM

### **5.1 PAṬISAṂVIDITVĀ, NOT APPAṬISAṂVIDITVĀ**

The phrasing of the opening passage common to the 3 consecutive discourses might then, concludes **Analayo**, be due to a relatively common type of transmission error, where either *a negation is lost or else an originally positively worded phrase is negated*.<sup>37</sup> That is, the sentences in question might earlier have read **paṭisaṃviditvā** instead of *appaṭisaṃviditvā*,<sup>38</sup> in which case the statement would have been:

<sup>36</sup> A 10.208/5:299,13 & Tib (Beijing Ed) *mñon pa, tu* 270a5 (D ju 236b2) speak of 3 periods of time for experiencing karmic retribution: for discussion, see von Hinüber 1971.

<sup>37</sup> These 3 Majjhima examples should suffice: **(1)** In a description of what appears to be an arrival at the final goal, M 29/1:196,29 reads *samaya.vimokkha*, where from the context one would rather expect *asamaya.vimokkha*, a reading found in fact in a repetition of the same passage at M I 197,27, and throughout in Be and Ce, as well as in the comy MA 2:232,3, whereas Se reads *samaya.vimokkha*. **(2)** The advice of a doctor with regard to a wound in M 105/2: 257,4 reads *alañ ca te antarāyāya*, whereas Be and Ce read *analañ ca te antarāyāya*, and Se *alañ ca te anan-tarāyāya* (the eds also disagree as to whether this wound still contains poison and whether the doctor is aware of that). In this case Ee finds support in a parallel version in SHT IV 500 folio 3 V4 (Sander 1980: 220), which reads:

Bhikshus, I do *not* say that there is an ending of intentional deeds done and accumulated, *having experienced* them [their results], whether right here in the present, or in the next life, or in a subsequent life.

Yet, bhikshus, I do not say that there is a making of an end of *dukkha* through having experienced (*paṭisaṃviditvā*) (the fruits of) intentional deeds that have been undertaken and accumulated. [§1ab]

“Though this obviously remains hypothetical, as I am not aware of any variant that would support the suggested emendation, nevertheless, such a statement would better accord with early Buddhist teachings than the reading *appaṭisaṃviditvā*” (Analayo 2009:14). By setting a contrast to the position adopted by the Jains [4.4], the suggested emendation *paṭisaṃviditvā* would highlight the point that, even though karma will definitely bear its fruit, nevertheless *liberation is not to be won through expiating all karmic fruition*.

The assumption that the text may have read *paṭisaṃviditvā* would also better suit the introductory phrase “yet” or “however,” *tveva* (*tu + eva*; both are emphatic particles), of the second paragraph of the Suttas, and which would then introduce a real contrast to the preceding statement on the inevitability of karmic retribution.<sup>39</sup> The suggested emendation *paṭisaṃviditvā* would also fit the subsequent exposition in the (Karaja,kāya) Brahma,vihāra Sutta, which culminates with the attainment of non-returning or full awakening, clearly showing that from the perspective of the remainder of the discourse, to make an end of suffering does not require experiencing every karmic fruition.

As such, assuming that the occurrence of a relatively common transmission error would fit better with the remainder of the (Karaja,kāya) Brahma,vihāra Sutta, would place the teachings given in these discourses in harmony with early Buddhist doctrine. In fact, though the Buddhist and Jain traditions obviously influenced each other in various ways, we would not expect the canonical texts of one tradition to uphold a position of the other tradition, especially where they elsewhere explicitly disagree, especially when it comes to such vital matters as the relationship between karma and liberation.

## 5.2 A SINGLE DISCOURSE SPLIT UP

Let us now collate the key ideas and parallelism of the related texts: the Sañcetanika Sutta (A 10.206 + 207), the (Karaja,kāya) Brahma,vihāra Sutta (A 10.208), and the Āgama and Tibetan versions. **Analayo** has worked out a useful table to illustrate this:

**Table 5.2:** A 10.206+10.207 compared with MĀ 12 and Śamathadeva, and with A 10.208.

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*ala[m]te-t(r)-ānta[r](ā)yāya.* (3) As a heading for an exposition of how clinging to a sense of self leads to agitation, M 138/3: 227,26 speaks of *anupādā paritassanā*, a reading found not only in other Pāli eds but also in its Chinese parallel MĀ 164/T1. 695c19: 不受而恐怖, even though this is a clear misfit and the context would require “agitation due to clinging.” In fact, the reading *upādā paritassanā* is found in a similar treatment in S 22.7/3:16,3, see also M:ÑB (1995) 1350 n1253. In sum, the above examples suggest transmission errors that involve: (1) loss of a negation in the PTS ed, (2) addition of a negation in Asian editions, (3) addition of a negation in the Pāli eds and in the Madhyama Āgama parallel. These examples thus testify to a tendency for negations to become lost or else be added during textual transmission. See Analayo’s fn.

<sup>38</sup> They are gerunds of *paṭisaṃvedeti*: see SD 49.8 (7.5.3.6(2)).

<sup>39</sup> “The only recurrence of the pattern *na tvevāhaṃ...dukkhassa anta,kiriyaṃ vadāmi* that I have been able to identify is S 22.99/3:149,27, where the point is also a refutation of a tenet held by contemporary recluses, preceded by a statement of a general principle (here on the nature of *saṃsāra*). This instance has a positively worded condition: *sandhāvataṃ saṃsaratam*, being in that respect similar to my suggested emendation. If the parallelism with S 22.99 should be a valid indication, then in the passage under discussion one would expect a positively worded condition, ie *paṭisaṃviditvā*, instead of *appaṭisaṃviditvā*.” (Analayo’s fn)

Sañcetanika-suttas (A 10.206 & A 10.207)	Chin & Tib version (MĀ 12 & Śamathadeva)	Karajakāya-sutta (A 10.208)
karmic retribution ↓ make an end of <i>dukkha</i> ↓ 10 unwholesome actions ↓ exposition of these 10 ↓ ↓ ↓ bad rebirth ↓ repetition of the above pattern for the 10 wholesome actions	karmic retribution ↓ 10 unwholesome actions ↓ exposition of these 10 ↓ <i>brahma, vihāra</i> practice ↓ fruits of <i>brahma, vihāra</i> practice	karmic retribution ↓ make an end of <i>dukkha</i> ↓ ↓ ↓ <i>brahma, vihāra</i> practice ↓ fruits of <i>brahma, vihāra</i> practice

(Analayo 2009:13)

According to **Analayo**,<sup>40</sup> the parallelism between the two Sañcetanika Suttas and the (Karaja,kāya) Brahma,vihāra Sutta in regard to their beginning parts, and between the Sañcetanika Suttas and the Chinese and Tibetan discourses in regard to the detailed treatment of the ten unwholesome actions [§§1c-7a], suggests the probability that all these discourses were interrelated during oral transmission. In fact, the Chinese and Tibetan versions are parallels to all three Pāli discourses.<sup>41</sup>

Thus, the way the (Karaja,kāya) Brahma,vihāra Sutta and the Sañcetanika Suttas have been preserved in the Pāli canon could be the result of *a garbling of what originally was a single discourse*. What was

<sup>40</sup> Hereon [5-6] are paraphrases or summaries (incl nn) of Analayo's analysis (2009: 13-20), with my occasional comments. Citations have been normalized.

<sup>41</sup> Akanuma 1929: 341 also lists SĀ 1047, SĀ 1048 and EĀ 48.1 as parallels to A 10.206 and A 10.207. Yet, SĀ 1047/T2.274a6 treats unwholesome deeds, mental states and views, 惡業,惡心,惡見 (è'yè, è'xīn, è'jiàn), making it a closer parallel to A 3.116/1:270,9, which examines *sīla, vipatti, citta, vipatti* and *diṭṭhi, vipatti*, and illustrates their bad consequence with the simile of the die, found also in SĀ 1047 at T II 274a21 and A 10.206/5:294,15. The other two parallels mentioned by Akanuma, SĀ 1048/T2. 274a26 and EĀ 48.1/T2.785c25, offer a treatment of the karmic retribution for the 10 unwholesome actions that has more in common with M 135/3:203,16 than with A 10.206, even though M 135 does not base its exposition on the 10 unwholesome actions. Thus, MĀ 15 and the sutra qu at Tib (Beijing ed) *mñon pa, tu* 270a-272b (D *ju* 236b-238b) seem to be the two chief parallels to A 10.206 + 207 + 208.

originally a single discourse—we could tentatively call it the **\*Sañcetanika Brahma,vihāra Sutta**—but later, probably due to transmission error, became three separate texts.<sup>42</sup>

## 6 JAIN INFLUENCES IN THE PALI TEXTS?

### 6.1 SABBA, KAMMA, JAHA

According to Jain teaching [4.2.2], we have to experience all our karmic fruits before we can be liberated [4.4], and how this idea is reflected in the opening sentence of the three consecutive discourses in Dasaka Nipāta of the Aṅguttara, that is, the two Sañcetanika Suttas (A 10.207+ 208) and the (Karaja,kāya) Brahma,vihāra (A 10.209) [4.1]. Yet another example where a Pāli discourse appears to present a Jain doctrine can be found in **the (Sabba) Kamma (Jaha) Sutta** (U 3.1).<sup>43</sup>

The Udāna is an anthology of short texts highlighted by “inspired utterances” of the Buddha. In this case, the Buddha sees the perseverance of a meditating monk “who leaves behind all karma, shaking off the dust of what he has done before” (*sabba,kamma,jahassa bhikkhuno, dhunamān’assa pure,kataṃ rajam*),<sup>44</sup> and he utters an *udāna* befitting the occasion.

According to the prose preamble to the verse of uplift (*udāna*), the Buddha utters his inspiration on seeing a monk seated in meditation who, “with mindfulness and clear comprehension was enduring without complaint painful, fierce, sharp and severe feelings that were the result of past deeds.”<sup>45</sup>

What is striking about this verse is the idea of “leaving behind all karma,” *sabba,kamma,jaha*, by “shaking off,” *dhunati*, the dust of past karma. The expression *sabba,kamma,jaha*, does not seem to occur in other Pāli discourse,<sup>46</sup> though the term *sabba,kamma-k,khaya*, “the destruction of all karma,” does occur as a term for awakening.<sup>47</sup>

### 6.2 DHUNATI

The verb *dhunati* as found in the four Nikāyas and in verses of Sutta Nipāta, the Thera,gāthā and Therī,gāthā tends to have a figurative sense as a “shaking off” or “casting off” of bad states. For example, it refers to how the Buddha’s disciples “cast off bad” (*dhunanti pāpaṃ*),<sup>48</sup> or else a monk “casts off bad states” (*dhunāti pāpake dhamme*), like a tree losing its leaves in the wind.<sup>49</sup>

We see a similar admonition, in allegorical terms, to “shake off Death’s army” (*dhunātha maccuno senaṃ*), just as an elephant would knock over a hut of reeds.<sup>50</sup> A **Thera,gāthā** verse records how the bhikshus “cast off the 3 roots of bad” (*tīṇi pāpassa mūlāni dhunanti*) (Thī 276); and in a **Sutta Nipāta** verse someone requests to have his “doubt cast off” (*dhunātha me saṃsayam*) (Sn 682), in the sense of

<sup>42</sup> This is my own suggestion. The title prefixed with an asterisk means that it is only conjectural.

<sup>43</sup> U 3.1/21 (SD 39.12).

<sup>44</sup> U 3.1/21,11 (Se reads *bhūnamānassa purekkhatam*).

<sup>45</sup> U 3.1/21,4: *purāṇa,kamma,vipāka,jam dukkham tippam kharam kaṭukam vedanam adhivāsento sato sampajāno avihaññamāno* (Be and Ce read *tibbam*, Se does not have *kharam*). According to UA 165,2, this monk was already an arhat, so that from the perspective of the commentators the monk’s endurance of pain due to former deeds was not something that brought him nearer liberation.

<sup>46</sup> A related expression would be *sabba,kamma,viḥāyinarā* or *sabba,kamma,viḥāyinarā* found in Be, Ce and Se of A 4.28, though Ee at A 2:29,1 reads *sammā kammaviyākatam* instead.

<sup>47</sup> See eg S 5.8/1:134,4; A 4.23/2:24,19; It 4.13/123,3.

<sup>48</sup> D 30/3:179,8 (Se reads *panudi-pāpassa*).

<sup>49</sup> Tha 2 & 1006.

<sup>50</sup> S 1:156,35 and 157,20; and again Tha 256; see also the similar expression *dhunāma maccuno senam*, Tha 1147 & 1149 (Se reads *dhunāmu*).

dispelling it with an explanation. In all these contexts, the verb *dhunati* conveys a figurative sense of casting or shaking off unwholesome mental qualities.

Thus, the relationship established in the above Udāna verse (U 3.1) between *dhunati* and the dust of past karma as an illustration of leaving behind all karma appears to be unique, even exotic, in early Buddhist texts. **Gombrich** (1994: 1078 f) comments that the above verse “sounds ... unequivocally Jain,” giving the impression that it “was of non-Buddhist origin.”

In fact, in Jain scriptures, as noted by **Enomoto** (1989: 45), “the elimination of *karman* is expressed as ‘shaking off (*dhū-*),’ and the word *raja* (*rajas, raya*) ... implies *karman*.” Examples of such usage can be found in the Dasaveyāliya Sutta (Daśavaikālika Sūtra), which presents shaking off the dust of karma (*dhunāti karma, rajaḥ*), as the way to liberation,<sup>51</sup> explaining that past bad is to be shaken off through austerity (*tapasā dhunoti purāṇa, pāpakam*).<sup>52</sup>

In such passages, the idea of “shaking off” has a *literal* sense, as the idea is to free the soul (in the Jain sense) from the material particles of karma that have accumulated. Hence, the above Udāna passage [6.1] appears to be another case where a Pāli passage attributes Jain (or popular) thought to the Buddha, by way of adapting a popular concept as a teaching tool.<sup>53</sup>

### 6.3 KAMMA OR KĀMA?

In the parallel versions of the Udāna, instead of *sabba, kamma, jahassa*, the Chinese and Tibetan counterparts speak of “leaving behind all sensuality,” indicating that they are based on a reading that has *kāma* instead of *karma/kamma*.<sup>54</sup> This puts the whole verse in a different light. The point of leaving behind *sensuality* connects very well with the imagery of dust, as other discourses associate the image of dust with sensuality and the householder’s life.<sup>55</sup>

Here, we see *dust* (*raja*) as aptly referring to something old, that is, actions “formerly done” or “done in the past” (*pubbe, kata* or *pure, kata*). Or, if we evoke the “dirt” aspect, it symbolizes “past bad deeds” (*purāṇa, pāpaka*). Furthermore, the dust of sensuality blinds us or numbs the mind.<sup>56</sup> A reference to sensuality would also concur with the figurative usage of *dhunati* in other discourses, since to shake off the dust of *kāma* would be a mode of shaking off unwholesome mental traits.<sup>57</sup>

<sup>51</sup> Lalwani 1973: 53, ult. & 54, 8 (ch 4 pt 12 vv 20-21).

<sup>52</sup> Lalwani 1973: 198, 9 & 203, 8 (ch 9 pt 4 v 8 (here counted as 4) and ch 10 v 7); for more examples, see Yamazaki 2003: 498-499.

<sup>53</sup> Enomoto 1989: 45 points out that a similar image can be found in Kauṣītaki-Upaniṣad 1.4, see Radhakrishnan 1953: 757, 4: “There he shakes off his good deeds and his bad deeds...thus one, freed from good and freed from bad, the knower of *Brahman*, goes on to *Brahman*” (*tat-sukṛta-duṣkṛte dhunute vā...sa eṣa visukṛto viduṣkṛto brahma-vidvān brahmaivābhīpraiti*).

<sup>54</sup> T212/4.765a6: 比丘盡諸愛, 捨愛去貢高 *bǐ qiū jìn zhū ài, shě ài qù gòng gāo*; T 213/T4.796b20: 苾芻諸愛盡, 捨愛去貢高 *bǐ chú zhū ài jìn, shě ài qù gòng gāo*; Beckh: *dge sloṅ ’dod pa kun spaṅs śiṅ, mdun gnas pa yi rdul bsal ba* (1911: 131 (32.3)); Zongtse: *dge sloṅ ’dod pa kun spaṅs śiṅ, mdun na gnas pa’i rdul bsal ba* (1990: 378 (32.3)). Enomoto comments: “the Tibetan and Chinese versions reflect the reading like *\*sarva, kāma, jahasya ... karman* is replaced by *kāma*” (1989: 44 n2). In the case of the Skt version, the beginning of the verse is lost, reading only ... *hasya bhikkhuno, dhunvānasya puraskṛtam rajaḥ*, according to Bernhard’s ed (1965: 432 (32.3)), on which, see Schmitthausen 1970.

<sup>55</sup> *Dust* as representing the household life occurs in a pericope for going forth, which regards household life as a “dusty path,” *rajo, patha* 塵勞之處 *chén láo zhī chù*, see eg M 27/1:179, 12 and its parallel MĀ 146/T1.657a5. The imagery of dust also occurs in Sn 974, where it represents passion (*rāga*), referring to the five sense-objects. See esp UA 166, 34, where *pure, kataṃ rajam* (U 21, 11) is glossed as the “dust of passion” (*rāga, raja*).

<sup>56</sup> These interpretations differ from those of Analayo’s.

<sup>57</sup> Enomoto 1989: 44 n2, however, seems to take the reading *kamma/karma* to be the original, as he comments that “*karman* is replaced by *kāma*.” In fact, the qualification *pure, kata* would suit *karma* better than *kāma* (ib n3).

Regarding the explanation given in the prose section of this Udāna discourse, the corresponding prose section in the Chinese parallel has no reference to experiencing pain resulting from past karma. In fact, it does not even mention a monk seated in meditation.<sup>58</sup> In general, prose sections in the Udāna tend to be later than the verses,<sup>59</sup> making it possible that the description of a monk seated in meditation and enduring pain arose at a time when the verse already read *sabba,kamma,jaha*. Here again, just as in the case of the (Karaja,kāya) Brahma,vihāra Sutta, a Jain idea could have been expediently used by or attributed to the Buddha, or perhaps it was an erroneous textual transmission.<sup>60</sup>

#### 6.4 NIJJARĀ

Another case of affinity with Jain thought can be found in **the Nigaṇṭha Sutta** (A 3.74), which presents the training in moral virtue, concentration and wisdom as 3 modes of “annihilation,” *nijjarā*, as a result of which one does not create new karma and gets rid of former karma by experiencing them.<sup>61</sup>

**Enomoto** comments that “the word *nijjarā* (*nirjarā*) is a technical term of Jain practice and indicates the annihilation of *karman*” (1989: 52). In this case, however, the use of Jain terminology seems to be intentional. The discourse begins with a Jain follower presenting his beliefs in a somewhat challenging manner. Hence, the use of Jain expressions in the reply serves a useful purpose, since in this way a teaching could be effectively given in terms understandable and acceptable to the visitor.<sup>62</sup>

#### 6.5 VITAKKA SAṆṬHĀNA SUTTA

**6.5.1** Yet another instance relevant to the present context could be the recommendation to forcefully restrain the mind,

If, bhikshus, ... there still arises in him bad unwholesome thoughts connected with desire, with hate or with delusion, then with clenched teeth and the tongue pressing on the palate,<sup>63</sup> he should subdue, restrain, attack the (bad) mind with the (good) mind.

(M 20,7/1:120 f), SD 1.6, & MĀ 101/T1.588c17

**6.5.2** The method, quoted above, is famously given in **the Vitakka Saṅṭhāna Sutta** (M 20) and its Madhyama Āgama parallel as the last of five methods for dealing with unwholesome thoughts.<sup>64</sup> The method is

<sup>58</sup> T212/T4.765a8.

<sup>59</sup> That the *udānas* themselves tend to represent an earlier textual stratum than the prose narrations has been suggested by a number of scholars, see U:W (1935) v; Winternitz 1920: 67; Abeynayake 1984: 66; Ireland 1990: 7; Lamotte 1968: 465; Nakamura 1980: 43; Norman 1983: 61; Pande 1957: 72; Seidenstücker 1913: 87 esp Seidenstücker 1920: xvi; Hinüber 1996: 46.

<sup>60</sup> Bronkhorst 1998: 12 thinks that the presence of such passages “in the Buddhist canon can be most easily explained on the assumption that they are not part of earliest Buddhism” (emphasis removed); for a reply to Bronkhorst 1998 see Enomoto 2003: 243-244.

<sup>61</sup> A 3.74/1:221,23 @ SD 18.7 (8.4): *so navañ ca kammaṃ na karoti purāṇañ ca kammaṃ phussa phussa vyanti, karoti* (Be, Ce and Se read *vyantīkaroti/byantīkaroti*), with a counterpart in SĀ 563 at T II 147c27: 業更不造, 宿業漸已斷 (*yè gèng bú zào, sù yè jiān yǐ duàn*).

<sup>62</sup> The expressions used in A 3.74 recur in A 4.195/2:197,32, with a counterpart in MĀ 12/1:434b23; cf also Bronkhorst 1993: 29 n8. In this case, too, the context is an encounter with a Jain, which would explain the choice of terminology. According to Ruegg 1992: 143, cases like A 3.74 and A 4.195 are “evidently to be explained by the fact that ... [the] auditor was a Nirgrantha and that the teaching was thus intended as an introductory salvific device,” cf also Gombrich 1994: 1095.

<sup>63</sup> *Dante’bhidantamādhāya jivhāya tāluṃ āhacca*.

<sup>64</sup> M 20,7/1:120 f (SD 1.6) & MĀ 101/T1.588c17.

also mentioned in the **Mahā Saccaka Sutta** (M 36), the **Bodhi Rāja, kumāra Sutta** (M 85), and the **Saṅgā-rava Sutta** (M 100).<sup>65</sup> In these contexts, it forms the initial practice of the Bodhisattva's self-mortification, and is the *least* severe—this is perhaps why it is recommended as the *last* of the 5 methods of allaying mental distraction.<sup>66</sup>

At first sight, this recommendation seems to contrast with other discourses that include the same practice among exercises that had been unable to awaken the Bodhisattva. Bronkhorst takes this instruction to be a case where “Jain practices had come to be accepted by at least some Buddhists.” (1993: xii)<sup>67</sup>

**6.5.3** A closer inspection of the Vitakka Saṅghāna Sutta and its parallels reveals, however, that this exercise is *not* presented as something that on its own results in awakening,<sup>68</sup> but rather *as a last resort* in case all other attempts to deal with unwholesome thoughts have failed. Even though forcefully restraining the mind is not a method that will result in awakening, it does serve to stop unwholesome thoughts and thereby prevent their aggravating into unwholesome actions.<sup>69</sup> Thus the instructions given in the Vitakka Saṅghāna Sutta do not conflict with other Pāli passages that consider forceful restraint of the mind to be on its own incapable of leading to awakening.

**6.5.4** In sum, besides the case of the Sañcetanika Suttas and the (Karaja, kāya) Brahma, vihāra Sutta, the Udāna discourse (U 3.1) discussed above [6.3], too, seems to be where a Pāli discourse “takes up a position that fits Jain thought better than the teachings of early Buddhism” (Analayo 2009: 19).<sup>70</sup> In both cases, the formulation found in the Pāli version is not supported by the parallel versions, so that both cases may well be the outcome of errors that occurred at some point during their transmission. These two cases thus reveal the potential of comparative studies based on parallel versions transmitted by different schools for properly assessing the legacy of the early Buddhist discourses.<sup>71</sup>

<sup>65</sup> Respectively M 36,20/1:242 (SD 49.4); M 85,19/2:93 (SD 55.2); & (M 100,17/2:212 (SD 10.9). Cf also the more briefly formulated counterparts in Mahā, vastu, Senart 1890:124,3, and Saṅgha, bheda, vastu, Gnoli 1977: 100,3.

<sup>66</sup> **Purisa Thāma S** (A 2.1.5), on the other hand, teaches us not to be content with wholesome mental states and to be unremitting in our “personal effort” to win the spiritual goal (A 2.1.5/1:50). See **Vitakka Saṅghāna S** (M 120), SD 1.6 (1). Cf J Bronkhorst, “Self and meditation in Indian Buddhism,” 1998: 12.

<sup>67</sup> Cf also Bronkhorst 1999: 86 and King 1980: 10.

<sup>68</sup> This can be seen more clearly in MĀ 101, which does not have a counterpart to the reference in M 20/1:122,4 to cutting off craving etc; for a discussion, see Anālayo 2005: 8-9.

<sup>69</sup> Gombrich comments that it is not “at all strange that a technique which, used by itself ... turned out not to lead to Enlightenment, could be recommended...for overcoming a particular difficulty.” (1994: 1080)

<sup>70</sup> Another example mentioned by Bronkhorst 1993: x or Bronkhorst 1999: 86 is the contrast between the rejection of the idea that the “development of the faculties” could be undertaken by avoiding sense experience, voiced in M 152/3:298,16 and SĀ 282/2:78b1, and the approving attitude shown in other discourses towards states of concentration during which sights or sounds are no longer experienced, eg in D 16/2:131,20, with parallels in the reconstructed Skt version in Waldschmidt 1951: 274 and in DĀ 2/T1.19a25, T5/T1.168b13, T6/T1.183c24, and T7/T1.198a17. Yet, the point made in M 152 and SĀ 282 is how to relate to everyday experience, in fact, the expression “development of the faculties,” *indriyabhāvanā* 修諸根 *xiū zhū gēn*, is an obvious counterpart to “restraint of the faculties,” *indriya, saṁvara* 守護諸根 *shǒu hù zhū gēn*. Thus, the point made in this passage is not a criticism of deeper stages of concentration devoid of sensory experience, but rather a criticism of attempting to deal with sensory impact in daily life by trying to avoid it, instead of developing equanimity towards whatever is experienced. (Analayo's n)

<sup>71</sup> For a fuller comparative study, see Analayo 2009.

## 7 Historical critical study

### 7.1 HISTORICAL CRITICAL STUDY OF BUDDHIST TEXTS

**7.1.1** In the problem of the opening passage of the Sañcetanika Suttas (A 10.206+207) and the (Karaja,-kāya) Brahma,vihāra Sutta (A 10.208), and similar problems in related texts, we have resolved the issues using **the historical critical method**. This method, also known as “higher criticism,” is a branch of literary or textual analysis, usually applied to the investigation of religious texts, comparing them to other texts written at or around the same time of the text in question.

The term “higher criticism” is used in contrast with **lower criticism** or “textual criticism,” the effort to determine what a text originally said before it was altered (through error or intent). Higher criticism treats scripture as a text created by human beings at a particular historical time and for various human motives, in contrast to direct insight or personal realization, that is, the true final spiritual authority.

**7.1.2 Analayo**, in his paper, “Karma and Liberation” (2009), gives an insightful historical critical examination of the problem regarding the opening passage of the three consecutive discourses mentioned (A 10.206-208). The problem is satisfactorily resolved, at least in the academic sense, by his examination and comparison of the following sources:

- (1) the primary source: the Pali texts, Chinese Āgamas, and related commentaries and translations,
- (2) the Jain and other contemporary or related Indian texts; and
- (3) the secondary sources: the writings of scholars in recent times.

With such a triangulation of sources, he is able to convincingly make 3 interesting and useful conclusions:

- (1) the problem passage of karmic fruition arises as a result of a confusion in the use of negations [5.1],
- (2) that the three consecutive texts (A 10.206-108) were originally a single text [5.2], and
- (3) that occasionally, we can see external (in this case, Jain) influence in the Buddhist textual tradition [6].

Let me briefly comment on each of these conclusions before closing.

### 7.2 KARMA AND LIBERATION.

#### 7.2.1 We must face our karmic music

**7.2.1.1** The discourse’s opening sentence is generally translated as follows:

× “Bhikshus, there is no destruction of deeds intentionally done and built up, I say, without one’s experiencing them [their fruits], whether right here in this life or, having been reborn, in some future life.” (A 10.206,1/5:292 = 10.207,1/5:297 = 10.208,1/5:299)

This statement clearly suggests that *the results of intentional deeds will inevitably have to be experienced* [4.1]. Similar (but not identical) statements on the definite relationship between karma and its fruit can be found elsewhere in the Pāli canon. Let us examine them in this connection.

**7.2.1.2** The following **Dhammapada** verse (Dh 127) comes with a story of a group of three persons, how each of them harms both humans and animals, and faces the painful karmic consequences of their misdeeds. At the end of the admonition, the Buddha utters this verse:



*Na antalikkhe na samudda, majjhe  
na pabbatānaṃ vivaraṃ pavissa  
na vijjati so jagati-p, padeso  
yatha-ṭ, ṭhito muñceyya pāpa, kammā*

Neither in the skies [space], nor in mid-ocean,  
nor by entering into an opening in the mountains:  
there is no place on earth where one  
would remain free from (the fruits of) bad karma.  
(Dh 127)

The meaning of this verse is quite clear. It is *not* that we must face the fruit of every action we have done, but that when a bad deed is done, its fruits will come to the doer at any time, anywhere when the conditions are right.

**7.2.1.3 The Kumārakā Sutta** (U 6.5) records how the Buddha, meeting some boys catching (*bādheti*) some small fishes, admonishes them:

*Sace vo dukkhaṃ appiyaṃ  
mā kattha pāpakaṃ kammaṃ  
āvi vā yadi vā raho  
sace'va pāpakaṃ kammaṃ karissatha  
karotha vā  
na vo dukkhā mutty atthi  
upeccāpi palāyataṃ*

If you love not suffering,  
do no bad deed [karma],  
whether openly or in secret.  
For, if you would do a bad deed,  
or do it (now),  
there is no escape from suffering,  
even if you were to try to flee. (U 5.4/51)

Clearly here, there is *no* mention that we must face *all* our karma's fruitions. The verse, as it stands, only states that when a negative karma fruits, suffering inevitably follows, and there is no way we can escape it when this happens.

**7.2.1.4 The (Cūḷa) Kokāliya Sutta** (Sn 3.10) is the Buddha's admonition against wrong speech after the death of the renegade monk, Kokāliya, who worked with Devadatta against the Buddha:

*Na hi nassati kassaci kammaṃ  
eti ha taṃ labhat'eva suvāmi  
dukkhaṃ mando para, loke  
attani passati kibbisa, kāri*

For, no one's karma is exhausted,  
truly, it comes back, the owner surely receives it:  
the foolish see suffering in the hereafter,  
the wrong-doer sees it for himself. (Sn 666)

Again here, what is stressed is that we are "owners" of our karma, which has the potential of fruiting as long as we are unawakened. If we do not face them in this life, they would fruit some time or other in the future when the conditions are right.

## 7.2.2 Pain without suffering

Karma is a universal principle, meaning that it will bear fruit whenever the conditions are right, even in the case of arhats and the Buddha (but they do not create new karma). The arhat **Sīvalī**, for example, due to various past acts of generosity, enjoys the karmic fruit of getting almsfood, even in difficult times.<sup>72</sup> It is said that when the Buddha visits Khadira, vāniya Revata, he takes Sīvalī with him because the path is difficult and food scarce.<sup>73</sup>

<sup>72</sup> U 2.8; AA 1:227 f, 243-248; DhA 2:192 f, 196, 200; J 1:408 f; ThaA 1:144-150; ApA 520-528.

<sup>73</sup> ThaA 1:149; Ap 2:495; AA 1:227. He is declared by the Buddha as the foremost amongst monks who receives almsfood (A 1:24). In homes of traditional Sinhalese Buddhists, we often see an image of Sīvalī, usu hanging in the

Even the Buddha, on the other hand, faces the fruitions of some past karma. Once, when he stands too long (over a few days) in the open sun, he suffers from bad head-ache as a result.<sup>74</sup> Even then, he does not *suffer* negatively as an unawakened being would. Pain is a physical response, a bodily feeling, but in the case of the Buddha and the arhats, it remains on the body, and does not invade the mind, as explained in **the Nakula, pitā Sutta** (S 22.1), centering around the famous reflection, ‘My body may be sick, but my mind will not be sick.’<sup>75</sup>

### **7.2.3 Limiting our karma**

**7.2.3.1 The (Karaja, kāya) Brahma, vihāra Sutta** (A 10.208) gives us further insight into how to limit our karma, that is, not allow karmic fruits to shadow us into future lives. The key passage of the Sutta says:

Indeed, bhikshus, the liberation of mind by lovingkindness should be developed by a woman or a man. Whether you are a woman or a man, you cannot take this body along when you depart (from this world). Bhikshus, this mortal life is but an intermediate state of consciousness.

But the noble disciple knows, “Whatever bad deeds I did before with this physical body, their result will be experienced here and they will not follow me.”

Lovingkindness, if developed in such a way, will lead to the state of non-returning, in the case of a monk who is established in the wisdom found here [in this Teaching], but who has not attained to a higher liberation. (A 10.208,2-3.3) + SD 2.10 (2)

A similar remark is found in the Chinese parallel as preserved in **the Madhyama Āgama**:

If [someone] performs deeds intentionally, I say that he will inevitably have to experience [their] fruits, either in this life or in a later life.<sup>76</sup> If [someone] performs deeds unintentionally, I say that he will not necessarily have to experience [their] fruits.

(MĀ 15/T1.437b-438b; tr Analayo, 2009: 5) [4.5]

**7.2.3.2** The Aṅguttara Commentary on the sentence, “Whatever bad deeds I did before with this physical body, their result will be experienced here and they will not follow me,” explains:

It will be a karma ripening in this existence (*diṭṭha, dhamma, vedanīya, kamma*). They will not follow one to the next existence because the ripening in the next existence (*upapajja, vedanīya*) has been cut off through the practice of lovingkindness. This passage should be understood as a reflection made by a streamwinner or a once-returner. (AA 5:78)

**7.2.3.3** This same principle is summed up in **Samiti, gutta Thera, gāthā**:

kitchen. In Thailand, he is depicted as a forest monk, standing with his alms-bowl and umbrella, reflecting his fame as a forest-monk.

<sup>74</sup> The Buddha is trying to prevent Viḍudabha’s attack on the Sakyas: Ap 387,24 = 1:300; DhA 1:346-349, 357-361; UA 265; cf J 1:133, 4:146 f, 151 f. For stories of the Buddha’s past bad karma, see **Pubba, kamma, piloti**, “The Strands (or Rags) of Previous Karma,” Ap no 387; see Piya Tan, *The Buddha and His Disciples*, 2004: 7.1, 23-24.

<sup>75</sup> S 22.1/3:1-5 (SD 5.4). In simple terms, not letting any physical or mental pain to invade the mind, is *not* to own it: see **Self & Selves**, SD 26.9 (2.4)

<sup>76</sup> A 10.208/5:299,13 and Tib (Beijing ed) *mñon pa, tu* 270a5 (D ju 236b2) speak of 3 time-periods for experiencing karmic retribution: for a discussion, see Hinüber 1971.

Whatever bad previously done by me in other births,  
it is to be felt here and now, as there exists no other occasion (for its fruiting).

*Yaṃ mayā pakataṃ pāpaṃ pubbe aññāsu jātisu,  
idh' eva taṃ vedaniyaṃ, vatthu aññaṃ na vijjati* (Tha 81)

**7.2.3.4** The Commentary explains that the speaker is an arhat (ThaA 1:186,15). Applying this perspective to **the Angulimāla Sutta** (M 86) verse:

Who checks the bad he has done by wholesome deeds,  
he lights up this world like the moon freed from cloud.

*Yassa pāpaṃ kataṃ kammaṃ kusalena pithīyati  
so'maṃ lokam pabhāseti abbhā mutto'va candimā* (M 86/2:104,23 = Tha 872; Dh 17)

says **Analayo**, this “suggests that their reference to closing off bad deeds by what is wholesome may refer to the same principle, in that through having attained awakening the scope for the ripening of karmic retribution is confined to the present life-time” (2009: 4 n12).

Furthermore, **J Main** explains:

Arahats, by means of their attainment, have cut off the causes for rebirth and will only experience the results of past action until their death. In this short span of time, much of their store of *kamma* will not have the opportunity to come to fruition. (2005: 2)

Within that last life-time, however, karma may still bear its fruit, for even the Buddha.<sup>77</sup>

**7.2.3.5** None of these passages support the view that we must face the fruition of all our karma before we can be liberated. As unawakened beings, we have been doing all sorts of unwholesome deeds (and wholesome ones, too) since time immemorial, rooted in ignorance and driven by craving. It would be impossible to experience the fruit of all past karma. Such a notion, as we have seen, however, was held by the Jains [4.2].

**7.2.3.6** The opening passage of the two Sañcetanika Suttas (A 5:206+207) and the (Karaja,kāya) Brahma,vihāra Sutta (A 5:208), as such, is clearly erroneous. As suggested by Analayo's investigation (2009), *this problem passage on karmic fruition arises from an error in textual transmission that preserves a confusion in the use of negations* [5.1]. We now have good reason to rectify these passages, which makes clear Buddhist sense as a result.

## 7.3 THREE TEXTS OR ONE?

### 7.3.1 The puzzle of the two identical suttas

Another important conclusion or probable solution Analayo presents here is that the two Sañcetanika Suttas (A 10.206+207)<sup>78</sup> and the (Karaja,kāya) Brahma,vihāra Sutta (A 10.208) were originally, or at

<sup>77</sup> See Cutler 1997, Guang Xing 2002, Hara 1997: 250-253 & Walters 1990; see also Piya Tan, *The Buddha and His Disciples*, 2004 ch 7.

<sup>78</sup> These are actually 2 identical discourses, **Sañcetanika S 1** (A 1.206/5:292-297) & **Sañcetanika S 2** (A 1.207/-5:297-299). The 2 paras both start and end these 2 discourses.

some early time, *a single text* [5.2]. The question now is how did it split up into three texts? There are two other related questions:

Why are there two identical Sañcetanika Suttas? This puzzle would probably remain unanswered, but is more of a curiosity than a problem. Sañcetanika Sutta 1 is simply duplicated in toto by Sañcetanika Sutta 2.

Why is the section on the “courses of karma” (*kamma,patha*) missing from the (Karaja,kāya) Brahma,vihāra Sutta? [7.3.2]. Analayo says that this is a case of an error in textual transmission, that is, human error.<sup>79</sup> It might be that the reciter or the scribe (or both), at some crucial point of transmission, perhaps during the process of writing the text down at the Alu,vihāra in the 1<sup>st</sup> century BCE,<sup>80</sup> recited or recorded the \*Sañcetanika Brahma,vihāra Sutta [5.2] thrice, two of them identical, but in the third, omitted the passage on the karmic courses (*kamma,patha*). This is another unresolved historical mystery.

### **7.3.2 The puzzle of the missing “course of karma” section**

This puzzle will be discussed in greater detail in our study of **the (Karaja,kāya) Brahma,vihāra Sutta** (A 10.208),<sup>81</sup> and will only be briefly mentioned here. In 1936, **F L Woodward**, in his *Aṅguttara translation* (PTS 1936), notices in his footnote that the Sutta’s account of lovingkindness meditation “is introduced without apparent reason thus suddenly” (A:W 5:193 n1). **Tilmann Vetter**, too, noted the problem, without resolving it (1988).

Nearly two decades later, **Choong Mun-keat** (2004) picks up from where Woodward left off, noting that Woodward “fails to mention a second problem: the sutta contains no set of ten items that might account for its inclusion in the Book of Tens” (2004:5), a fact also echoed by **Analayo** (2009: 11).

Choong, using the Chinese parallel of the (Karaja,kāya) Brahma,vihāra Sutta, that is, **MĀ 15** (T437b-27-438a5), locates the missing passage in a Chinese parallel translation in the *Madhyama Āgama* (MĀ 15/T1.437b-438b). In 2004, after listening to Choong presenting his paper in Singapore,<sup>82</sup> I investigated further and discovered that the missing passage is actually in the Sañcetanika Sutta (A 10.206+207), which comes just before the (Karaja,kāya) Brahma,vihāra Sutta (A 10.208) in the Karaja,kāya Vagga of the *Aṅguttara*. In due course, as we have noted, Analayo surmised that the three discourses were probably originally a single sutta, but split into three while in transmission [7.3.1].<sup>83</sup>

### **7.4 JAIN INFLUENCE OR SKILLFUL MEANS?**

The early Buddhist discourses are full of debates, stories and references to other prevalent religious individuals and groups in India of the Buddha’s time. Besides references to the brahmins, the early texts often contain teachings given in response to the Jains. Some of the key discourses relating to Jains found throughout the 4 Nikāyas, are:<sup>84</sup>

<b>Sāmañña,phala Sutta</b>	summary of Nāta,putta’s teachings	D 2.27-29/1:57-59
<b>Cūla Dukkha-k,khandha Sutta</b>	the austerities of the Jains	M 14.15-22/1:93-95
<b>Upāli Sutta</b>	Upāli the houselord takes refuge	M 56/1:371-387

<sup>79</sup> Analayo 2009: 14 n40.

<sup>80</sup> The Alu,vihāra or Āloka,vihāra is located about 20 km (12 mi) north of Kandy, near Matale, in the Central Province: see E W Adikaram, *Early History of Buddhism in Ceylon*, 1946: 78 f.

<sup>81</sup> See **(Karaja,kāya) Brahma,vihāra S** (A 10.208/5:299-301), SD 2.10 Intro.

<sup>82</sup> Chung, “Exploring Theravāda Studies: Intellectual trends and the future of a field of study,” National Univ of Singapore, 12-14 Aug 2004.

<sup>83</sup> For further discussion, see **(Karaja,kāya) Brahma,vihāra S** (A 10.208/5:299-301), SD 2.10 (4).

<sup>84</sup> In *Niganṭha Nāta,putta*, see **Upāli S** (M 56), SD 27.1 (2.1).

<b>Abhaya Rāja,kumāra Sutta</b>	prince Abhaya takes refuge	M 58/1:392-396
<b>Deva,daha Sutta</b>	analysis and criticism of Jainism	M 101/2:214
<b>Saṅkha Sutta</b>	Asi,bandhaka,putta takes refuge	S 42.8/4:317-322
<b>(Asaddhamma) Nigaṇṭha Sutta</b>	criticism of the Jains	A 10.78/5:150

The social milieu of Buddha's time was characterized by religious growth and exchanges. There were numerous wandering mendicants and sages giving teachings and debating. Friendly meetings and exchanges were common enough. **The Upāli Sutta** (M 56), for example, opens with the nirgrantha (Jain ascetic) Dīgha,tapassī, after his alms-meal, visiting the Buddha near Nālandā for a friendly exchange.<sup>85</sup>

Understandably, the monks would discuss the differences between Buddhist teachings and Jain teachings, and in so doing, they would be quite familiar with Jain doctrines and vocabulary [6]. It is possible that a Sutta reciter who was familiar with Jain teachings on karma could have made a verbal slip in the case of the opening three discourses in question [2.1] and recited *appaṭisaṃviditvā* instead of *paṭisaṃviditvā* [7.2.3].

## 7.5 CONCLUSION

### 7.5.1 PARIYĀYA

**7.5.1.1** The observations and solution proposed by various scholars are very useful, especially for those who desire to have a better understanding of the Buddhist textual tradition. Look at the puzzling passage in question [2.1], another solution might be possible. Let us look at the Pali passage again:

*Nāhaṃ bhikkhave sañcetanikānaṃ kammānaṃ katānaṃ upacitānaṃ appaṭisaṃviditvā  
vyantībhāvaṃ vadāmi, tañ ca kho diṭṭhe va dhamme upapajjaṃ vā apare vā **pariyāye**.* [5.1]

As we have already noted [2.1], Buddhaghosa takes the opening verse, *apare vā pariyāye*, as *apara,-pariyāye* ("at another time"). However, I think it is possible to take the phrase as it is, that is, to take *pariyāye* as a separate word. In fact, if we do this, without conflating the two words, the passage becomes very clear.

**7.5.1.2** Now, *pariyāye* is not an easy term,<sup>86</sup> but here, I think, we can take it as meaning "in a manner of speaking" or "in the context of teaching," resulting in this translation of the passage in question:

In a manner of speaking, bhikshus, I say that actions willed, performed and accumulated will *not* become extinct as long as their results have not been experienced, be it in this life, in the next life or other.

As we have noted, this statement here seems to be supported by various other passages [7.2.1]. However, the Buddha is not asserting that we must face all our past karma before we can be liberated. What he is saying here is that this is likely to be the case with samsara, which is endless. Theoretically speaking, we need to exhaust all our past karma before being free of them. But is this possible? It just isn't.

<sup>85</sup> M 56.2-4/1:371-373 @ SD 27.1.

<sup>86</sup> See SD 50.25 (1.4) & *Pariyāya nipariyāya*, SD 68.2.

7.5.1.3 Then, the following passage continues:

Yet, bhikshus, I do *not* say that there is an ending of suffering *without* having experienced (the fruits) of intentional deeds done and accumulated. [§1b]

This sentence means that past karma may still fruit for a liberated person when the conditions are right, but of course, such a person is not mentally troubled by such occurrences. [7.2.2]

### 7.5.2 KNOWING AND SEEING

This academic or full-learning (*pariyatti*) exercise we have done should remind us that, unlike the *book-centred* religions, whose dogmas are contained in the written word, Buddhism as a *truth-centred* teaching, generally treats its scriptures as primary sources of truth, but in any uncertainty or difficulties, personal spiritual experiences (a still clear mind), or better, the awakened mind of a morally virtuous and wise practitioner, is held in the highest regard.

However, in the case of the problem passages or expressions found in the Sañcetanika Sutta and the related texts we have here discussed, the issues are just as effectively resolved by the historical critical method, without downplaying the priority of true spiritual experience.

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## Sañcetanika Sutta 1

### The First Discourse on the Intentional

A 10.206 = A 10.207

[292]

1 “Bhikshus, I do *not* say that there is an ending of intentional deeds, done and accumulated, having experienced<sup>87</sup> them [their results], whether right here in the present, or in the next life, or in a subsequent life.<sup>88</sup>

1.2 Yet, bhikshus, I do *not* say, too, that there is a making an end of suffering, having experienced (the fruits) of intentional deeds done and accumulated.<sup>89</sup>

<sup>87</sup> “Having experienced,” *paṭisaṃveditvā* or *paṭisaṃveditvā*, instead of MSS *appaṭisaṃveditvā* or *appaṭisaṃveditvā* see Intro (2.1) & (5).

<sup>88</sup> *Nāhaṃ bhikkhave sañcetanikānaṃ kammānaṃ katānaṃ upacitānaṃ paṭisaṃveditvā vyantībhāvaṃ vadāmi, tañ ca kho diṭṭhe va dhamme upapajjāṃ vā apare vā pariyāye*. Following the **Āgama** parallel [4.5], another reconstruction is possible: \* “Bhikshus, I say that (the results of) intentional deeds done and accumulated, *would be experienced*, whether right here in the present, or in the next life, or in a subsequent life.” Anyway, this 1<sup>st</sup> sentence refers to karma itself, while the foll sentence, to the fruit (*vipāka*).

Foll the reading **upapajjāṃ** or **uppajjāṃ** (rather than vl *uppajje*, & Norman 1997:166), I have here tr in keeping with the Sutta tradition. Buddhaghosa “corrects” *upapajjāṃ* here and elsewhere to be a tatpurusha, as *upapajje* or *uppajje* (A 1:134,23,28 = 135,2; 5:292,4 = 294,28 = 297,10 = 298,17 = *anantare atta,bhāve*, AA 5:76; Vism 19.14/-601); cf *upapajja,vedanīyaṃ kammaṃ* (Kvu 611,23). Comy explains this sentence (wherever it occurs) as relating “three kinds of karma” (*tīṇi kammāni*, according to the time of their ripening (*vipāka*) or fruiting (*phala*) (AA 2:210, 222): see (**Kamma**) **Nidāna S** (A 3.33), SD 4.14 (4). See also Intro (1).

## Unwholesome courses of conduct

1.3 Bhikshus, threefold is the defiling fault of **bodily action**<sup>90</sup> due to unwholesome volition, with painful outcome, painful results;<sup>91</sup>

fourfold is the defiling fault of **verbal action** due to unwholesome volition, with painful outcome, painful results;

threefold is the defiling fault of **mental action** due to unwholesome volition, with painful outcome, painful results.

### THE 3 WRONG BODILY ACTIONS

1.4 And how, bhikshus, is the defiling fault of **bodily action** due to unwholesome volition, with painful outcome, painful results *threefold*?

**2** (1) Here, bhikshus, a certain person harms living beings: cruel, bloody-handed, given to violence and killing, merciless to living beings.

(2) Here again, he takes what is not given: in a village or in a forest,<sup>92</sup> he takes by way of theft, the possessions of others that are of service to them

(3) Here again, he commits sexual misconduct: falling into such a conduct with those under the care of their mother, under the care of their father, [under the care of their parents,] under the care of their brother, under the care of their sister, under the care of a relative, one with a husband, one under the care of the law,<sup>93</sup> even with one adorned with a string of garlands [in betrothal to another].<sup>94</sup>

Thus, bhikshus, is the defiling fault of bodily action due to unwholesome volition, with painful outcome, painful results threefold.

### THE 4 WRONG VERBAL ACTIONS

2.2 And how, bhikshus, is the defiling fault of **verbal action** due to unwholesome volition, with painful outcome, painful results *fourfold*? [293]

**3** (4) Here, bhikshus, a certain person speaks falsehood:

<sup>89</sup> *Na tve vā'ham bhikkhave sañcetanikānaṃ kammānaṃ katānaṃ upacitānaṃ appatisamviditvā dukkhass'anta-kiriyaṃ vadāmi.* These 2 paras also open **Brahma, vihāra S** (A 10.208,1/5:299), SD 2.10. Also note that this sentence refers to the fruit (*vipāka*) of karma while the earlier sentence [§1.1] to karma itself (the intention and the act).

<sup>90</sup> "Defiling fault," *-sandosa, byāpatti*.

<sup>91</sup> "With painful outcome, with painful results," *dukkh'udrayā dukkha, vipākā*. As at **Amba, laṅghikā Rāhul'ovāda S** (M 7.9/1:416).

<sup>92</sup> "In a village or in a forest," *gāma, gataṃ vā araṇṇa'gataṃ va*, lit "gone to the village or gone to the forest".

<sup>93</sup> Comy: *Yo itthan, nāmaṃ itthiṃ gacchati, tassa ettako daṇḍo'ti evaṃ gāmaṃ vā gehaṃ vā vithiṃ vā uddissa ṭhapita, daṇḍā, pana saparidaṇḍā nāma*, "This penalty is placed in connection with a village, house or street, thus: 'Whoever goes to such and such a woman gets such a penalty'—this is called *sa, paridaṇḍā* (MA 2:330). This apparently refers to where prostitution is illegal. In modern terms, this rule also covers "wards of the court," ie, minors involved in some kind of legal process or adjudication.

<sup>94</sup> *Mātu, rakkhitā pitu, rakkhitā [mātā, pitu, rakkhitā] bhātu, rakkhitā, bhagini, rakkhitā ñāti, rakkhitā sa-s, sāmikā sa, paridaṇḍā antamaso mālā, guṇa, parirakkhitā pi.* These "protected women" are listed as ten in the Vinaya as *mātā, rakkhitā, pitu, rakkhitā, mātā, pitu, rakkhitā, bhātura, rakkhitā, bhaginī, rakkhitā, ñāti, rakkhitā, gotta, rakkhitā* (those under the care of the clan), *dhamma, rakkhitā* (those under the care of custom)—the preceding refer to minors—*sārakkhā* (those "under (natural) protection," ie the betrothed [*mālā, guṇa, parirakkhitā*] and married women [*sa-s, sāmikā*], incl women of the royal harem), *sa, paridaṇḍā* (V3:139). The "one with a husband" and "one who has been garlanded in betrothal to another" of **Sāleyyaka S** (M 41) come under the category of *sārakkhā* in the Vinaya. On *sa, paridaṇḍā*, see prec n.

when questioned as a witness before a council, before a congregation, in the midst of relatives, in the midst of a guild [a company], in the midst of the royal court [a court of law] and questioned thus:

‘Sir, tell us what you know!’

Not knowing, he says he knows, or knowing, he says he knows not;

having not seen, he says he saw, or having seen, he says he did not see—

consciously lying thus for his own sake, for the sake of others, or for some small material<sup>95</sup> gain.

(5) Here again, he speaks divisive words:

what he has heard here (from others), he repeats it there (to others) to divide them;

what he has heard there, he repeats it here to divide them—

thus he divides the united,

who encourages the divided (to remain so) [rejoices in division];

being pleased at discord,<sup>96</sup>

enjoying discord, delighting in discord, saying words conducive to discord.<sup>97</sup>

(6) Here again, he speaks harsh words—

he utters words that are rough, hard,

hurting to others, offensive to others,

connected with anger,<sup>98</sup>

inconducive to mental concentration.

(7) Here again, he chatters frivolously [utters useless talk]—

he speaks at the wrong time, speaks what is false, speaks what is unbeneficial,

he speaks what is not the teaching, what is not the discipline;

he speaks words not worth treasuring,

spoken out of time, poorly reasoned [baseless],

undefined [rambling], unconnected with the goal.<sup>99</sup>

Thus, bhikshus, is the defiling fault of verbal action due to unwholesome volition, with painful outcome, painful results fourfold.

### THE 3 WRONG MENTAL ACTIONS

3.2 And how, bhikshus, is the defiling fault of **mental action** due to unwholesome volition, with painful outcome, painful results *threefold*?

**4** (8) Here, monk, a certain person is covetous—he covets the possessions of others that are of service to them, thinking, ‘Oh, may what belongs to others become mine!’

(9) Here again, he is one with a mind of ill will, a mind of wicked thoughts, thinking, ‘May these beings be killed or slaughtered or wiped out or destroyed or not exist!’

(10) Here again, he is one with wrong view, with distorted vision, thinking,<sup>100</sup> ‘There is no giving,<sup>101</sup> no offering, no sacrifice. There is no fruit or result of good or bad actions. This world does not exist, the

<sup>95</sup> “Material,” *āmisā*, alt tr “worldly”.

<sup>96</sup> “Discord,” *vagga*, fr *vi-aggā* (Skt *vyagra*) opp of *sāmagga*, “concord.” See M 1:286; It 11 = V 2:205.

<sup>97</sup> On dealing with slander, see eg **Brahma, jāla S** (D 1,1.5/1:4).

<sup>98</sup> “Connected with anger,” *kodha, sāmāntā*, adv of (adj) *samanta*, “all around.”

<sup>99</sup> “Unconnected with the goal,” ie, unrelated to the goal of cultivating moral virtue, of mental cultivation, of wisdom, and of liberation.

<sup>100</sup> In **Sāmañña, phala S**, this view is attributed to Ajita Kesakambalī, the hair-blanket ascetic (D 2,23/1:55). He wore a cloak of human hair. His materialist view is answered in **Apañṇaka S** (M 60,5-12/1:401-404).

<sup>101</sup> “There is no giving,” *n’atthi dinnarū*. MA 2:332 = DA 165 says that this means there is no fruit of giving. Cf D 1:55; M 1:401, 515; S 3:206.



next world does not exist;<sup>102</sup> there is no mother, no father;<sup>103</sup> there are no spontaneously born beings;<sup>104</sup> there are no brahmins and recluses who, **[294]** living rightly and practising rightly, having directly known and realized for themselves this world and the hereafter, proclaim them.<sup>105</sup>

Thus, monk, is the defiling fault of mental action due to unwholesome volition, with painful outcome, painful results threefold.

#### DISADVANTAGE OF THE UNWHOLESOME COURSES

**5** Bhikshus, as a result of the 3 kinds of defiling fault of bodily action due to unwholesome volition, beings, after death, when the body has broken up, reappear in *a plane of misery, a bad destination, a lower realm, in hell*.

As a result of the 4 kinds of defiling fault of verbal action due to unwholesome volition, beings, after death, when the body has broken up, reappear in *a plane of misery, a bad destination, a lower realm, in hell*.

As a result of the 3 kinds of defiling fault of mental action due to unwholesome volition, beings, after death, when the body has broken up, reappear in *a plane of misery, a bad destination, a lower realm, in hell*.

#### SIMILE OF THE DICE THROW

**6** Just as a **perfect throw of the dice**,<sup>106</sup> which when thrown upwards, would come to rest for sure wherever it falls—

so too as a result of *the threefold defiling fault of bodily action* due to unwholesome volition, beings, after death, when the body has broken up, reappear in a plane of misery, a bad destination, a lower realm, in hell.

6.2 Just as a perfect throw of the dice, which when thrown upwards, would come to rest for sure wherever it falls—

so too as a result of *the fourfold defiling fault of verbal action* due to unwholesome volition, beings, after death, when the body has broken up, reappear in a plane of misery, a bad destination, a lower realm, in hell.

6.3 Just as a perfect throw of the dice, which when thrown upwards, would come to rest for sure wherever it falls—

so too as a result of *the threefold defiling fault of mental action* due to unwholesome volition, beings, after death, when the body has broken up, reappear in a plane of misery, a bad destination, a lower realm, in hell.

<sup>102</sup> “This world does not exist, the next world does not exist.” Comys explain that “(a) ‘this world does not exist’ means that when one is established in the next world, this world does not exist; (b) ‘the next world does not exist’ means that when one is established in this world, the next world does not exist.” (MA 2:332 = DA 1:165). Deeds done in such a deterministic system would not carry over into the afterlife, even if this view concedes to a hereafter.

<sup>103</sup> “There is no father, no mother.” Comys explain “there is no fruit of good or of bad behaviour (towards them)” (MA 2:332 = DA 1:165).

<sup>104</sup> *Opapātika*, said of the rebirth of a non-returner, but here also refers to all divine and hell beings. See **Mahāli S** (D 1:27, 156).

<sup>105</sup> Comy: This last statement is made regarding the non-existence of “all-knowing” (*sabbaññū*) Buddhas (MA 2:322), in other words, awakening is impossible.

<sup>106</sup> “Throw of the dice,” *maṇi*, which Comy glosses as *pāsaka*, “dice, throw of the dice” (AA 5:77).

7 Bhikshus, I do *not* say that there is an ending of intentional deeds done and accumulated, *having experienced* them [their results], whether right here in the present, or in the next life, or in a subsequent life.

And, bhikshus, there is no making an end of suffering *without* one's experiencing of deeds one has intentionally done and built up, I say.

## Wholesome courses of conduct

7.2 Bhikshus, threefold is the virtue<sup>107</sup> of **bodily action** due to wholesome volition, with pleasurable outcome, pleasurable results;<sup>108</sup> fourfold is the virtue of **verbal action** due to wholesome volition, with pleasurable outcome, pleasurable results; threefold is the virtue of **mental action** [295] due to wholesome volition, with pleasurable outcome, pleasurable results.

### THE 3 WHOLESOME BODILY ACTIONS

8 And how, bhikshus, is the virtue of **bodily action** due to wholesome volition, with pleasurable outcome, pleasurable results threefold?

(1) Here, monk, a certain person, having given up harming living beings, refrains from harming living beings, lays down rod and sword, conscientious, merciful, dwells beneficial and compassionate to all living beings.

(2) Here again, having given up taking the not-given, he refrains from taking the not-given—in a village or in a forest, he does not take by way of theft, the possessions of others that are of service to them.

(3) Here again, having given up sexual misconduct, he refrains from sexual misconduct—  
not falling into such a conduct with those under the care of their mother, under the care of their father,  
[under the care of their parents,] under the care of their brother, under the care of their sister,  
under the care of relatives, one with a husband, one under the care of the law,  
not even with one adorned with a string of garlands [in betrothal to another].

Thus, bhikshus, is the virtue of **bodily action** due to wholesome volition, with pleasurable outcome, pleasurable results threefold.

### THE 4 WHOLESOME VERBAL ACTIONS

9 And how, bhikshus, is the virtue of **verbal action** due to wholesome volition, with pleasurable outcome, pleasurable results fourfold?

(4) Here, bhikshus, a certain person, having given up speaking falsehood, refrains from speaking falsehood—

when questioned as a witness before a council, before a congregation, in the midst of relatives,  
in the midst of a guild [or company], in the midst of the royal court [a court of law]  
and questioned thus: 'Sir, tell us what you know!'

Not knowing, he says he knows not, or knowing, he says he knows;

having not seen, he says he did not see, or having seen, he says he saw—

not consciously telling a lie thus for his own sake, for the sake of others, or (even) for some small material gain.

(5) Here again, having given up divisive speech, he refrains from divisive speech—

<sup>107</sup> "Virtue," *sampatti*, "success, attainment, happiness, bliss, fortune" (A 4:26, 160); opp *vipatti* = *byāpatti* or *vyāpatti*.

<sup>108</sup> "With painful outcome, with painful results," *dukkh'udrayā dukkha, vipākā*. As at **Amba, laṭṭhikā Rāhu'ovāda S** (M 7,9/1:416).

what he has heard here (from others), he does not repeat it there (to others) to divide them;  
 what he has heard there, he does not repeat it here to divide them—  
 thus he is one who unites the disunited, [296] or who discourages the divided (from remaining so)  
 [rejoices not in division];  
 he is pleased at concord, enjoying concord, delighting in concord, saying words conducive to  
 concord.

(6) Here again, having given up harsh speech, he refrains from harsh speech—  
 he utters words that are blameless, pleasant to the ear, touching the heart, urbane, loved by the masses,  
 pleasant to the masses.

(7) Here again, having given up useless talk, he refrains from useless talk—  
 he speaks at the right time, speaks what is true, speaks what is beneficial,  
 speaks what is the teaching, what is the discipline;  
 he speaks words worth treasuring, spoken in time, well-reasoned, well-defined [not rambling],  
 connected with the goal. [§3 (7)]

Thus, bhikshus, is the virtue of **verbal action** due to wholesome volition, with pleasurable outcome,  
 pleasurable results fourfold.

#### THE 3 WHOLESOME MENTAL ACTIONS

**10** And how, bhikshus, is the virtue of **mental action** due to wholesome volition, with pleasurable  
 outcome, pleasurable results **threefold**?

(8) Here, monk, a certain person is not covetous—he covets not the possessions of others that are  
 of service to them, thinking, ‘Oh, may what belongs to others become mine!’

(9) Here again, he is one with a mind free of ill will, a mind without any bad thought, thinking,  
 ‘May these beings be free from hate;  
 may they be free from suffering;<sup>109</sup>  
 may they be free from trouble;<sup>110</sup>  
 may they continue to be happy!’<sup>111</sup>

(10) Here again, he is one with right view, without distorted vision, thinking,  
 ‘There is what is given, what is offered, what is sacrificed.

There is fruit and result of good or bad actions.

There is this world, there is the next world.

There is mother, there is father.

There are spontaneously born beings.

There are brahmins and recluses who, living rightly and practising rightly, having directly known and  
 realized for themselves this world and the hereafter, proclaim them.’

Thus, monk, is the virtue of **mental action** due to wholesome volition, with pleasurable outcome,  
 pleasurable results threefold.

<sup>109</sup> “Be free from suffering,” *avyapajjhā* (also *avyāpajja*; vl *avyābajjha*): **(1)** not to be injured or harmed; harmless  
 or non-injuring; free from suffering (*niddukkha*, ItA ad It 16,5\*): M 1:90,1; A 3:285,17 = 5:329,25, 5:210,14; J  
 6:287,7\*; M 2:115,22-23; see CPD <sup>1</sup>a-vyāpajja; **(2)** freedom from suffering: U 10,20\* = V 1:3,28\*; J 6:286,20\*; S  
 4:371,29; A 4:246,8; Dhs 33, 36, 313, 1056; Vbh 169,29.

<sup>110</sup> “Be free from trouble,” *anīghā*, resolved as *an + īgha*, instead of *a + nigha* (affliction, trouble, woe). The ideas  
 connoted by *a-nigha* overlap with the preceding “free from hate, free from suffering”.

<sup>111</sup> *Ime sattā averā avyāpajjhā anīghā sukhī attānaṃ pariharantu*. Cf A 2:3, 228, 253. On this subsection, see  
**Brahma, vihāra**, SD 38.5 (4.1).

## BENEFIT OF WHOLESOME COURSES

**11** Bhikshus, as a result of the 3 kinds of virtue of bodily action due to wholesome volition, beings, after death, when the body has broken up, reappear in a state of joy, in a happy destination, in heaven.

11.2 As a result of the 4 kinds of virtue of verbal action due to wholesome volition, beings, after death, when the body has broken up, reappear in a state of joy, in a happy destination, in heaven.

11.3 As a result of the 3 kinds of virtue of mental action due to wholesome volition, beings, after death, when the body has broken up, reappear in a state of joy, in a happy destination, in heaven.

## SIMILE OF THE DICE THROW

**12** Just as a **perfect throw of the dice**, which when thrown upwards, would come to rest for sure wherever it falls—

so too as a result of *the threefold virtue of bodily action* due to wholesome volition, **[297]** beings, after death, when the body has broken up, reappear in a state of joy, in a happy destination, in heaven.

12.2 Just as a perfect throw of the dice, which when thrown upwards, would come to rest for sure wherever it falls—

so too as a result of *the fourfold virtue of verbal action* due to wholesome volition, beings, after death, when the body has broken up, reappear in a state of joy, in a happy destination, in heaven.

12.3 Just as a perfect throw of the dice, which when thrown upwards, would come to rest for sure wherever it falls—

so too as a result of *the threefold virtue of mental action* due to wholesome volition, beings, after death, when the body has broken up, reappear in a state of joy, in a happy destination, in heaven.

## CONCLUSION

**13** <sup>112</sup>Bhikshus, I do *not* say that there is a making an end of intentional deeds done and accumulated, *having experienced* them [their results], whether right here in the present, or in the next life, or in a subsequent life.

13.2 Yet, bhikshus, I do *not* say, too, that there is a making an end of suffering, having experienced (the fruits) of intentional deeds done and accumulated.” [§1]

— evaṃ —

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<sup>112</sup> For Pali text & nn of these 2 paras, see §1a above.